The legal and regulatory aspects of international remittances within the SADC region by Mbalekwa, Simbarashe
i 
 
THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
REMITTANCES WITHIN THE SADC 
REGION 
 
by 
SIMBARASHE MBALEKWA 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of 
MAGISTER LEGUM 
in the 
faculty of law 
at 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
JANUARY 2011                                                                 Supervisor: Professor V.L Davids 
  
i 
 
DECLARATION BY STUDENT 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FULL NAME:             SIMBABARASHE       MBALEKWA          
 
 
STUDENT NUMBER: 203018869 
 
 
QUALIFICATION:              LLM 
 
 
DECLARATION:  
 
 
 
In accordance with Rule G4.6.3, I hereby declare that the above-mentioned dissertation is my 
own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment to another University 
or for another qualification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE:  ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
DATE:   ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank the following people who each made a unique contribution to the 
completion of this dissertation: 
 
 Professor Vivienne-Lawack Davids; for agreeing to be my supervisor and for the 
guidance she has provided. 
 Dawn Prinsloo the law faculty libararian; for the assistance rendered in finding 
material relevant to my study. 
 Dennis Gondoza and Alan Gombera; for persuading me to further my studies.  
Without your advice I would not have embarked on what has proven to be an 
enlightening and truly beneficial experience. 
 To my family who continually inspire and motivate me to go beyond what I often 
mistakenly perceive to be my limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
 
Declaration...............................................................................................................................i 
Aknowledgements...................................................................................................................ii 
Table of contents.....................................................................................................................iii 
Executive Summary................................................................................................................xii 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... i 
 
1        INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 
2        THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE INDUSTRY ........................ 2 
3        PROBLEM STATEMENT ....................................................................................................... 3 
3 1         The South African legal and regulatory framework pertaining to international remittances .... 5 
3 1 1       Exchange control laws ............................................................................................................. 5 
3 1 2       Immigration laws ..................................................................................................................... 6 
3 1 3       Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism law ................................... 6 
3 1 4       Summary .................................................................................................................................. 7 
4         OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................................... 7 
5         SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ........................................................................................ 7 
6             SCOPE OF STUDY ............................................................................................................... 10 
7             METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................ 10 
 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................................................ 12 
 
1             INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 12 
iv 
 
2         NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA ....................................... 12 
2 1          Background ............................................................................................................................ 12 
2 2          South Africa ........................................................................................................................... 13 
2 2 1       Organisation ........................................................................................................................... 13 
2 2 1 1    The customer network ............................................................................................................ 13 
2 2 1 2    The payment network ............................................................................................................ 14 
2 2 1 3    The clearing network ............................................................................................................. 14 
2 2 1 4    The Settlement network ......................................................................................................... 14 
2 2 1 5    The Continuous Linked Settlement network ......................................................................... 15 
2 2 2       Oversight of the NPS ............................................................................................................. 15 
2 3          Zambia ................................................................................................................................... 18 
2 3 1       Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 18 
2 3 2       Organisation ........................................................................................................................... 18 
2 3 2 1    The DDACC and PIC systems ............................................................................................... 19 
2 3 2 2    The ZIPS system .................................................................................................................... 19 
2 3 2 3    The PRPS system ................................................................................................................... 20 
2 3 3       Oversight of the NPS ............................................................................................................. 20 
2 4          Zimbabwe .............................................................................................................................. 21 
2 4 1       Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 21 
2 4 2       Organisation ........................................................................................................................... 21 
2 4 2 1    Clearing .................................................................................................................................. 21 
2 4 2 2    Settlement .............................................................................................................................. 22 
2 4 3       Oversight ................................................................................................................................ 22 
3         INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE TRANSACTIONS ..................................................... 23 
3 1          Background ............................................................................................................................ 23 
3 2          The dynamics of an international remittance transaction ...................................................... 24 
3 2 1       Participants ............................................................................................................................. 24 
v 
 
3 2 1 1    Sender and recipient ............................................................................................................... 24 
3 2 1 2    Remittance service provider .................................................................................................. 24 
3 2 2       Remittance networks .............................................................................................................. 25 
3 2 2 1    Unilateral network ................................................................................................................. 25 
3 2 2 2    Franchised network ................................................................................................................ 25 
3 2 2 3    Negotiated network ................................................................................................................ 26 
3 2 2 4    Open network ......................................................................................................................... 26 
3 2 3       The remittance process .......................................................................................................... 27 
3 2 3 1    Capturing ............................................................................................................................... 27 
3 2 3 2    Messaging .............................................................................................................................. 28 
3 2 3 3    Settlement .............................................................................................................................. 28 
3 2 3 4    Disbursement ......................................................................................................................... 29 
3 3          Remittance channels .............................................................................................................. 32 
3 3 1       Formal channels ..................................................................................................................... 33 
3 3 1 1    Banks ..................................................................................................................................... 33 
3 3 1 2    Money transfer operators ....................................................................................................... 35 
3 3 1 3    The Post Office ...................................................................................................................... 36 
3 3 2       Informal remittance channels ................................................................................................. 37 
3 4 3       Hawala ................................................................................................................................... 39 
3 4 3 1    Background ............................................................................................................................ 39 
3 4 3 2    The dynamics of a hawala remittance transaction ................................................................. 39 
3 4 3 3    Why hawala remittances continue to be utilised .................................................................... 42 
3 4 4       Channel preferences ............................................................................................................... 43 
3 5          Factors that influence the use of informal remittance channels ............................................. 44 
3 5 1       Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 44 
3 5 2       Costs....................................................................................................................................... 44 
3 5 2 1    Lack of transparency .............................................................................................................. 45 
vi 
 
3 5 2 2    Infrastructural inadequacies ................................................................................................... 46 
3 5 2 3    The legal and regulatory environment ................................................................................... 47 
3 5 2 4    Lack of competitive market conditions .................................................................................. 47 
3 5 2 5    Risk ........................................................................................................................................ 48 
4             CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 48 
 
CHAPTER 3: EXCHANGE CONTROL ......................................................................................... 50 
 
1             INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 50 
2             THE HISTORY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA ................................. 51 
3             THE CURRENT FACE OF EXCHANGE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA ..................... 54 
3 1          The Exchange Control Regulations ....................................................................................... 54 
3 2          The purpose of exchange control ........................................................................................... 54 
3 3          Exchange control and the remittance industry ....................................................................... 55 
3 3 1       Authorised dealer licenses ..................................................................................................... 56 
3 3 2       The SARB Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System ........................ 58 
3 3 2 1    The purpose of the SARB Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System 60 
3 3 3       The residential status of the remitter ...................................................................................... 60 
3 3 3 1    Residents ................................................................................................................................ 61 
3 3 3 2    Non-residents ......................................................................................................................... 61 
3 3 3 3    Temporary residents............................................................................................................... 62 
3 3 4       The nature of the transaction .................................................................................................. 62 
3 4          Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 63 
3 4 1       The impact of Exchange Control Laws on potential remitters .............................................. 64 
3 4 2       The impact of Exchange Control laws on the level of competition within the remittance 
industry.................................................................................................................................................65 
3 4 2 1    Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 65 
3 4 2 2   „Competition‟ .......................................................................................................................... 65 
vii 
 
3 4 2 3    The competitive environment of the South African remittance industry ............................... 67 
3 4 2 4    Exclusive agreements............................................................................................................. 68 
3 4 2 5    Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 71 
4             EXCHANGE CONTROL IN ZAMBIA ................................................................................ 72 
4 1          Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 72 
4 2          The Financial Sector Development Plan ................................................................................ 72 
4 3          The Banking and Financial Services Act ............................................................................... 73 
4 4          The National Payment Systems Act....................................................................................... 75 
4 5          The National Payment System Act (Money transmission services guidelines) ..................... 76 
4 6          Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 77 
5             EXCHANGE CONTROL IN ZIMBABWE .......................................................................... 79 
5 1          Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 79 
5 2         The legal and regulatory framework ....................................................................................... 80 
5 3          Money Transfer Agencies ...................................................................................................... 81 
5 4          Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 83 
6             CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 84 
 
CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRATION LAWS ........................................................................................... 89 
1             INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 89 
2             SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION ENVIRONMENT ..................................................... 90 
2 1          Background ............................................................................................................................ 90 
2 2          The Immigration Act .............................................................................................................. 91 
2 2 1       Quota work permit ................................................................................................................. 91 
2 2 2       General work permit .............................................................................................................. 92 
2 2 3       Exceptional skills permit ........................................................................................................ 94 
2 2 4       Corporate permit .................................................................................................................... 94 
2 2 5       Intra-company transfer permit ............................................................................................... 94 
2 2 6       Business permit ...................................................................................................................... 95 
viii 
 
2 3         The Duty to ascertain the legality of a client‟s presence in South Africa ............................... 95 
2 4         Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 96 
2 5         The United States of America: Matricular card ...................................................................... 97 
2 6          Regularising Zimbabwean migration to South Africa ........................................................... 98 
3             ZAMBIAN IMMIGRATION ENVIRONMENT ................................................................ 100 
3 1          Background .......................................................................................................................... 100 
3 2          The Immigration and Deportation Act ................................................................................. 100 
4             ZIMBABWEAN IMMIGRATION ENVIRONMENT ....................................................... 101 
4 1          Background .......................................................................................................................... 101 
4 2          The Immigration Act ............................................................................................................ 103 
5             CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 104 
1             INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 107 
2             MONEY LAUNDERING .................................................................................................... 108 
2 1          The money laundering process ............................................................................................ 108 
2 1 1       Placement ............................................................................................................................. 109 
2 1 2       Layering ............................................................................................................................... 109 
2 1 3       Integration ............................................................................................................................ 110 
2 2          The three dimensions of money laundering ......................................................................... 110 
2 3          The importance of suppressing money laundering .............................................................. 111 
3             TERRORISM AND ITS FINANCING ............................................................................... 112 
3 1          Terrorism ............................................................................................................................. 112 
3 2          The financing of terrorism ................................................................................................... 114 
4             THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ...................................................................... 114 
4 1          Background .......................................................................................................................... 114 
4 2          The FATF 40+9 recommendations ...................................................................................... 115 
4 2 1       Implications that the recommendations bear for the remittance industry ............................ 116 
5             SOUTH AFRICA: AML AND CFT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT .. 117 
5 1          Money laundering in South Africa....................................................................................... 117 
ix 
 
5 2          Anti-Money laundering legislation ...................................................................................... 118 
5 2 1       AML measures: FICA.......................................................................................................... 119 
5 3          CFT legislation .................................................................................................................... 120 
6             ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 121 
6 1          CDD obligation imposed by FICA ...................................................................................... 122 
6 1 1       Customer identification and verification.............................................................................. 122 
6 1 2       The provision and verification of a residential address ....................................................... 125 
6 1 2 1    Enhancing financial inclusion: Exemption 17 ..................................................................... 126 
6 2          Impact of AML and CFT measures upon the remittance industry ....................................... 128 
6 2 1       Access to formal remittance services ................................................................................... 128 
6 2 2       Compliance costs ................................................................................................................. 129 
6 2 3       Cross border networking ...................................................................................................... 130 
7             ZAMBIA .............................................................................................................................. 131 
7 1          Background .......................................................................................................................... 131 
7 2          AML legislation ................................................................................................................... 132 
7 2 1       BoZ AML Directives, 2004 ................................................................................................. 133 
7 2 1 1    CDD requisites ..................................................................................................................... 133 
7 2 1 2    Reporting of suspicious transactions and activities ............................................................. 135 
7 2 2       Practical application of AML measures ............................................................................... 135 
7 3          Anti-terrorism legislation ..................................................................................................... 136 
7 4          Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 138 
8             ZIMBABWE ........................................................................................................................ 139 
8 1          Background .......................................................................................................................... 139 
8 2         AML legislation .................................................................................................................... 139 
8 2 1       The Serious Offences (Confiscation of Profits) Act ............................................................ 139 
8 2 2       The Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money Laundering Act ............................... 141 
8 2 2 1    Customer identification ........................................................................................................ 142 
8 2 2 2    Reporting of suspicious transactions and activities ............................................................. 144 
x 
 
8 2 2 3    Correspondent relationships ................................................................................................. 144 
8 3          Anti-Terrorism legislation ................................................................................................... 145 
8 4          Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 146 
9             CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 147 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION......................................................................................................... 150 
 
1         INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 150 
2         FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................... 150 
2 1          Exchange Control................................................................................................................. 150 
2 1 1       Authorised dealer licenses ................................................................................................... 151 
2 1 2       The reporting of foreign exchange transactions ................................................................... 151 
2 1 3       The residential status of the remitter .................................................................................... 152 
2 1 4       Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 152 
2 2          Immigration laws ................................................................................................................. 154 
2 2 1       Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 155 
2 3          AML and CFT legislation .................................................................................................... 156 
2 3 1       Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 157 
3             CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 158 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
ANNEXURE A:  Zimbabwean Exchange Control Regulations 
ANNEXURE B:  Zimbabwean Exchange Control (Money Transfer Agencies Order) 
ANNEXURE C:  List of South African Authorised dealers in foreign currency 
ANNEXURE D: „Western Union signs exclusive global agreement with Travelex for money 
transfer      services‟ 
xii 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Migrant labourers who cross borders often have to send money back to their various countries 
of origin.  These monetary transfers are known as remittances.  To send these funds migrants 
often opt to rely on informal mechanisms as opposed to the remittance services of formal 
financial institutions such as banks.   
 
Informal remittance mechanisms raise a number of concerns such as those related to 
consumer protection.  In contrast to formal channels informal channels are not based on any 
legally binding agreements.  They are highly based on trust and do not offer any legally 
binding guarantee that the funds will be delivered or that the remitter will be reimbursed in 
the event of non-delivery.   
 
Aside from consumer protection concerns, informal remittances also raise security related 
concerns.  These channels are not subject to the supervision of any regulatory authority and 
usually offer a high level of anonymity.  They can act as an attractive mechanism for 
terrorists and criminal organisations to launder and mobilise their illicit funds. 
 
Taking into mind the concerns mentioned above, as well as others, it would be preferable for 
more remittances to be channelled through formal financial mechanisms.  In conducting 
research on remittance transactions financial, as well as other institutions and organisations, 
have outlined legal and regulatory provisions in sending and recipient countries as being a 
factor that often hinders migrants from accessing formal financial services. 
  
This dissertation examines how the South African legal and regulatory framework affects the 
formalisation of remittances by migrant labourers, with a focus on the context of low-income 
migrants.  The study identifies the Exchange control, immigration, anti-money laundering 
and anti-terrorism legislative provisions as being the most significant provisions that affect 
the formalisation of migrant remittances.  So as to make an analysis and gather 
recommendations were possible, a comparison of the South African legal and regulatory 
provisions is made to those of Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
xiii 
 
The dissertation comes to the conclusion that South African legal and regulatory provisions 
hinder the formalisation of migrant remittances to a certain extent.  They do so by 
collectively and individually restricting migrants who do not fulfil legislative requisites from 
accessing formal remittance channels.  It is submitted that such migrants are inclined to rely 
on informal remittance mechanisms when the need to send money arises.   
 
Furthermore, South African law restricts competition within the remittance market by making 
it difficult for service providers to enter the market.  The lack of an adequate competitive 
level fosters the prevalence of high remittance costs which can pose a significant barrier to 
low income migrants that wish to channel funds via formal means.  
 
Taking into mind the significance of formalising remittances as well as the objectives that the 
laws that hinder them seek to attain, which are equally significant, it is necessary for the 
regulatory authorities to investigate ways on how to possibly cater for both.  It is submitted 
that if more remittances were to be channelled through official means the objectives sought to 
be attained by some of these legislative provisions would be attained more efficiently. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
For centuries individuals have found the need to migrate from their countries of origin to 
various destinations around the globe. Currently, globalisation continues to fuel such 
movement by making it easier for people to move between countries.  The urge to migrate 
can be ascribed to variable factors that can be classified as “push” and “pull” factors.1  Push 
factors encompass negative elements within the country of origin such as war, famine, 
economic and political strife.
2
  Pull factors encompass positive features in the destination 
country such as, amongst others, better living standards and employment opportunities.  The 
latter factors affect an individual‟s choice in regard to where they choose to migrate to and 
such a decision could also be affected by geographical distance between the country of origin 
and the destination country. 
 
South Africa, being a relatively politically and economically stable African nation, offers 
numerous pull factors making it an attractive destination for many African, as well as 
international, migrants.  Statistics carried on behalf of organisations such as Finmark Trust on 
the level of immigration into South Africa support the previous statement.  In 2005 Truen et 
al
3
 estimated the stock of migrants into South Africa to be at 2,1 million which at the time 
represented 4,8% of the total South African population.  The report, however, did not include 
figures for Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa.   
 
Zimbabwe has been going through a financial and political quagmire for the greater part of 
the last decade.  As a result of this, its neighbouring states have faced an increased influx of 
Zimbabweans with South Africa being a popular destination.  Kerzner, in his study of 
                                                          
1
 Azeez & Begum “International remittances: A source of development finance” 2009 International NGO 
Journal 4 (5) 299 300. 
2
 For instance the economic and political instability has driven a significant segment of the Zimbabwean 
population to various destinations around the globe over the past decade.  See Meldrum “Refugees flood from 
Zimbabwe” Guardian (2007-07-2010) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/01/zimbabwe.southafrica 
(accessed 08-12-2010). 
3
 Genesis Analytics “Supporting remittances in Southern Africa: Estimating market potential and assessing 
regulatory obstacles” (2005 Genesis Analytics report - Hereinafter referred to as Genesis Analytics “Supporting 
remittances in Southern Africa”) 4.   
2 
 
remittances between South Africa and Zimbabwe,
4
 quotes Makina‟s estimate of there being 
between 800 000 - 1,000 000 Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa.  
 
A significant portion of the immigrants in South Africa are drawn by the prospect of seeking 
job opportunities that are more favourable than those available within their countries of 
origin.  Some of these migrants are able to receive valid work permits entitling them to work 
legally in South Africa, whilst others are not able to able to do so.  Regardless of the legality 
of work, such migrants find the need to send money to families they have left in their country 
of origin.  When such a need arises, the migrant worker, the low-income migrant worker in 
particular, often faces considerable legal, as well as financial obstacles in accessing the 
services of formal financial institutions such as banks.  As a consequence, they may have to 
rely on informal means to send their funds.  This dissertation examines how legal and 
regulatory provisions impact upon the international remittance industry in South Africa and 
the ability of the low-income migrant worker to access formal remittance services. 
 
 
2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE INDUSTRY 
 
2 1   Defining international remittances 
 
The term „international remittance‟ does not have a solid universal definition.  Different 
individuals and organisations have given varying definitions to the term „international 
remittances‟.  The World Bank5 and the Bank for International Settlements6 have defined 
remittances as: 
 
“[C]ross-border person-to-person payments of relatively low value.”7     
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Finmark Trust “Cash and Carry: Understanding the Johannesburg-Zimbabwe remittance corridor” (2009 
Finmark Trust report – Hereinafter referred to as Finmark Trust “Cash and Carry” ) 7. 
5
 For more information on The World Bank visit their website at http://www.worldbank.org (accessed 08-12-
2010). 
6
 Hereinafter referred to as the BIS.  For more information on the BIS visit their website at www.bis.org 
(accessed 08-12-2010). 
7
 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (hereinafter referred to as CPSS) “General principles for 
international remittance services” (2007) 2. 
3 
 
Bester et al have defined them as:  
 
“[N]on- reciprocal transfers from one person to another across a distance”.8   
 
Azeez and Begum have defined remittances as: 
 
 “[T]hat portion of migrants‟ earnings sent from the migration destination to the place of 
origin.”9  
 
Despite their differences certain aspects are common to the varying definitions, namely that 
remittances involve: 
 
 unrequited,10 person-to-person11 payments and 
 a considerable distance between the sender and the recipient.  
 
The definition given by Azeez and Begum is considered to be the most appropriate definition 
for purposes of this dissertation which focuses on the context of migrant workers.  It should 
be noted that despite the fact that within this dissertation the term „remittance‟ is used to refer 
to cash transactions, this should not be mistaken as implying that all remittance transactions 
are strictly cash based.  On the contrary, remittances can be in the form of groceries as well as 
other basic necessities.  However, for the purposes of this dissertation the scope is limited to 
cash based remittances. 
 
 
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
An individual who wishes to send funds across the border has the option of using either 
formal or informal remittance channels.  In defining formal channels reference can be made 
                                                          
8
 Finmark Trust “Reviewing the Policy Framework for money transfers” (2010 Finmark Trust report - 
Hereinafter referred to as Finmark Trust “Reviewing the policy framework for money transfers”) 2. 
9
 Azeez & Begum 2009 International NGO Journal 300. 
10
 „Unrequited payment‟ means they are not made with an expectation that goods or services shall be given in 
return to the person making the payment. 
11
 These are payments between individuals as opposed to, for instance, payments made between a person and a 
business. 
4 
 
to the financial department of the International Monetary fund
12
 which has defined a formal 
remittance service provider as: 
 
 “[A] provider that is regulated and overseen by competent government agencies for its 
remittance services”.13    
 
Taking the definition outlined above into account, formal remittance channels can be defined 
as being those that are operated within the legal and regulatory framework and that are 
subject to the supervision of a regulatory authority.  The RSPs that are prominent within 
formal channels are banks, money transfer operators, post offices and bureaux de change. 
 
Informal remittance channels can be described as remittance channels that are operated 
outside the legal and regulatory framework and that are not subject to the supervision of a 
regulatory authority.  Common RSPs within informal channels are long distance bus and taxi 
drivers, relatives and friends.  On the broader context hawala networks are also a popular 
informal remittance channel.
14
 
  
Currently, in the South African remittance market, migrants prefer to send funds through 
informal channels in comparison to formal channels.
15
  Informal channels do not grant the 
remitter the security that formal channels offer as they are highly based on trust and not on 
legally enforceable agreements which begs the question as to why informal remittance 
channels are the favoured means of remitting funds. 
 
The preference for informal channels can partially be attributed to the high transaction fees 
that are associated with formal remittance channels.  South Africa has been cited as having 
some of the highest remittance fees globally.
16
  These high remittance fees are often cited as a 
factor that influences the use of informal channels, which tend to be cheaper than formal 
channels.
17
 
                                                          
12
 Hereinafter referred to as the IMF. 
13
 IMF “Approaches to a regulatory framework for formal and informal remittance systems: Experiences and 
lessons” (2005) 10. 
14
 Hawala transactions are elaborated upon further in ch 2. 
15
 Genesis Analytics “Facilitating Southern African remittance networks” (2006 Genesis Analytics report – 
Hereinafter referred to as Genesis Analytics “Facilitating Southern African remittance networks”) 1.  
16
 See the World Bank database on worldwide remittance prices. http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org 
(accessed 08-12-2010). 
17
 See Ghosh Migrant‟s remittances and development: Myths, rhetorics and realities (2006) 36; Freund & 
Spatarofa “Remittances, transaction costs and informality” Journal of development economics 356 356 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MImg&_imagekey=B6VBV-4PPF6F5-1-1-
5 
 
Aside from the aforementioned, the prevalence of informal remittance channels can also be 
attributed to the legal and regulatory framework, more specifically the Exchange Control, 
anti-money laundering and immigration laws.  These laws can individually and collectively 
bear an influence upon the formalisation of remittances.    
 
 
3 1 The South African legal and regulatory framework pertaining to        
international remittances 
 
3 1 1   Exchange control laws  
 
The term “foreign exchange controls” refers to the various methods used by governments to 
control the purchase and sale of foreign currency by residents as well as non-residents.
18
  
South Africa is a nation that still maintains and imposes foreign exchange controls.  These 
provide for the inward and outward movement of foreign currency, as well goods, to be 
monitored so as to ensure the country‟s foreign currency reserves are used in its best 
interests.
19
   
 
The exchange control laws of South Africa bear significant implications for the remittance 
industry.  They, for instance, require that financial institutions that deal in foreign currency be 
in possession of a license authorising them to do so unless an exception is granted by the 
treasury.
20
  International remittance transactions inevitably require service providers to deal 
in foreign currency.  Therefore, depending on whether or not such licensing is open to a 
variety of institutions, this may or may not inhibit competition in the remittance industry by 
affecting the ability of RSPs to enter the market.  According to the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems
21
 (CPSS) competitive market conditions can foster lower remittance 
prices.
22
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3&_cdi=5936&_user=1378441&_pii=S0304387807000818&_origin=search&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2008
&_sk=99919997&view=c&wchp=dGLzVLB-
zSkWA&md5=605eb03ed23000a9ed2e85fa285ca9ba&ie=/sdarticle.pdf (accessed 08-12-2010) 
18
 Wealth Design “Foreign exchange controls in South Africa” http://www.wealthdesign.biz/.../b5e6325f-6460-
4cf9-86c8-763c0dfc2309.pdf  (accessed 09-12-2010). 
19
 Exchange Control manual E1. 
20
 Reg 23 of the Exchange Control Regulations of 1961. 
21
 Hereinafter referred to as the CPSS. 
22
 CPSS “General principles for international remittance services” 26. 
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Exchange control laws also affect the ability of an individual to purchase foreign currency, 
which is necessary for cross-border remittance transactions via formal channels.  The South 
African Exchange control laws distinguish between residents, temporary residents, non-
residents, immigrants and emigrants.
23
  Depending on which category the individual falls into 
they may or may not be able to purchase foreign currency and remit funds from South Africa. 
 
 
3 1 2   Immigration laws 
 
In South Africa, only foreigners who have a valid work permit may legally earn an income 
from working in the country.  In order to be able to purchase foreign currency a migrant must 
be in possession of a valid work permit and specify the source of their funds.  Hence the 
manner in which immigration laws cater for migrant labour indirectly plays a role in the 
formalisation of remittances. 
 
 
3 1 3   Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism law 
 
Ever since the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States of America nations 
all across the globe have increased their efforts to curb terrorism and its financing as well to 
suppress money laundering activities.  South Africa is an example of one of the nations that 
have taken such steps. 
 
As part of the efforts to suppress money laundering and combat terrorist financing, South 
African legislation requires financial institutions to take steps to identify their clients and 
verify such identity prior to establishing a business relationship or concluding a single once-
off transaction.
24
  Depending on the manner in which a person‟s identity may be verified, this 
may or may not inhibit their ability to access formal remittance services.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Exchange Control manual F1.  
24
 S 21 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
7 
 
3 1 4   Summary 
 
The South African legal and regulatory framework has the potential to affect the remittance 
market in a two-fold manner.  Firstly, it may affect the capacity of potential RSPs to enter the 
remittance market.  The latter has an impact on the market‟s competitive level which 
subsequently affects remittance prices.  Secondly, it may affect the ability of an individual to 
access formal financial services through the emphasis placed on an individual‟s residential 
status which can prohibit them from accessing formal financial services.   
 
 
4 OBJECTIVES 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to analyse the laws and regulations of South 
Africa that have an influence upon the international remittance industry and to ascertain 
whether they facilitate or inhibit the formalisation of remittances.  As a means of making a 
comparison to South Africa the laws of Zambia and Zimbabwe shall also be examined
25
 
 
The secondary objective is to make recommendations on how the formalisation of 
remittances can be improved where such is felt necessary. 
 
 
5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
Awareness on the socio-economic importance of remittances has steadily been increasing in 
magnitude in recent years with their social and economical impact on developing nations 
becoming more apparent.  Remittances are increasingly becoming acknowledged as being a 
significant means of alleviating poverty.  It has been stated that a 10% increase in the share of 
international remittances in a country‟s GDP can typically be associated with a 1,6% decline 
in the amount of people living with poverty.
26
   
 
                                                          
25 Zambia and Zimbabwe have similar legislative provisions to those of South Africa that affect remittances 
(except that Zambia does not have Exchange Control laws).  They, however, deal with the implementation of 
these laws differently in some aspects.  From these differences it may be possible to gather recommendations on 
how the South African legal and regulatory framework can be adjusted so as to facilitate the formalisation of 
remittances.    
26
 Genesis Analytics “Supporting remittances in Southern Africa” 16. 
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In addition, remittances also act as a valuable form of income support to households to which 
they are sent and alleviate the plight of many low-income families.  Taking into account the 
latter, formalisation of remittances will be advantageous from a consumer protection 
perspective as formal channels present a more secure method of remitting funds as opposed 
to informal remittance systems which are trust based and do not offer the sender legal 
recourse in the event of non-delivery. 
   
Furthermore, remittances can play a key role in fostering economic growth in developing 
countries.  They can contribute to foreign exchange reserves of a country that finds itself in a 
situation where foreign currency is scarce
27
  and assist in the purchase of imports and 
settlement of national debts.  Remittances are increasingly playing a crucial role as a source 
of foreign currency in many cases to such an extent that they have been regarded as being 
second only to foreign direct investment.
28
   
 
When remittances are channelled through informal mechanisms they do not contribute to the 
recipient country‟s official foreign currency reserves, and cannot make a meaningful 
contribution towards its development.
29
  Formalisation of remittance transactions will allow 
for the full developmental potential of remittances upon recipient countries to be attained. 
 
The formalisation of remittances is also crucial due to security concerns that informal 
remittances are associated with.  Informal remittance channels, unregulated and elusive as 
they inherently are, present an attractive mechanism for the laundering and mobilisation of 
illicit funds.  Informal remittance transactions typically leave no paper trail, making it almost 
impossible to trace the sender and recipient of funds. 
 
Remittances are by nature unrequited transfers, they are not made for the purpose of 
purchasing goods and services.  This makes it difficult to trace the purpose of a transaction 
and allows for terrorist and other illicit funds to easily be mixed with legitimate funds making 
it difficult to distinguish between the illicit and legitimate funds.  
 
                                                          
27
 As in Zimbabwe which has been battling with a foreign currency shortage for the greater part of the last 
decade.   
28
 IMF “Approaches to a Regulatory Framework for Formal and Informal remittance systems” 6. 
29
 Ghosh Migrant‟s remittances and development: Myths, rhetorics and realities (2006) 40. 
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The security concerns of governments become more apparent when one considers the fact 
that of the billions of dollars estimated to flow by means of remittance channels,
30
 half of this 
money, and perhaps even more, is believed to flow through informal mechanisms.
31
  Billions 
of dollars are thereby moving around the globe with a high probability that the senders and 
recipients are not being identified. 
 
It is has been put forth by organisations, as the IMF, that the formalisation of remittances will 
ease the security concerns mentioned above.
32
  It is submitted that the detection of illicit 
flows would be simplified if the majority of remittance transactions were conducted through 
formal channels.  Criminal networks would have less ease in manoeuvring and laundering 
their funds.  Taking the latter into account, formalisation of remittances can foster the 
achievement of the purposes that South Africa‟s anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism legislation has been put in place for.  
 
Furthermore, formalising more remittances transactions would foster the achievement of the 
purposes that Exchange Controls are put in place for.  As stated before
33
 one of the purposes 
of Exchange Control is to provide for the movement of funds to be monitored so as to ensure 
that the country‟s foreign currency reserves are used in its best interests.  Informal 
remittances defeat the latter purpose as they are not subject to the supervision of any 
regulatory authority and constitute unaccounted flows of money. 
 
Another factor to take into mind when looking at the importance of formalising remittances is 
the potential effect that some informal mechanisms can have upon a country‟s monetary 
supply.  Remittances that are channelled through means such as long distance taxi drivers 
result in a country‟s currency physically leaving its borders.  The latter can necessitate the 
printing of more money which can lead to an increase in the rate of inflation.
34
  It would be in 
the interests of South Africa, which has a monetary policy framework that focuses on 
targeting inflation,
35
 for more remittances to be channelled formally. 
                                                          
30
 A 2008 World Bank estimate put global remittance flows at a value of $USD 433 billion. See IAMTN “G8 
nations agenda to cut remittance prices” http://www.iamtn.org/content/global-money-transfer-monthly-3 
(accessed 08-12-2010) 
31
 IMF “Impact of remittances on poverty and financial development in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2007) 3. 
32
 IMF “Approaches to a Regulatory Framework for Formal and Informal remittance systems” 6. 
33
 See par  3 1 1. 
34
 See R. Heakel “What is the quantity theory of money?” http://www.investopedia.com/articles/05/010705.asp 
(accessed 13-12-2010). 
35
 See Commitee of central bank Governors in SADC “Reserve bank of South Africa” (2009) 173 
http://www.sadcbankers.org/SADC/SADC.nsf/LADV/AF172B5E6B5AA3134225767400451483/$File/South+
Africa(Final).pdf (accessed 08-12-2010). 
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When remittances are channelled through formal mechanisms the sending country‟s currency 
does not actually leave its borders.  Instead it is exchanged for other currencies (more often 
US dollars) and remains available for use within the domestic economy.
36
 
 
 
6     SCOPE OF STUDY 
 
Despite the fact that the title refers to international remittances within the SADC region, this 
dissertation shall primarily focus on the impact of legislation in regard to the formalisation of 
remittances from South Africa, with a particular focus on the plight of the low-income 
migrant worker.  Carrying an analysis of all the countries that fall within the SADC region 
would be a mammoth task that could negatively affect the quality of the research; hence the 
ambit of the dissertation has been limited.  The laws pertaining to remittances that are 
applicable in Zambia and Zimbabwe, as indicated before, shall be used as comparators to 
those that apply in South Africa.  
 
The dissertation focuses on the international aspect of remittances as it is felt that little focus 
has been thrown on catering for the needs of international remitters.  This can, amongst other 
reasons, be attributed to the fact that governments tend to focus on improving domestic 
systems and immigrants, who are the primary clients when it comes to international 
remittance services, do not have the necessary voting power to bring their plight to the 
attention of the government.
37
    
 
 
7     METHODOLOGY 
 
Taking into account the subject matter of this research and the paucity of data on it, a desktop 
methodology has been followed with heavy reliance being put on data and information 
compiled in reports by various organisations and financial institutions.  The rest of the 
dissertation is structured as follows: 
 
                                                          
36
 See Urbach “Exchange Controls are an apartheid relic and should be abolished” 2010 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page292681?oid=511058&sn=2009+Detail (accessed 13-12-
2010). 
37
 Genesis Analytics “African families, African money: Bridging the money transfer divide” (2003 Genesis 
Analytics report – Hereinafter referred to as Genesis Analytics “African families, African money”) 3. 
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Chapter Two: Gives an outlook of the international remittance payment system.  Amongst 
other things it distinguishes formal and informal remittance channels and outlines how 
transactions within these channels are carried out, the participants of such transactions and 
the challenges faced in formalising remittances.    
 
Chapter Three: Deals with Exchange Control laws. It gives a historical background on 
exchange control in South Africa and examines the impact that these laws have upon the 
remittance industry.   
 
Chapter Four: Examines how immigration law caters for migrant labour and the possible 
effects that it may have on the remittance industry. 
 
Chapter Five: Examines anti money laundering (AML) and CFT laws and their impact upon 
the remittance industry.  It also examines how international best practise standards have 
influenced the implementation of these laws. 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
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CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
In order for funds to move from one location to another certain arrangements that cater for 
such have to be put in place.  The purpose of this chapter is to outline the various 
mechanisms that exist to cater for remittance transfers through both formal, as well as 
informal channels.   Prior to providing outlook of the latter an overview of the national 
payment systems of the South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe shall be given. 
 
National payment systems arrangements set the general framework for funds transfers, both 
domestically as well as internationally, and as a consequence they have an influence upon 
remittance transfers.  As such it is necessary for an overview of how national payment 
systems function and cater for the movement of funds to be given.   
 
 
2 NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
2 1   Background 
 
A national payment system
38
, as defined by the BIS, encompasses a set of instruments, 
banking procedures, and typically a funds transfer system that allows for the circulation of 
funds.
39
  Aside from the payments between banks, a payment system includes the entire 
payment process, systems, mechanisms, institutions, agreements as well as laws that are in 
place and have an impact upon the movement of funds.
40 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Hereinafter referred to as NPS. 
39
 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (hereinafter referred to as the CPSS) “A glossary of 
terms used in payment and settlement systems” (2003) 36. 
40
 SARB financial stability review (September 2008) 39. 
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2 2   South Africa 
 
Before the National Payment System Act
41
 came into effect there was no legislation that 
specifically governed the NPS.  The NPS was established, regulated and by either common 
law or in terms of certain provisions contained in selected South African legislation.
42
  The 
NPS Act, which came into effect in on the 28
th
 of October 2008, is currently the principle 
piece of legislation that regulates the NPS.  
 
 
2 2 1   Organisation 
 
Over the past years the South African NPS has developed into a complex environment which, 
for clarity, can be broken down into various inter-linking payment networks.  These networks 
are the:
43
 
 
 Customer network; 
 Payment network; 
 Clearing network; 
 Settlement network; and 
 Continuous Linked Settlement Network. 
 
 
2 2 1 1   The customer network 
 
This network encompasses the payment networks that have been in place by business 
customers of commercial banks such as supermarkets and public utilities.
44
  The customer 
network allows these businesses to partake in the payment system and provide payment 
services to their clients.  The business customers of banks do cannot, however, directly access 
to the settlement network and must therefore use the payment networks of participating 
banks.   
 
                                                          
41
 78 of 1998. 
42
 Davids “The legal and regulatory framework of the National Payment System” 2008 Obiter 29 3 453 454. 
43
 SARB financial stability review (report for September 2008) 40-43.  Hereinafter referred to as the SARB 
financial stability review (September 2008). 
44
 SARB financial stability review (September 2008) 40. 
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2 2 1 2   The payment network 
 
This network consists of the systems and communications mechanisms put in place by 
commercial banks so as to provide their customers with facilities and channels to effect 
payments.
45
  It encompasses bank-owned automated teller machines (ATMs), internet 
banking services, branch networks and payment instruments such as; cheques, debit cards, 
credit cards and so forth.  
 
 
2 2 1 3   The clearing network 
 
“Clearing” refers to the exchange of payment instructions.46  The clearing network provides a 
forum for payment system participants to exchange payment instructions.  Previously only 
banking institutions were granted access to the clearing network.  As the payment system 
evolved more non-banking institutions began to participate in the payment system.  The 
reserve bank decided to re-evaluate the criteria for participation in the clearing network and 
as a consequence non-banking institutions are now able to access the network and clear in 
their own name.
47
 
 
Payment clearing house
48
 (PCH) system operators are other participants of the clearing 
network.  These are also referred to as “clearing houses”.  The NPS Act defines a PCH 
system operator as: 
 
“[A] person authorised by the payment system management body to provide clearing 
processing services on behalf of two or more system participants or a payment clearing 
house.”49 
 
In South Africa, one such PCH system operator is Bankserv.  Bankserv, which is owned by 
the South African clearing and settlement banks, is responsible for clearing and determining 
interbank obligations stemming from the retail payments environment.   
2 2 1 4   The Settlement network 
                                                          
45
 SARB financial stability review (September 2008) 41. 
46
 S 1(iv) of the NPS Act. 
47
 SARB financial stability review (September 2008) 42. 
48
 Hereinafter referred to as a PCH. 
49
S 1(xx). 
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A “settlement system” is defined by the NPS Act as: 
 
“[A] system established and operated by the Reserve Bank for the discharge of payment 
and settlement obligations between system participants”.50 
 
The core of South Africa‟s payment system is the South African Multiple Option 
Settlement
51
 system which is owned and operated by the South African Reserve Bank.
52
  The 
SAMOS is a real time gross settlement
53
 system and enables settlement participants to settle 
their interbank payment obligations finally and irrevocably.  Only banking institutions and 
designated settlement operators have access to the settlement system.
54
 
 
 
2 2 1 5   The Continuous Linked Settlement network 
 
The Continuous Linked Settlement
55
 system interlinks with the SAMOS for purposes of 
settling the rand leg of high value cross border foreign exchange transactions.
56
  Low value 
payments such as remittances are not settled within the CLS system.  Such cross-border 
transactions are settled through cross-border banking relationships.
57
 
 
 
2 2 2   Oversight of the NPS 
 
The South African Reserve Bank has described the function of overseeing the national 
payment system as being inclusive of the entire process that is initiated when an end user 
                                                          
50
 S 1(xvii). 
51
 Hereinafter referred to as SAMOS. 
52
 Hereinafter referred to as the SARB. 
53
 Real time gross settlement (hereinafter referred to as RTGS) systems allow for funds as well as securities 
transfers to be continuously settled in “real time”.  Transfers are settled individually at the time that they are 
received as opposed to them being settled collectively with other transfers at a later stage.  See CPSS definition 
of “real time” and “RTGS systems” – CPSS “Glossary of terms used in payment and settlement systems” 40-41. 
54
 See ss 3 and 4 of the South African NPS Act. 
55
 Hereinafter referred to as CLS. 
56
 Davids 2008 Obiter 29 3 456.  The CLS system eliminates foreign exchange settlement risks by use of 
Payment versus Payment (PvP).  PvP is a mechanism used in a foreign exchange settlement system that ensures 
that a final transfer of currency occurs if, and only if, a final transfer of the other currency or currency takes 
place.  Both legs of the foreign exchange transaction are settled within the CLS system.  At the present moment 
two South African Banks, ABSA and Standard Bank, are members of the CLS system.  Members of the CLS 
system have direct access to the CLS Bank and settle transactions across the CLS system on behalf of 
themselves or third parties.
56
 
57
 BIS “The payment system in South Africa” Payment systems in the Southern African Development 
Community 147 158  https://www.bis.org/publ/cpss30.pdf   (accessed 08-12-2010). 
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issues a payment instruction to pay another person or business, up until the point when the 
beneficiary receives payment.
58
  It covers all the arrangements and procedures that exist to 
cater for clearing as well as settlement of the payment instruction, and payment towards the 
intended beneficiary.
59
 
 
The efficiency, as well as safety, of a NPS plays a crucial part in ensuring overall stability of 
the country‟s financial sector.60  It is therefore necessary for some form of supervision to be 
put in place.  In South Africa, the South African Reserve Bank Act
61
 provides for such 
supervision.  Section 10(1)(c) of the Act expressly empowers the SARB to, inter alia, 
perform functions that allow it to regulate as well as oversee the payment system.  In turn, the 
SARB has established a National Payment System Department which bears the responsibility 
of overseeing the NPS.  The National Payment System Act
62
 which was promulgated on the 
8
th
 of October 2008 enhances the regulatory and supervisory powers of the SARB.  
 
The BIS has defined the function of overseeing the NPS as being: 
 
“[A] central bank task, principally intended to protect the smooth functioning of a payment 
system and to protect the financial system from possible „domino effects‟ which may occur 
when one or more participants in the payment system incur credit risk or liquidity risk..”63  
 
The BIS definition of „oversight‟ gives a notion of why it is necessary for a NPS to be 
supervised.  Payment systems are subject to a number of risks namely; credit,
64
 liquidity,
65
 
legal
66
 as well as operational risks.
67
  A participant that incurs either credit or liquidity risk 
may compromise other system participant‟s capacity, or financial institutions in other parts of 
the financial system, to fulfil their financial obligations as they become due.
68
   
 
                                                          
58
 SARB “The National Payment System framework and strategy: Vision 2010” (2006) 11. 
59
 Supra. 
60
 SARB financial stability review (September 2008) 40. 
61
 90 of 1989.  The Act was amended in 1996 in order to clarify the role of the SARB in regard to the national 
payment system. 
62
 78 of 1998 – Hereinafter referred to as the NPS Act. 
63
 BIS “A glossary of terms used in payments and settlements systems” 37. 
64
 The risk that a participant will not be able to fully meet its financial obligations within the system. 
65
 The risk that a participant within the system will have insufficient funds to fulfil financial obligations within 
the system as, and when, they become due. 
66
 The risk that a poor legal framework will cause or exacerbate credit or liquidity risks. 
67
 The risk that operational factors such as technical malfunctions or operational mistakes will cause or 
exacerbate credit or liquidity risks.  
68
 This is what is referred to as a „domino effect‟ in the BIS description of the function of overseeing a NPS.  
See footnote 20 above. 
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The risk of detrimental effects being imposed on other participants due to, amongst others, 
credit or liquidity problems faced by another participant in the system, is known as systemic 
risk.
69
  It is submitted that the potential threat of systemic failure makes it necessary to, 
control access to the NPS, as well monitor the activities of participants. 
 
Remittances, as stated by Bester et al,
70
 are a payment system phenomenon.  Providers of 
remittance services fall within the payment system, albeit at a lower level of the entire 
system.  Remittance transactions can be categorised within the retail payment system of the 
NPS.  The latter systems primarily deal with consumer payments of relatively low value and, 
in contrast to systematically important payment systems,
71
 are, generally, not viewed as being 
a threat to systemic stability.
72
  The BIS and World Bank have stated that, taking into account 
that remittances are low value payments, credit or liquidity failure by an RSP is unlikely to 
cause systemic risk in the NPS.
73
 
 
The SARB has, however, stated that retail payment systems can collectively form 
systematically important payment system.
74
  Taking the latter into account, it is submitted 
that it is necessary for retail payment systems to be supervised.  Supervision of retail payment 
systems is also necessary taking into account that they facilitate day-to-day consumer 
transactions and can, in the event of inefficiency and failure, compromise public confidence 
in, as well as the integrity of, the NPS.
75
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69
 S 12(1) of the NPS Act.  See also CPSS “A glossary of terms used in payments and settlement systems” 48. 
70
 Finmark Trust “Reviewing the policy framework for money transfers” 2. 
71
 These are payment systems with participants that handle high value transactions and can, in the event of risk 
exposure, trigger systematic disruptions amongst other system participants or financial institutions in other 
financial areas. See CPSS “Core principles for systematically important payment systems” 5, CPSS “A Glossary 
of terms used in payment and settlement systems” 48 as well as the report prepared for the Competition 
Commissioner by the Competition Commission bank enquiry panel (2006) 407. 
72
 Report prepared for the Competition Commissioner by Competition Commission bank enquiry panel 407. 
73
 CPSS “General principles for remittance services” 18. 
74
 SARB “The National payment system in South Africa 1995-2005” 15. 
75
 SARB “The National payment system framework and strategy: Vision 2010” 11.  See also the report prepared 
for the Competition Commissioner by Competition Commission bank enquiry panel 411. 
http://www.copcom.co.za/technical- report (accessed 08-12-2010) 
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2 3   Zambia 
 
2 3 1   Introduction 
 
Prior to the enactment of the National Payment Systems Act,
76
 legislative provisions dealing 
with varying aspects of the NPS were scattered in different pieces of legislation such as the 
Bank of Zambia Act, the Banking and Financial Services Act and the Bills of Exchanges Act.  
There was no legislation that specifically dealt with the regulation and supervision of the NPS 
comprehensively.
77
    
 
In 2007 the NPS Act was assented to.  The latter Act serves to provide for, amongst other 
purposes, the management, administration, operation, supervision and regulation of the 
payment, clearing and settlement systems.  The Act defines a payment system as:
78
 
 
“[A] clearing and settlement system operating under clearing house rules”. 
 
A “clearing and settlement system” is defined as: 
 
“[A] system or arrangement to clear or settle payment or settlement obligations or 
instructions in which 
 
a) there are at least 3 participants one of which is a bank; 
b) clearing or settlement is all or partly in Zambian Kwacha; 
c) the payment obligations that arise from clearing within the system or arrangement are 
ultimately settled through adjustments to the account of one or more participants at the 
Bank of Zambia
79
 or other settlement agent.” 
 
 
2 3 2      Organisation 
 
The Zambian payment system is comprised of four primary payment systems. These are:
80
 
                                                          
76
 1 of 2007. 
77
 BIS “The Payment System in Zambia” 226 225-236. http://www.bis.org/cpss/paysys/Zambia.pdf (accessed 
08-12-2010). 
78
 S 2(1). 
79
 Hereinafter referred to as the BOZ. 
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 the Direct Debit and Credit Clearing (DDACC) system; 
 the Physical Interbank Clearing (PIC) system; 
 Zambian Interbank Payment and Settlement (ZIPS) system; and 
 Position Retail Payments Switching System.  
 
 
2 3 2 1   The DDACC and PIC systems 
 
The DDACC and PIC are electronic clearing systems.  The DDACC allows banks to 
automatically transfer funds to and from bank accounts, by way of direct debit or direct 
credit, via the Zambian Electronic Clearing House.
81
  Direct debit allows for an organisation 
to make regularly collect payments, through its bank, from large numbers of customers.  
Direct credit on the other hand, enables an organisation to make regular payments, through its 
bank, top various beneficiaries.  DDAC instructions are submitted by electronic means such 
as diskette, modem or internet.  There is no physical interchange of papers.
82
 
 
The PIC is a paper based clearing system which uses Magnetic Ink Recognition encoded 
cheques.
83
  It has been running since the 20
th
 of September 1999.  The DDACC and the PIC 
are both operated by the ZECH. 
 
2 3 2 2   The ZIPS system 
 
The ZIPS system is an electronic payment system in which transactions are continuously 
settled on a transaction by transaction basis in real time.
84
  In other words it is RTGS system.  
The ZIPS system was developed in order to improve the management of payment risks 
associated with high value retail payments.  The system is managed and operated by the Bank 
of Zambia in its capacity as a settlement system provider.  The Bank of Zambia, like any 
other bank, is also a participant of the ZIPS system.
85
   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
80
 Bank of Zambia, Finmark Trust and Zambia Electronic Clearing House Limited (ZECHL) “Key principles in 
National Switch Deployment: The Zambian case study” (2008) 11. 
81
 Hereinafter referred to as the ZECH. 
82
 Zambia national commercial bank (Zanaco) http://www.zanaco.co.zm/Payment%20Services%20-
%20ddacc.htm (accessed 08-12-2010). 
83
 Hereinafter referred to as MICR. 
84
 Bank of Zambia, Finmark Trust and Zambia Electronic Clearing House Limited (ZECHL) “Key principles in 
National Switch Deployment: The Zambian case study” 11. 
85
 Bank of Zambia http://www.boz.zm/ (accessed 08-12-2010). 
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2 3 2 3   The PRPS system 
 
The PRPS system, which is also referred to as eSwitch/Zamlink, was launched in October 
2005 by four major commercial banks.
86
  The system allows these banks to share their ATMs 
and Point of Sale (POS) terminals.
87
 
 
 
2 3 3   Oversight of the NPS 
 
In Zambia, as is the case in South Africa, the responsibility of overseeing the NPS rests upon 
the central bank.  The NPS Act states that the Bank of Zambia shall: 
 
“[R]egulate and oversee the operations of payment systems in order to ensure the integrity, 
effectiveness, efficiency, competiveness and security of the payment systems so as to 
promote the stability and safety of the Zambian financial system.”88 
 
Before the NPS Act came into effect no legislative provision existed, which bestowed the 
responsibility of overseeing the NPS on the Bank of Zambia.  The 1996 Bank of Zambia 
Act
89
 does, however, state that one of the functions of the Bank of Zambia is to promote 
efficient payment mechanisms.
90
  Section 44 of the Act states, furthermore, that: 
 
“[T] he bank may in conjunction with other financial institutions, organise facilities for the 
clearing of their cheques and other instruments for effective payments”. 
 
In the absence of legislative provision that expressly empowered the Bank of Zambia to 
oversee the NPS, the Bank relied upon the aforementioned provisions of the Bank of Zambia 
Act at the basis of its authority to supervise the NPS. 
 
 
 
                                                          
86
 Finance Bank, Investrust, First Alliance Bank and Intermarket Bank. 
87
 Bank of Zambia http://www.boz.zm/ . 
88
 S 5(1) of the National Payment Systems Act. 
89
 43 of 1996. 
90
 S 4(2) (b). 
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2 4   Zimbabwe 
 
2 4 1   Introduction 
 
Prior to the enactment of the National Payment Systems Act
91
 there was no legislation that 
comprehensively governed the Zimbabwean NPS.  The payment system was primarily 
regulated by the Zimbabwean Commercial law, which is largely influenced by Roman-Dutch 
law and English law.
92
  The NPS Act is the first piece of legislation to comprehensively 
regulate the NPS.   
 
The NPS Act of Zimbabwe, in contrast to those of South Africa and Zambia, does not 
provide an express define a payment system.  However, from reading section 3 of the Act one 
can gather an idea of what a payment system is.  The section states the following:
93
 
 
“[T]he Reserve bank may recognise a payment system that has any of the following 
objects: 
 
a) the clearing of payment instructions between financial institutions that are participants 
in the system; 
b) the settling of obligations arising from the payment of clearing instructions...”. 
 
 
2 4 2      Organisation 
 
2 4 2 1   Clearing 
 
The Bankers Clearing House
94
 is the central point for the clearing and settlement of inter-
bank claims.  The BCH is situated at, and monitored by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
95
  
The clearing process is largely manual and paper based.
96
 
                                                          
91
 21 of  2001–Hereinafter referred to as the NPS Act. 
92
 BIS “The Payment System in Zimbabwe” (2005) 242.  http://www.bis.org/cpss/paysys/Zambia.pdf (accessed 
26-11-2010). 
93
 S 3(1). 
94
 Hereinafter referred to as the BCH. 
95
 Hereinafter referred to as the RBZ. 
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Only the Reserve Bank and commercial banks which are registered in terms of the Banking 
Act, and have been actively participant in the banking business for at least 3 years can 
partake in the clearing process.
97
  Other financial institutions must therefore use commercial 
banks, that they hold bank accounts with, as their clearing agents.
98
 
 
 
2 4 2 2   Settlement 
 
The Zimbabwe Electronic Transfer and Settlement System
99
 is the core of Zimbabwe‟s 
settlement system.  The ZETSS, in line with international best practices aimed at reducing the 
risks associated with clearing and settlement, is an RTGS system.  The system went live in 
November 2002.
100
 
 
 
2 4 3      Oversight 
 
The supervision of the NPS is a responsibility that has been entrusted to the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe.  Prior to the enactment of the NPS Act, the Reserve Bank relied on the provisions 
of the Reserve Bank Act of 1964.
101
  The Act empowers the Reserve Bank to organise and 
provide facilities for the collection and clearance of cheques and other similar instruments.  
The Act does not, however, expressly provide for the Reserve Bank to supervise the NPS.
102
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
96
 Committee of central bank Governors in SADC “Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe” (2009) 22. 
http://www.sadcbankers.org/SADC/SADC.nsf/LADV/78677DE6AA2C006A4225726E0049AAEC/$File/Zimb
abwe.pdf (accessed 08-12-2010). 
97
 Committee of central bank Governors in SADC “Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe” 18. 
98
 22. 
99
 Hereinafter referred to as ZETSS.  
100
 Committee of central bank Governors in SADC “Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe” 17. 
101
 BIS “Payment systems in Zimbabwe” 241. 
102
 Supra. 
23 
 
3 INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE TRANSACTIONS 
 
3 1   Background  
 
The term “international remittance”103 does not have a solid universal definition.  Different 
authors have assigned varying definitions to the term.  The BIS and the World Bank have 
defined them as:  
 
“[C]ross-border person-to-person payments of relatively low value”.104  
 
Bester et al have defined them as:  
 
“[N]on-reciprocal transfers from one person to another across a distance”.105 
 
Azeez and Begum have defined them as:  
 
“that portion of migrants‟ earnings sent from the migration destination to the place of 
origin”106 
   
The latter definition is deemed more suitable for the purposes of this dissertation which looks 
at the context of the labour migrants whom send funds back to families in their countries of 
origin.  According to statistics carried out by Genesis Analytics amounts sent by such 
migrants within the SADC region are of relatively low value in regard to the amount sent.
107
   
 
From the varying definitions mentioned above two common features of international 
remittances can be identified, namely: 
 unrequited  person-to-person payments108 of relatively low value; and 
 a considerable distance between the sender and the recipient. 
                                                          
103
 Remittance transactions may also be conducted at a domestic level.   However, for purposes of this 
dissertation the scope has been limited to international remittance transactions. 
104
 CPSS “General principles for international remittance services” 6. 
105
 Finmark Trust “Reviewing the policy framework for money transfers” 2. 
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Most remittance transactions can be categorized as credit transfers as payment is typically 
initiated when the sender instructs a remittance service provider to send funds.
109
  Remittance 
transactions are typically recurrent payments made via individual transfers as opposed to 
being made by standing order.
110
  Remittances may either be in the form of cash transfers or 
goods such as groceries.
111
  However, for purposes of this dissertation the focus shall be cast 
upon remittances of a monetary form and not those made in the form goods.   
 
 
3 2   The dynamics of an international remittance transaction 
 
3 2 1   Participants 
            
The key participants in a typical remittance transaction are the sender, the recipient, the 
capturing remittance service provider and the disbursing remittance service provider. 
 
 
 
3 2 1 1   Sender and recipient 
 
The sender, in the context of this dissertation, refers to the migrant worker seeking to send 
funds to their country of origin.  The recipient is the person to whom the migrant seeks to 
sends funds to.  Often, but not necessarily, the person is a family member of the migrant such 
as his spouse, sibling or parent. 
 
 
3 2 1 2   Remittance service provider 
 
A remittance service provider
112
 facilitates the transfer of funds from the sender to the 
recipient in exchange for a fee, which is usually a percentage of the amount being sent.
113
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Different types of RSPs exist within the South African international remittance industry.  The 
nature of these RSPs differs depending on the type of remittance channel that is utilised.
114
   
 
The “capturing RSP” is the RSP to whom the sender hands over the funds that are intended to 
be sent to the recipient.  The “disbursing RSP”, on the other hand, is the RSP that pays out 
the funds to the recipient.  Depending on the type of remittance network in place, the 
capturing and disbursing RSP may be one and the same entity or, alternatively, agents of a 
single RSP albeit located in different countries. 
 
 
3 2 2   Remittance networks 
 
Regardless of whether or not a remittance is channelled via formal or informal means, some 
form of network needs to be in place in order for the service to function.  Access points at 
which consumers can hand over funds and conversely receive funds need to be in place and 
interlinked.
115
  In regard to the nature of a remittance network four types can be distinguished 
namely; unilateral, franchised, negotiated and open networks. 
 
3 2 2 1   Unilateral network 
 
These involve a single RSP; the latter does not utilize the services of any other entities for 
purpose of capturing and disbursement.  Such networks can only be implemented if the RSP 
has physical access points in both the sending and recipient country or if the network is a 
virtual one.
116
  Unilateral remittance services are rare due to scarcity of physical access points 
and lack of access to electronic communications and banking in general. 
 
 
3 2 2 2   Franchised network 
 
In a franchised service an RSP creates a remittance network without owning any of the 
physical access points.  The RSP provides the infrastructure for the messaging and settlement 
                                                          
114
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aspects of the remittance transaction and acquires physical access points by inviting 
institutions in both the sending and recipient country to offer services as agents of the RSP on 
standardised terms.
117
  This type of network is typically associated with global MTOs such as 
Western Union which utilise, inter alia, banks and post offices as agents.
118
 
 
 
3 2 2 3   Negotiated network 
 
In a negotiated remittance service network an RSP negotiates and establishes a network with 
an institution or institutions, or even individuals, in other countries and by doing so creates an 
adequate network of access points.
119
  It is typical for funds to be paid out to the recipient 
before the disbursing RSP actually receives funds from the capturing RSP with no guarantee 
of payment aside from the expectation that the capturing agent will settle the amount in 
future.
120
  Hawala remittances can be categorised under this form of remittance service.
121
 
 
3 2 2 4   Open network 
 
In an open remittance network an RSP is able to offer remittance services to customers 
without owning any access points in the recipient country.  It obtains access points by using 
an open network which any RSP can access.
122
  These networks are not pre-negotiated and 
usually, as a consequence, the messaging and settlement aspects of a transaction occur 
simultaneously.   
 
The only network of this sort that exists at the moment is the international banking network, 
consisting of national payment systems that can be accessed from another country either by 
way of direct links between the payment systems or correspondent banking.
123
  Open network 
remittance services are the most common remittance service offered by banks allowing them 
to send cross-border payments to any other bank in the world.  RSPs that are not banks can 
access the network via banks that they hold accounts with. 
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3 2 3      The remittance process 
 
A variety of activities transpire within the process of making a remittance transaction.  Of 
these activities the capturing and disbursement aspects are the most visible to the end user.  
Messaging and settlement, which transpire between capturing and disbursement, are not as 
apparent. 
 
 
3 2 3 1   Capturing 
 
Capturing involves the sender paying funds that are to be sent, as well as the applicable 
transaction fees, to the RSP or its agent.  Payment can be effected by any means acceptable to 
the sender and RSP and may be done via cash, cheque or account transfer.  The mode of 
payment may be influenced by the nature of the RSP.
124
 
 
Transactions are typically carried out at a physical location such as a bank branch, post office 
and so forth.  However with technological advancements it is now possible for transactions to 
be concluded in a virtual location by means of a computer or mobile phone.
125
  
 
It is usually necessary for the sender to identify themselves and to verify such identity using 
documents that are prescribed by regulatory authorities.
126
  In contrast, minimal information 
in regard to the identity of the recipient is usually required, with specification of their name 
being the basic minimum requirement.   
 
For security reasons that are inherently beneficial to the consumer, MTOs such as Western 
Union provide the sender with a Money Transfer Control Number
127
 which is unique to each 
transaction and require them to set a test question. The capturing RSP in turn, provides the 
disbursing RSP with details of the MTCN and answer to the test question.  The latter are also 
relayed by the sender to the recipient.     
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3 2 3 2   Messaging 
 
Messaging encompasses the sending of information in regard to the transaction from the 
capturing RSP to the disbursing RSP
128
 and is predominantly carried out through SWIFT‟s 
message transmission.
129
  Typically the information sent encompasses details in regard to, 
amongst other things, the amount sent and a MTCN and answer to a test question.   
 
Depending on the nature of the remittance service, for instance whether it is an open or 
franchised service, funds and information in regard to the transaction can either be sent 
simultaneously or independently.  In an open service remittance network funds are usually 
sent simultaneously with information in regard to the transaction whereas in other networks, 
funds are sent separately from the information pertaining to the transaction.
130
 
 
 
3 2 3 3   Settlement 
 
Settlement provides for the actual movement of funds between the capturing RSP and the 
disbursing RSP.
131
  The settlement process, depending on the arrangements in place, can be 
of varying speed and complexity.
132
  Settlement usually occurs in a “settlement chain”133  by 
way of credit transfers from the payer to the payees‟ bank with one of the payments being a 
cross-border payment effected by means of correspondent banking.
134
 
 
In order to “settle” remittance transactions RSPs must have access to the domestic NPS of the 
country within which they operate.  In South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe RSPs that are 
not banks cannot directly access the settlement system.  They can only access the settlement 
system indirectly via the banks that they hold accounts with.  These banks subsequently settle 
cross-border foreign exchange transactions via correspondent banking relationships. 
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In some instances the RSP may have bank accounts in both the sending and receiving country 
in which case the cross-border aspect of the settlement process can be partially internalised. 
In the latter scenario funds from the capturing agent are credited to the RSP‟s account in the 
sending country and funds to the disbursing agent are debited from the RSP‟s account in the 
receiving country.  In circumstances where the flow of remittances within the corridor is 
uneven the RSP may have to transfer funds from its account in the sending country so as to 
top up its account in the receiving country.
135
 
 
Unlike payments between end users and agents, which are paid on an individual basis, 
payments between the agents and RSPs can be batched and possibly netted.
136
  In order for 
netting arrangements to function it is necessary for a fairly even two-way flow of remittances 
between the sending and recipient country to be in place.
137
 
 
Despite the fact that settlement occurs in a chain it is not always necessary for the disbursing 
agent to wait for the actual receipt of funds that have been sent so as to pay the recipient.  It is 
possible for liquidity arrangements to be in place allowing for the disbursing RSP to pay the 
recipient before actual receipt of funds from the capturing RSP.
138
 
 
Liquidity arrangements are more common place within franchised networks provided by 
global MTO‟s such as Western Union whereby the recipient may collect funds from 
anywhere and the RSP will not be aware of which disbursing agent to pay till the funds are 
actually collected.  Liquidity arrangements entail a greater a credit risk on the part of the RSP 
and make it necessary for the disbursing agent to retain greater liquidity.  Provision of the 
latter coupled with the increased credit risk that the RSP is exposed are likely to raise the 
overall transaction costs.
139
 
 
 
 3 2 3 4   Disbursement 
 
Disbursement entails the payment of funds by the disbursing agent towards the recipient.  As 
with capturing, payment can occur via any means acceptable to the recipient and the 
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disbursing agent.  Were money is sent via an MTO the sender is typically required to provide 
an MTCN and answer to a test question set by the sender.  Failure to provide the correct 
MTCN or answer to the set question prevents the recipient from obtaining the funds from the 
disbursing agent 
 
An illustration of a formal remittance transaction within a franchised remittance network 
shall be given in the illustration below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scenario portrayed in the illustration involves the participation of a single RSP which 
utilises agents in both countries so as to attain access points.  S seeks to send funds to R who 
is located in country B and therefore makes a cash payment to agent (A), the latter being the 
RSP‟s capturing agent in country A.  Agent (A) relays the information pertaining to the 
32 
 
transaction, such as the MTCN and amount sent, to the RSP which in turn passes on the 
information to agent (B).  S also sends details of the transaction to R. 
 
At some point agent (A) has to pay the funds it has received to the RSP.  For the purposes of 
the illustration it assumed that it does so once a day as opposed to making a transfer for each 
individual remittance transaction.  The agent transfers the funds by depositing the funds into 
its account at bank (A1), and gives the latter instructions to make a credit transfer from its 
account to the RSP‟s account at bank (A2).  Agent (A)‟s account is consequently debited 
whilst the RSP‟s account is credited with the amount.  Depending on how the payment 
system works, banks (A1) and (A2) will have to settle across their accounts at the central 
bank.
140
 
 
In order to transfer funds to its disbursing agent in country B, agent (B), the RSP gives 
instructions to its bank to transfer the amount by means of a international credit transfer to its 
account at bank (B1) in country B.
141
  The RSP then instructs bank (B1) to make a credit 
transfer of funds to agent (B)‟s bank account at bank account.  Agent (B) eventually pays the 
amount to R upon presentation of the transaction code which would have been relayed to 
them by S. 
 
Although the transaction has been outlined in a sequential manner it does not necessarily 
always transpire as such.  As mentioned previously,
142
 it is possible for a liquidity 
arrangement to be in effect.  If the latter where applicable to the scenario outlined above it 
would be possible for agent (B) to pay out the funds to R before actual receipt of the funds 
from the RSP.   
 
 
 
3 3   Remittance channels 
 
When a migrant decides to send funds beyond borders they have the option of channelling 
such funds through either formal or informal mechanisms. 
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3 3 1   Formal channels 
 
In formulating a description on formal channels reference can be made to the financial 
department of the IMF which has defined a formal RSP as: 
 
 “[A] provider that is regulated and overseen by competent government agencies for its  
remittance services”.143 
 
Taking the definition mentioned above into account, formal remittance channels can be 
described as being those that are operated within the legal and regulatory framework and that 
are subject to the supervision of a superior regulatory authority.  In the case of South Africa, 
the SARB would be the latter authority.  The key service providers within the formal 
remittance channels in the SADC region shall be outlined below. 
 
 
3 3 1 1   Banks 
 
In South Africa, as shall be outlined later on, in order to deal in foreign currency the 
individual or institution is required to have an authorised dealer license.
144
  Currently only 
banks are given full authorised dealer licenses which gives them a considerable level of 
leeway in regard to foreign currency transactions. 
 
Banks are traditionally an important means of effecting cross-border transactions, which can 
be attributed to their extensive networks in both sending and recipient countries as well as 
their participation in the international payment and settlement systems.
145
  Banks that have an 
international presence may use their own networks to make cross-border transfers of money, 
whereas those that have a limited presence can, amongst other options, use correspondent 
banking relationships or a franchised network operated by a global money transfer 
operator.
146
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The common method utilized by banks in transferring funds is by means of telegraphic 
transfers.  These are cross-border account-to-account transfers that are subject to a minimum 
commission fee as well as the payment of a SWIFT fee.  Telegraphic transfers require that 
both the sender and recipient be holders of bank accounts, the transfer can take as little as 10 
minutes to effect but 2 days to clear.
147
 
 
Bank telegraphic transfer services are mainly tailored for individuals with bank accounts and 
who are at the upper end of the income scale.  The minimum fees charged make it 
unfavourable to send small amounts of money as the sender can face transaction charges 
equal to 16.39% of the amount they wish to send.
148
  Studies indicate that low-income 
migrants in the SADC remittance market tend to remit fairly small amounts of money.
149
  
Taking the latter into account, minimum fees charged by banks may make it unfavourable for 
a low-income migrant to utilise the services of a bank when they wish to remit funds.  
 
Other than telegraphic transfers, banks also offer internet as well as mobile international 
transfer services.  Previously, in South Africa such services were only available for domestic 
transfers.  ABSA and Western Union have recently introduced such services to ABSA‟s 
internet and cell phone banking clients, allowing them to send as well as receive cross–border 
remittances electronically.
150
    
 
Mobile payments
151
 can be described as transactions whereby customers are able to give 
payment instructions by means of their cell phone to either a merchant, payment service 
provider, or, as in the case of South Africa, a bank.  Upon being given the instruction, the 
institution proceeds to pay the specified amount towards the beneficiary.
152
  Transactions, 
reportedly, take between 2-3 minutes to execute,
153
 thereby offering much convenience and 
appeal.  The appeal of electronic services for the purposes of cross-border remittances is 
hampered by the fact that currently such services are only available to clients of ABSA bank 
thereby restricting the capacity of individuals to access such services.   
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The SARB is concerned that internet and mobile payment services can be utilised to 
circumvent Exchange Control laws and has therefore made their provision subject to certain 
restrictions.
154
  In regard to mobile and internet cross-border transfer transactions, money 
may only be sent under, and for, the following conditions and purposes:
155
 
 
 As earnings of foreign nationals who are temporarily resident in South Africa. 
 Alimony payments in respect of a court order. 
 As gifts other than those to charitable, religious, cultural or educational organisations. 
 
Apart from the restrictions mentioned above, constraints have also been placed in regard to 
the amount that an individual may transfer per transaction as well as annually.  In respect of 
each individual transaction the limit is either R30 000 or the maximum allowance applicable 
in respect of the senders ordinary internet or cell phone banking transactions or alternatively 
whichever is the lowest between the two. 
 
 
3 3 1 2   Money transfer operators 
 
Migrants who are unbanked have the option of engaging the services of money transfer 
operators.
156
  MTOs are financial companies that provide services in regard to cross-border 
transfer of funds using either their own internal network or another cross-border banking 
network.
157
  The services of Money Gram
158
 and Western Union,
159
 two of the worldwide 
leaders
160
 in this field of the formal remittance market, are currently available in South 
Africa. 
 
Global MTOs mostly implement franchised networking in the provision of their services, 
engaging entities such as, inter alia, banks, post offices and retail shops as agents.  MTOs 
such as the two mentioned above have the benefit of having a vast distribution network 
                                                          
154
 TechCentral “ABSA takes global money transfers online”. 
155
 Supra. 
156
 Hereinafter referred to as MTOs. 
157
 IMF International transactions in remittances 9. 
158
 For more information on Money Gram visit their website at http://www.moneygram.com (accessed 08-03-
2010). 
159
 For more information on Western Union visit their website at http://www.westernunion.com (accessed 08-
03-2010). 
160
 Bradford “International remittances” (2008) Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Payment systems research 
briefing 2. 
36 
 
around the globe that caters for the speed and convenience that remitters seek when sending 
funds.  In the appropriate environment MTOs can present formidable competition against 
banks in regard to provision of remittance services. 
 
 
3 3 1 3   The Post Office 
 
As an alternative to banks and MTOs, remitters have the option of engaging the services of 
the post office which is empowered to remit funds within and outside South Africa.
161
  In 
comparison to other formal RSPs, post offices have been outlined as having the largest 
outreach network
162
 which encompasses remote locations and can prove useful within 
developing countries that lack adequate financial infrastructure.   
 
Post offices either provide their own services for international money transfers or may act as 
agents of other money transfer agents.  They provide remittance products in the form of 
ordinary money orders and telegraphic money orders, the latter being speedier than ordinary 
money orders.
163
  
 
The post office‟s position within the remittance market is unique in that, unlike its 
counterparts, it is not subject to the Exchange Control Regulations.  This anomaly is 
attributed to the fact that its services were initiated prior to the passage of the Exchange 
Control laws.
164
  It is able to offer its services at a much cheaper price, which is partially a 
circumstance of the fact that it faces no regulatory compliance costs.  For remittances within 
the Common Monetary Area,
165
 which encompasses Lesotho, Namibia South Africa and 
Swaziland,
166
 a limitation of R2000 per transaction is imposed.  For remittances outside the 
CMA a limitation of R2000 per month for each individual is in place.  It is submitted that 
these value thresholds are easily accommodate the needs of low-income migrant worker.  
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The post office despite its unique situation is not immune from deficiencies.  For instance its 
money order services are not available for the Zimbabwe remittance corridor.
167
  Furthermore 
transactions via the post office have a longer time period and, unlike the services of MTOs 
such as Money Gram, receipt of funds is not immediate. 
 
 
3 3 1 4   Bureaux de change   
 
Foreign currency exchange bureaus may, in addition to their foreign currency conversion 
business, also provide remittance services.  They may do so on their own behalf or as agents 
of MTO‟s. 
 
 
3 3 2   Informal remittance channels 
 
The IMF has defined an informal RSP as: 
 
“[A] provider functioning without regulation or oversight of financial supervisors for its 
remittance services”168 
 
Taking into account the definition mentioned above, informal remittance channels can be 
described as being those that are operated outside the legal and regulatory framework.  Such 
remittance channels are often, but not necessarily, illegal.
169
  
 
Informal transfers are based on informal relationships and involve a high level of trust 
between the sender and the RSP.  These channels entail a high level of risk, on the part of the 
sender, as there is no guarantee of delivery and the sender has no legal recourse should the 
RSP fail to deliver.  In the South African remittance market, common providers of informal 
remittance services are long distance taxi drivers and friends.
170
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When sending funds via taxi drivers the procedure appears to vary dependant on whether the 
remitter is a friend or stranger to the taxi driver.
171
  If the remitter is familiar with the driver, 
transaction costs are lower or even foregone.
172
  No record of the transaction is maintained, 
making trust an essential component.  On the other hand, if the remitter is a stranger the 
procedure is more formalised.
173
  The sender approaches a taxi association office and together 
with the driver, who will be entrusted with the funds, counts the amount to be sent.  The 
value of the amount entrusted to the driver is recorded in a book kept at the office specifically 
for such purposes.  The recipient collects the funds from the taxi association office in the 
destination country and is required to know the number plate of the taxi as well as the name 
of the driver that delivered the money.   
 
Senders are often not insured against losses incurred due to theft or accidents.  Taxi drivers, 
on the other hand, are at times insured against such losses, more specifically in cases where 
transactions have been recorded in books at the taxi association office.
174
 
 
Remittances via friends or family are similar to those channelled via taxi drivers and are also 
highly trust based.  Remittances via these people are favourable as they allow for funds to be 
sent to recipients located in remote areas where infrastructural facilities may be inadequate or 
non-existent.  Furthermore transactions costs are low or may be foregone where the 
relationship between the sender and person entrusted with funds is close.
175
 
 
 On the broader international context more complex informal systems have developed, the 
„hawala‟ remittance system being chief in terms of notoriety. 
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3 4 3   Hawala  
 
3 4 3 1   Background 
  
The term „hawala‟ means transfer in Arabic,176 and gives a hint of where the system 
originated from.  The hawala remittance system originated in the Middle East, more 
specifically India and Pakistan, and was developed before western banking practises were 
established in the Middle East.
177
  The hawala remittance system has gradually spread all 
over the world, albeit under varying terminology.  For instance, in Pakistan it is known as 
hundi, whereas in China it goes by the name fei ch‟ien,178 in Zambia it goes by the name Mali 
a mbeleko.
179
   
 
The term hawala can be broadly viewed as a reference to money transfer mechanisms that 
exist in the absence of, or parallel to, conventional formal financial remittance channels.
180
   
 
 
3 4 3 2   The dynamics of a hawala remittance transaction 
 
In regard to the nature of the remittance network, hawala transactions can be classified under 
negotiated networks.
181
  Networking amongst hawaladars is crucial in order for the system to 
function efficiently.  Transfers are implemented by means of communications between 
members of a network of hawaladars.
182
  The prominent feature that distinguishes hawala 
remittance transactions from their counterparts in the formal financial sector is the heavy 
reliance on trust and the minimal, if any at all, use of negotiable instruments.
183
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Hawala remittance transactions typically involve the transfer of funds without necessarily 
physically or electronically moving funds between points.  Such may, however, be done for 
purposes of settling net positions.
184
  The functioning of the system shall be illustrated by 
means of a hypothetical transaction.   
 
S who is a migrant worker in South Africa wants to send R5000 to his brother R who is 
located in Zambia.  S approaches (A), a hawaladar in South Africa, whom he hands over the 
R5000 he wishes to send to R as well as a commission fee.  Hawaladar (A) then proceeds to 
contact (B), a hawaladar counterpart in Zambia, by phone, e-mail or any other convenient 
communication device.  (A) gives (B) details pertaining to the amount that S wishes to send 
and the identity of the recipient. (A) and (B) also agree on a transaction code.   
 
Upon agreeing upon a transaction code, with (B), (A) gives it to S who in turn provides it to 
R by way of, amongst other possibilities, a phone call or even a fax message.  S then 
approaches (B) and upon being provided with the correct transaction code (B) pays the funds 
to S in Zambian kwachas, before actually receiving funds from (A).  Transactions are not 
usually receipted and are therefore highly trust based.
185
   
 
Hawaladar (A) subsequently remains indebted to hawaladar (B), the latter has no guarantee 
of settlement and only has the expectation that (A) will settle the debt in future.  There are a 
number of ways in which settlement can transpire and a reverse transaction, which is, in the 
case of the aforementioned example a transaction from Zambia to South Africa, is one way in 
which the debt can be extinguished.
186
  At times a business relationship may exist between 
the hawaladars.  (B) may, for instance, supply timber to (A).  In the latter scenario the debt 
could be settled by means of over invoicing which would entail (B) supplying timber to (A) 
worth, for instance, R10 000 but instead writing an invoice of R15 000 so as to cover the 
R5000 that (A) owes him.
187
 
 
The transaction described above can be outlined by means of an illustration:
188
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3 4 3 3   Why hawala remittances continue to be utilised 
 
Hawala transactions are inevitably coupled with a high level of risk towards the consumer in 
that they are not receipted and are heavily reliant on trust.   The sender typically has no 
guarantee that the intended recipient will receive the funds and is forced to rely on the 
hawaladars word.  Despite this high level of risk, migrants continue to utilise hawala 
systems to send funds across borders which begs the question as to why such systems 
continue to be utilised. 
 
The persistent utilisation of hawala systems can be primarily attributed to the fact that 
remittance transactions channelled through hawaladars are cheaper than those executed 
through formal channels.  It has been estimated that hawala transactions can be lower than 
2% of the amount sought to be remitted.
189
   
 
The speed of hawala transactions also contributes to their continued usage.  Funds can be 
available almost immediately, which is much quicker in comparison to formal remittance 
mechanisms such as bank international wire transfers.  The latter transfers may at times take a 
minimum period of a week to be effected, which is partially a consequence of the need to 
comply with domestic as well as international regulations put in place to ensure the source or 
purpose of the funds are not illicit.
190
  Furthermore, in contrast to formal financial systems, 
hawala systems are not affected by weekends, holidays or time differences. 
 
Hawala systems, apart from the reasons mentioned above, also cater for migrants who do not 
valid travel documents in their possession or are illegally in a country.  In some cases the 
legal and regulatory regime of a country may require that some form of identification be 
presented before one can carry out a financial transaction with a formal financial institution.  
It may also be required that the latter inform the immigration department of any individuals 
who lack any or proper documentation.
191
  Hawala channels eliminate the bureaucracy that 
most formal financial institutions enforce as no passport or identification card is required 
prior to a transaction being carried out and transactions are carried out under anonymity.  In 
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the absence of systems such as hawala, the migrant without proper, or any, documentation 
would be unable to remit funds.   
 
 
3 4 4   Channel preferences 
 
Remittances within the SADC are predominantly channelled via informal mechanisms, a 
circumstance that is not unique to South Africa alone but commonplace in the international 
remittance industry as whole.
192
  In South Africa it has been estimated that more than 50% of 
remittances transactions are executed outside the formal sector with taxi drivers and friends 
being the preferred RSPs, whilst on the formal side, the post office is the preferred means of 
remitting funds.  The preferences can be illustrated by means of a table which shall be given 
below:
193
   
 
RSPs % of total international remittance flows 
Taxi drivers 21,3 
Friends/relatives 31,9 
Post office  31.9 
Bank 5,0 
Other  10 
  
Total 100 
Implied % of formal remittances (assuming that 
„other‟ refers to formal mechanisms) 
 
46,9 
   
 
In Zambia the position is the same, informal mechanisms are the predominant means of 
remitting funds,
194
 with bus drivers being a popular conduit.   
 
It is submitted that from a risk perspective, on the part of the consumer, the preference for 
informal channels, is peculiar.  Formal channels are safer a remittance channel in terms of 
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guaranteeing the delivery of funds to the recipient.  Despite this informal channels, which 
commonly do not offer a consumer any form of recourse in the event of non-delivery, are the 
preferred means of sending remittances.  The latter begs the question as to why the status quo 
is such.  In doing so one can take into account the challenges that the international remittance 
payment system encounters, some of which have already be mentioned in the discussion on 
hawala transactions. 
 
 
3 5   Factors that influence the use of informal remittance channels 
 
3 5 1   Introduction  
 
Migrants who chose to send funds through informal channels do so for a variety of reasons, 
some of which have been outlined in the discussion on hawala remittances.  Factors such as 
cost, speed of the service, as well as consumer perceptions of formal remittance channels, 
amongst other factors, affect a remitter‟s choice of channel.  High transaction costs have been 
cited as being the principle factor that inhibit migrant from using formal remittance 
services,
195
 and as such the cost aspect of remittances shall be discussed below. 
 
 
3 5 2   Costs 
 
For migrants, the costs of sending funds through formal remittance channels is often 
expensive relative to the amount sought to be sent as well as their often low incomes.
196
  The 
costs of remitting from South Africa to other African countries have been reported to range 
between 12-35% of the value sought to be sent.
197
  The World Bank data base on worldwide 
remittance prices for the fourth quarter of 2008 outlined South Africa as having some of the 
highest remittance prices on a global front, with the South-Africa–Zambia corridor being 
ranked amongst some the most expensive corridors in the world.
198
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Remittances through informal mechanisms have been cited as being generally cheaper than 
those executed through formal channels.
199
  The prevalence of high remittance costs can be 
attributed to the following factors:
200
 
 
 lack of transparency in the market; 
 infrastructural inadequacies; 
 legal and regulatory provisions;  
 lack of competitive market conditions; and 
 risk. 
 
These factors and their influence on remittance costs shall be examined below. 
 
 
3 5 2 1   Lack of transparency  
 
The lack of transparency in the global remittance market has been cited as being one of the 
principle factors that facilitate high remittance prices.
201
  Transparency, in the context of 
remittance transactions, entails giving a consumer a full outline of the overall price and speed 
of service.
202
  Apart from enabling consumers to make informed decisions in regard to which 
RSPs services to utilise it makes the market as a whole more efficient.
203
  
 
It is generally difficult for consumers to calculate and compare prices due to the variables that 
make up remittance prices.  Remittance prices are composed of the fee charged for sending a 
certain amount, a margin taken on the exchange rate when remittances are paid and received 
in different countries, and at times a fee is charged to the recipient.
204
  The latter fee 
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components may also differ depending on aspects such as inter alia whether the recipient is 
paid in cash, or the funds are credited to their account, as well as the speed of the service.
205
    
 
The variables comprised in remittance transaction fees make calculation of remittance costs, 
by a consumer, a difficult task and may in turn prohibit them from determining which 
services are more suitable to their needs and financial abilities.  The inability to determine 
remittance costs has a negative effect on competition as consumers continue to patronise 
traditional RSPs, as they are unable to compare the services of these RSPs against those of 
other service providers.
206
  As a means of making remittance prices more transparent and to 
put pressure on RSPs to improve their services and cut down transaction prices the World 
Bank group has created a global database on remittance prices.
207
 
 
 
3 5 2 2   Infrastructural inadequacies 
 
In order for a remittance system to function adequately it is necessary to have access points 
were consumers can pay and retrieve funds.
208
  RSPs, particularly those that provide 
franchised or unilateral services, often have to partner with institutions in receiving countries 
so as to provide access points.   
 
At times the domestic financial infrastructure in recipient countries is underdeveloped and the 
banking, or other potential network of agents, may not have an adequate geographical 
coverage which creates access problems for recipients.
209
  In remittance terminology this is 
referred to as “the last mile challenge”.  In circumstances were such geographical coverage is 
inadequate, recipients may find themselves travelling over long distances to access funds and 
hence overall transaction costs are increased.
210
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3 5 2 3   The legal and regulatory environment 
 
Like most financial services, remittance services are subject to anti-money laundering and 
combating financing of terrorism legislation.  These laws impose know your customer or 
customer due diligence obligations that require financial institutions to gather, what at times 
can be extensive, information from their clients as well as report on suspicious 
transactions.
211
  These regulatory requisites may impose compliance costs which can have an 
impact upon remittance transaction fees. 
 
Regulatory requirements can also bear significant implications for the competition within the 
remittance industry, especially in circumstances were RSPs are required to be in possession 
of a license or registered to provide remittance services.  A potential effect of the latter would 
be the limitation of competition within the remittance market by excluding potential RSPs 
from entering into the remittance industry.  More so, if the fees for licensing and registration 
are expensive
212
 or were only certain financial institutions are awarded such licenses or are 
entitled to registration.  Economic theory suggests that the less competitive a market is, the 
higher the price of products and services in the market will be.
213
 
 
 
3 5 2 4   Lack of competitive market conditions 
 
It has been said that the key method to reducing the price of remittance services and making 
them more accessible, lies in increasing the level of competition within the international 
remittance industry.
214
  The international remittance industry in Africa is characterised by a 
limited level of competition
215
 attributable to a variety of reasons. 
 
The low level of competition can partially be attributed to the exclusivity agreements which 
MTOs enter into with their agents.
216
  These agreements prohibit the latter from acting as 
agents of any other RSP.  Such agreements have negative implications for competition within 
the industry, particularly were the financial infrastructure is underdeveloped.  In instances 
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such as the latter, potential RSPs may find themselves in a position where they are unable to 
provide services due to lack of access points.  The latter subsequently deprives consumers of 
a variety in regard to available remittances services, culminating in an increased likelihood of 
monopolistic conditions ensuing.
217
  
 
Apart from exclusivity agreements, the level of competition within the industry is also 
affected by the lack of transparency in the international remittance industry.  The latter 
constrains competition between RSPs in that consumers are unable to compare prices and 
instead tend to patronise traditional market players.   
 
The regulatory environment also potentially constrains competition in circumstances where 
licensing is a pre-requisite for an individual or institution to deal in foreign currency.  Such 
pre-requisites can compromise a potential RSP‟s ability to enter into a remittance market.218 
 
 
3 5 2 5   Risk 
 
In providing remittance services RSP‟s face a variety of financial, legal, operational, fraud 
and reputational risks.
219
  A mutual concern for all participants in a remittance transaction is 
the risk that funds will be lost whilst in transition.  The question of who bears the risk 
depends on the nature of the remittance service.
220
  In regard to unilateral and franchised 
networks the RSP usually bears the risk.
221
  It is submitted that the exposure to such risk is 
inevitably taking into account when providing remittance services and plays a role in 
determining the costs of a transaction. 
 
 
4      CONCLUSION 
 
Within this chapter an outline has been given of the various arrangements commonly put in 
place by RSPs to allow for funds to be transferred from a sender in one country to a recipient 
in another.  In other words, a portrayal has been given of the payment system aspect of the 
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international remittance industry.  In doing so a description has been given of the various 
RSPs as well the different channels through which remittances are sent, with informal 
mechanisms being indicated as the preferred means of sending funds. 
 
The preference for informal mechanisms can partially be attributed to the high service costs 
associated with formal remittance channels.  These high costs are in turn, partially, a by-
product of various factors, of which the legal and regulatory environment has been outlined 
as being a possible factor.   
 
Within the subsequent chapters an analysis shall be made of the impact that the South 
African, Zambian and Zimbabwean legal and regulatory environment have upon the 
formalisation of remittances.  Aside from looking at how these laws and regulations impact 
upon the costs of remittances their impact upon an individual‟s capacity to access formal 
remittance channels shall also be analysed. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXCHANGE CONTROL 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
 
The term „foreign exchange controls‟ broadly refers to the various methods utilised by 
governments in an attempt to control the purchase and sale of foreign currency by residents 
as well as non-residents.  Countries that impose foreign currency controls can be referred to 
as „Article 14 countries‟, denoting the provision in the IMF Articles Of Agreement that 
allows for exchange controls in provisional economies.
222
   
 
Some of the common methods implemented in the enforcement of exchange control entail:
223
 
 
 Banning the use of foreign currency within a country 
 Banning locals from possessing foreign currency 
 Restricting currency exchange to Government approved exchangers 
 Fixed exchange rates 
 Restricting the amount of currency that can be imported or exported 
 
Prior to the 90‟s foreign exchange controls were more common amongst poorer countries.224 
However, as free trade and globalization increased, a gradual trend towards economic 
liberalisation was initiated and exchange controls were either loosened or abolished all 
together.
225
  In present day, countries that still impose foreign exchange controls are an 
exception rather than the norm.
226
  South Africa is a country that still maintains and imposes 
foreign exchange controls.   
 
This chapter seeks to examine how these laws impact upon the remittance industry and make 
recommendations were such is felt necessary to facilitate the formalisation of remittances.  
Prior to doing so however, it is necessary for a brief discussion on the history of exchange 
control in South Africa be given.   
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2   THE HISTORY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Exchange control laws were initially introduced in South Africa and other members of the 
British sterling area in 1939 towards the beginning of the Second World War.
227
  At that 
point in time exchange controls were introduced as part of the Emergency Finance 
Regulations that were implemented by a select group of countries, mostly members of the 
British Commonwealth, during as well as after the Second World War.  Initially the objective 
of these Emergency Finance Regulations was to maintain the free movement of funds, 
emanating mainly from the United Kingdom, between Sterling Area countries whilst 
preventing the outflow of funds into non-Sterling Area countries.
228
  Eventually the 
restrictions were extended to transactions between Sterling Area countries as well.
229
 
 
After the end of the Second World War, the Sterling Area exchange controls were gradually 
phased out.  South Africa, however, did not abolish exchange controls and, in 1961, opted to 
extend these controls and tailored them to specifically suit the South African context.
230
  The 
latter controls placed a restriction on the outflow of funds from South Africa to the rest of the 
world.  The decision to place these restrictions centred, primarily, around the events 
emanating from the political situation that was prevalent at the time, more specifically by the 
events that transpired after the Sharpeville massacre on March 21 1960
231
 and South Africa‟s 
withdrawal from the British Commonwealth.
232
   
 
The volatile political situation foresaw large outflows of capital that were unrelated to any 
financial underpinnings and eventually resulted in the domestic economy being deprived of 
liquidity and savings that were essential in order for it to develop.
233
  At this point in time 
exchange controls were enforced with the intention of protecting the South African economy 
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from the adverse effect of large scale outflows of capital.
234
  One of the distinguishing effects 
of these controls was that, for the first time in South Africa, exchange control restricted the 
repatriation of non-resident investment funds from the country.
235
   
Over the years the political situation in the country continued to deteriorate and capital 
outflows unrelated to any underlying financial fundamentals continued to transpire.  An 
incidental consequence of these continued outflows of capital was the further intensification 
of exchange controls.
236
 
 
In the period following 1985 severe pressure was exerted on the domestic economy due to, 
inter alia, international sanctions and trade boycotts, prompting further intensification of 
exchange control laws.
237
  Some of the control measures that were implemented to intensify 
exchange control entailed the application of restrictive measures upon a few current-account 
transactions whilst outward movement of funds by residents were subject to prior approval by 
exchange control authorities.
238
 
 
Following the announcement of the election of a Government of National Unity towards the 
end of 1993, the non-economic factors that had foreseen large scale outflows of capital from 
South Africa, during the period between 1960 and the early 90‟s, disappeared.239  Despite the 
fact that a large amount of funds continued to flow out of South Africa during the beginning 
of 1994, a dramatic turn of events ensued thereafter.
240
   
 
During the second half of 1994 there was a net inflow of more than R9 billion into the 
country.  In the following year there was a net inflow of R21,7 billion which brought the total 
net inflow capital, for the period between July 1994 to December 1995, to more than R30 
billion.
241
  The renewed capital inflow paved the way for exchange controls in South Africa 
to be phased out, and there was general view that they were not in the interests of the 
country‟s optimal economic growth and development.242 
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There was a strong divergence of views in regard to how fast the exchange controls were to 
be removed.  One school of thought favoured what is often referred to as the “big-bang” 
approach,
243
 which advocated the immediate removal of exchange control in a single bold 
move.  In order for such an approach to be successful it may have required the 
implementation of measures such as, amongst others, a sharp depreciation of the exchange 
rate, extremely high interest rates, application of a very restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 
so as to gain the confidence of local and foreign investors.
244
  Without such adjustments the 
immediate abolition of exchange controls would lead to the balance of payments being 
critically compromised and could necessitate the re-institution of exchange controls.
245
 
 
The immediate removal of exchange control laws could also result in large outflows of 
capital.  At the time when abolition of exchange control was being debated South Africa had 
an extremely low level of foreign currency reserves.  This effectively rendered it impossible 
for the SARB to provide any meaningful support to the foreign exchange market in the event 
of large capital outflows from the country.
246
 
 
In opposition of the immediate abolishment of exchange controls, others advocated for a 
gradual phasing out of exchange control.
247
  The South African authorities decided to 
implement for the latter approach.
248
  Hence South Africa still maintains, albeit, less strict, 
exchange control laws and these continue to be loosened and shall eventually be rendered 
non-existent over time. 
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3   THE CURRENT FACE OF EXCHANGE CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3 1   The Exchange Control Regulations 
 
Exchange control in South Africa is currently regulated by the Exchange Control Regulations 
of 1961
249
 which have been issued in terms of section 9 of the Currency and Exchanges 
Act.
250
  The latter Act forms the foundation of exchange control in South Africa and 
empowers the President to issue regulations in regard to any matter that affects or relates to, 
directly or indirectly, banks currency or exchanges.
251
 
 
The administration of the Exchange Control Regulations is a function that has been bestowed 
upon the Treasury.
252
  The Minister of finance has however, as empowered by the Exchange 
Control Regulations,
253
 delegated some of the powers and functions of the Treasury to the 
SARB.
254
  The SARB in turn established the Exchange Control Department, now known as 
the Financial Surveillance Department,
255
 to administer the regulations.  The Department has 
subsequently appointed certain banks as authorized dealers and these assist in the 
administration of exchange control laws in South Africa.
256
 
 
 
3 2   The purpose of exchange control 
 
The SARB has outlined the following reasons as being at the core of exchange control in 
South Africa namely:
 257
 
 
 to ensure that certain foreign currency acquired by South African residents is timeously 
repatriated into the South African banking system; and 
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 to prevent the loss of South Africa‟s foreign currency resources through cross-border 
transfer of real or financial capital assets held in South Africa. 
 
The balance of South Africa‟s foreign currency is known as its foreign currency reserves and 
these funds are primarily earned by means of foreign borrowings and through the export of 
goods and services abroad.
258
  South Africa‟s foreign exchange reserves are primarily utilised 
to pay for goods and services that are imported into the country and to service its foreign 
debt.
259
  It is essential for a country to have foreign currency reserves in order for it to 
develop adequately.
260
 
 
Exchange control in South Africa is a means of ensuring, amongst other concerns, that the 
foreign currency reserves that are available are utilised in the best interests of the country.
261
  
Exchange control laws and regulations accommodate the latter purpose by making provision 
for the movement of funds and goods, into as well as out off, South Africa to monitored 
whilst at the same time avoiding interference with the industrial and financial systems of the 
country.
262
 
 
 
3 3   Exchange control and the remittance industry 
 
Different Exchange Control rulings apply to transactions of residents of the Common 
Monetary Area
263
 and those of non-CMA residents.
264
  The CMA encompasses Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa.
265
  These countries form a single exchange territory 
and Exchange control restrictions do not apply between them.
266
   
 
Although each CMA member has its own exchange regulations and authorities they are 
required, in terms of the CMA agreement, to enforce exchange control at a level that is, at 
minimum, as strict as that which is applicable in South Africa.
267
  Transactions between the 
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CMA members are not subject to any trade or exchange limitations and are therefore not 
subject to exchange control approval.
268
  On the other hand, transactions between CMA 
members and non CMA members are subject to exchange control approval. 
 
Although different rulings apply in regard to transactions that fall within the territorial area of 
the CMA and those that fall outside the CMA, the Exchange Control Regulations do not 
prohibit individuals from remitting funds outside South Africa per se.
269
  Individuals are 
permitted, subject to certain restrictions and the fulfilment of certain requisites, to remit funds 
from South Africa even if they are destined for countries that fall outside the scope of the 
CMA area.   
 
In regard to the previously mentioned restrictions and requisites the following matters come 
to the fore: 
 
 authorised dealer licenses; 
 the SARB cross border foreign exchange transaction reporting system; 
 the residential status of the remitter; and 
 the nature of the transaction.  
 
Each of the issues mentioned above are discussed within the paragraphs that follow. 
 
 
3 3 1   Authorised dealer licenses 
 
An authorised dealer, in regard to foreign exchange transactions, is a person that has been 
authorised by the Treasury to deal in foreign currency.
270
  In terms of the Exchange Control 
Regulations only authorised dealers may deal in foreign currency, unless an exception is 
granted by the Treasury.
271
  International remittance transactions that go beyond the CMA 
require service providers to deal in foreign currency.
272
  Therefore, in order to provide cross-
border remittance services in South Africa, an institution or person is required to be in 
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possession of an authorised dealer license
273
 and this technically renders the provision of 
informal remittance services an illegal activity. 
 
As mentioned previously,
274
 the Treasury has delegated certain powers and functions to the 
SARB.  Amongst the powers that have been delegated to the SARB is the power to appoint 
authorised dealers.  Applications for authorised dealer licenses have to be presented to the 
Financial Surveillance Department of the SARB.  Upon approval an applicant is awarded 
either a license that grants full authority to deal in foreign currency or, alternatively, a limited 
authorised dealer license.  
 
Limited authorised dealer licenses, as their name suggests, limit the transactions in regard to 
which the licensee is permitted to deal in foreign currency.  Such licenses are commonly 
awarded to bureaux de change, and previously restricted the licensee to transactions that are 
of personal nature such as those involving the purchase and sale of foreign currency for travel 
related purposes.
275
   
 
Until fairly recently the only institutions that were permitted to carry out cross-border 
remittances were those in possession of a license granting full authorisation to deal in foreign 
currency, with the post office being the only exception to this rule.
276
  The SARB was, and 
currently still is, only willing to grant authorised dealer licenses to institutions with banking 
licenses.  Institutions with limited authorised dealer licenses
277
 were expressly prohibited 
from partaking in any cross-border remittance businesses.
278
  The SARB has, however, 
extended the services that ADLAs are permitted to provide to include the provision of cross-
border remittance services, hence foreign exchange bureaus such as American Express and 
Travelex Africa are now able to provide remittance services within as well out of South 
Africa.
279
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At the present moment banks and bureaux de change are the only entities that the SARB is 
willing to grant authorisation to carry out remittance transactions.  Hence RSP‟s such as 
MTOs have to form partnerships with the latter institutions, or the post office, if they wish to 
provide services in South Africa.  The reasons behind the SARB‟s restrictive policy, in regard 
to institutions it is willing to grant authority to conduct remittance transactions, are not clear 
cut.  One could, however, argue that such an approach is a necessity in order to avoid 
systemic risk to the NPS.
280
  The conservative approach of the SARB could also be attributed 
to its previous encounters with Western Union.
281
    
 
Even if MTOs were allowed to provide their services as standalone entities they would still 
face a potentially significant barrier in accessing the remittance industry by virtue of the 
reporting requisites imposed by the SARB.  These require foreign currency dealers to have a 
reporting system, known as the South African Cross Border- Foreign Exchange Transaction 
Reporting System, in place. 
 
 
3 3 2   The SARB Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System 
 
Whenever a South African resident makes a payment to a non-resident, the authorised dealer 
involved in the transaction is required to report to the SARB, giving details of the payment, 
regardless of how small the amount being paid may be.
282
  Therefore every international 
remittance transaction that falls outside the CMA must be reported to the SARB.   
 
The reporting is done via the SARB‟s Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting 
System which each authorised dealer must be in possession of so as to comply with the 
exchange control laws of South Africa.  An institution that applies for an authorised dealer 
license must, within their application, give full details in regard to their proposed planning 
and implementation of the Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System,
283
 
and may only commence business upon successful testing and implementation of the 
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system.
284
  The system is reportedly relatively expensive to install
285
 and it is submitted that 
theses costs can act as a barrier to potential RSPs that wish to enter that remittance market.   
 
The data that is required to be provided with each transaction is quite extensive and calls 
upon the authorised dealer to request the remitter for the following information:
286
  
 
 Residents are required to provide a full name, residence permit number an address as well 
as either an e-mail address, phone or fax number. 
 Non-residents are required to provide their full name, country code and if possible an 
address. 
 The value of the transaction in both the local as well as foreign currency concerned    must 
be specified. 
 The purpose of the transaction. 
 
The ability to report on transactions plays a crucial role in determining whether or not an RSP 
can enter the remittance industry and its ability to maintain its position as an RSP.  Part of 
Western Union‟s reasons for withdrawing its services from South Africa in 2001 can be 
attributed to the SARB‟s reporting requisites.287   
 
Previously Western Union was represented by Union African Money Transfer
288
 a company 
registered for the sole purpose of representing Western Union in South Africa and that had 
obtained permission from the SARB to operate via ABSA bank, one of the major authorised 
dealers in South Africa.  UAMT found itself facing substantial difficulties in complying with 
regulatory requisites with matters coming to a head in 2001 when the SARB introduced new 
time limits in regard to the period within which transactions were to be reported to it.   
 
The new time frame stipulated by the SARB required transactions to be reported within 24 
hours as opposed to the previous one week period.  The previous period allowed for UAMT 
to report transactions via ABSA.  The new periods, on the other hand, made it necessary for 
UAMT to report transactions directly to SARB making it necessary for it to install reporting 
systems in all its outlets in order for them to comply with Exchange Control requirements. 
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The costs of installing and complying with the new system rendered a variety of UAMT‟s 
outlets economically unviable and it was forced to scale down its network from over 150 
outlets to a mere 17.  The remaining outlets were overburdened and service quality 
deteriorated and Western Union, faced with other problems, decided to pull out its services 
from South Africa.
289
     
 
 
3 3 2 1    The purpose of the SARB Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction 
Reporting System 
 
One of the reasons for applying Exchange control in South Africa is to ensure that the 
country‟s foreign currency reserves are utilised its best interests.290  It is essential to protect 
foreign currency reserves from depletion as such could lead to devaluation of the local 
currency and macroeconomic instability.
291
   In order for foreign currency reserves to be 
adequately protected procedures and mechanisms have to be put in place to monitor how they 
are being utilised.   The SARB Cross Border Transaction Reporting System is a mechanism 
used to monitor how the foreign currency reserves of South Africa are utilised. 
 
The SARB Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System enables the SARB 
to monitor the movement of foreign currency into, as well as, out of South Africa, to a certain 
extent,
292
 thereby assisting it in the protection of foreign currency reserves.  In addition to 
providing a means for the SARB to monitor foreign currency movements, it also aides the 
SARB in the compilation balance of payments data.
293
 
 
 
3 3 3   The residential status of the remitter 
 
The identity of the remitter plays a pivotal role in regard their ability to access formal 
financial institutions and their services.  The Exchange control regulations distinguish 
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between transactions of residents, non-residents, temporary residents, immigrants and 
emigrants.
294
  The latter two categories are not relevant for the purposes of this dissertation. 
 
 
3 3 3 1   Residents 
 
Residents are defined as persons, natural or juristic, who have taken up permanent residence, 
are domiciled or registered in South Africa.
295
  The definition is wide enough to encompass 
individuals who are South African by birth as well as those who become South Africans by 
way of registration.   
 
The Exchange Control Regulations place no restrictions on this category of individuals in 
regard to their ability to access banking as well as other formal financial services.
296
  They 
are permitted to remit funds from South Africa provided that the transaction is for an 
authorised purpose and the value of the amount sent falls within the prescribed limits.  
 
 
3 3 3 2   Non-residents 
 
This category of individuals encompasses persons, natural or juristic, whose normal place of 
business, residence or registration falls outside the CMA.
297
  Non-residents are prohibited 
from working in South Africa and therefore cannot legally earn an income by working in 
South Africa.
298
  This, in turn, limits their ability to access the services of financial 
institutions as foreigners are required to verify the source of the funds that they wish to 
remit.
299
  Migrants who are illegally present in South Africa fall into this category.
300
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3 3 3 3   Temporary residents 
 
Temporary residents are defined as natural persons of countries that fall outside the CMA that 
have taken up temporary residence in South Africa, excluding those who are purely in the 
country on a temporary visit.
301
  Contract workers are encompassed within this category. 
Temporary residents, for purposes of exchange control, are treated more or less like 
residents.
302
  They are treated as such in order to avoid unnecessary administrative procedures 
that would ensue if they were to be treated as non-residents.
303
  Temporary residents are 
therefore allowed to open bank accounts and have access to other financial services.   
 
Individuals that fall within this category are also permitted to remit money they have earned 
whilst working in South Africa.
304
  In order to do so, however, they must be able to 
substantiate the source of the funds and the value of the amounts being sent must be 
reasonable in relation to the income generating activities of the individual.
305
   
 
 
3 3 4   The nature of the transaction 
 
The purpose of a remittance transaction is a factor that must be taken into account in 
determining whether or not a transaction is permissible in terms of the Exchange control laws 
of South Africa.  Authorised dealers, when carrying out transactions, are required to make an 
enquiry in regard to the purpose for which funds are sent and must include their findings in 
the report that is submitted to the SARB.
306
   
A person seeking to purchase foreign currency from an authorised dealer is required to give 
an accurate description of the purpose for which they seek the foreign currency.
307
  The 
remitter must also provide any further information in regard to the transaction that the dealer 
may request.
308
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According to regulation 2
309
 authorised dealers may only sell or buy foreign currency, inter 
alia, for purposes specified and on conditions determined by the Treasury.  There are a 
variety of categories in regard to permissible purposes for which foreign currency may be 
purchased,
310
 for purposes of this dissertation the gift category is the most relevant as this is 
the category within which remittances can be more appropriately classified into.  
 
In regard to monetary gift remittances to non residents, residents are given an annual 
allowance of R30 000 per person.
311
  Should they wish to remit funds that go beyond this 
limit an application must be made to the Financial Surveillance Department, which is willing 
to approve such requests in exceptional circumstances.
312
  For remittances that fall within the 
CMA area, no limit is applicable.
313
 
 
The limit imposed on the remittance of monetary gifts, between residents and non-residents, 
easily accommodates remittances by migrant workers who, ordinarily, remit amounts that are 
relatively low in terms of value.  Some of the other purposes for which remittances may be 
made for, just to mention a few, include alimony payments of up to R9000 per month over 
and above the amount awarded by the court and maintenance payment of up to R9000.
314
 
 
 
3 4   Analysis 
 
The exchange control laws of South Africa do not negatively impact upon the remittance 
industry in the sense of prohibiting remittances from South Africa.  On the contrary, 
remittances that go beyond the borders of South Africa and the CMA are permitted subject to 
certain restrictions and the fulfilment of certain pre-requisites.   
 
In addition to permitting outward remittance the laws allow for generous allowances when 
residents wish to remit funds to non-residents.  The exchange control laws hinder remittances 
in other ways, primarily through their capacity to present formidable barriers to potential 
remitters as well as their ability to compromise competition within the South African 
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remittance industry by prohibiting potential RSPs from entering the remittance market.  Each 
of these issues is discussed below. 
 
 
3 4 1   The impact of Exchange Control Laws on potential remitters 
 
An individual‟s ability to utilise the services of formal RSPs to remit funds from South Africa 
is influenced, to a great extent, by the legality of their presence in South Africa.  Exchange 
control laws effectively require RSPs to engage in the administration of immigration laws.  
This is portrayed by aspects such as the obligation placed on authorised dealers, when they 
engage in foreign currency transactions, to attain a residence permit number from clients who 
are not South African citizens.
315
   
 
In order for a transaction to be executed, the client must either be a citizen or in possession of 
a valid work, or residence, permit.  By virtue of such requisites migrants who enter South 
Africa without a valid permit or whose permit has expired find themselves being excluded 
from utilising formal remittance services.  Such individuals are forced to rely on informal 
remittance mechanisms when they wish to remit funds from South Africa. 
 
Another factor that compromises the ability of individuals to access formal remittance 
services, albeit in an indirect manner, is the obligation imposed on authorised dealers to 
report on the foreign exchange transactions they execute.  The fact that every transaction, 
regardless of the amount involved, must be reported to the SARB inevitably raises the costs 
that an RSP incurs in carrying out a transaction.
316
   
 
It is submitted that the costs incurred in reporting transactions to the SARB are ultimately 
passed on to the remitter as part of the transaction costs and contribute to the significantly 
high cost of sending money from South Africa.
317
  The high cost of remitting funds via 
formal mechanisms in turn acts as a barrier to low income consumers‟ access to formal 
remittance services and inclines them to utilise informal mechanisms to remit funds as a 
substitute. 
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3 4 2   The impact of Exchange Control laws on the level of competition within the 
remittance industry 
 
3 4 2 1    Introduction 
 
The level of competition within the remittance industry plays a role in determining the 
transaction costs that prevail in the market.  Taking this into account, the World Bank and 
CPSS have recommended that the level of competition within the remittance industry be 
increased so as to reduce the price of remittances and make them more accessible.
318
   
 
South African Exchange Control Regulations, by stating that only authorised dealers may 
deal in foreign currency, actively have an impact upon the level of competition within the 
remittance industry.  The provision of remittance services is an activity that inevitably 
requires an RSP to deal in foreign currency.  Without an authorised dealer license a potential 
RSP cannot legally provide remittance services within South Africa and is hence excluded 
from being a competitor within the industry. 
 
Aside from the issue of authorised dealer licenses the SARB‟s reporting requisites also play a 
significant role in determining a RSPs entrance into the remittance industry.  However, 
before an in depth analysis of these aspects is taken, it is necessary for a brief discussion the 
concept of „competition‟ to be carried out. 
 
 
3 4 2 2   „Competition‟  
 
In defining the concept of „competition‟ one can make reference to Lorimar Productions Inc. 
v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers.
319
  Van Dijkhorst J stated the following:   
 
“In general terms competition involves the idea of a struggle between rivals 
endeavouring to obtain the same end.  It may be said to exist whenever there is a 
potential diversion of trade from one to another.  For Competition to exist the articles 
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or services of the competitors should be related to the same purpose or must satisfy the 
same need.”320  
 
The term refers to the process by which competitors attempt to gain a competitive advantage 
over one another.
321
  The purpose of competition law, essentially, is to ensure that 
competition takes place on a level playing field.
322
  Free and fair competition subsequently 
benefits consumers through variety in product and service choice and lower prices.
323
 
According to economic theory, effective competition is usually achieved where there is a 
reasonable level of parity amongst a variety of competitors whom are able to exert strong 
mutual pressure and are not able to co-ordinate their behaviour as well as in conditions where 
entry into the market by new competitors is easy.
324
 
    
The ability of competitors to enter a market is compromised when barriers to such entry a 
significant.  Barriers to entry are obstacles that keep potential competitors out of a market 
whilst at the same time allowing existing and established firms to posses and abuse market 
power by, for instance, elevating prices beyond the level they would be at under competitive 
conditions.
325
  Another effect of such barriers is that smaller firms are given an opportunity to 
expand and attain market power.
326
  Barriers to entry may be presented in the form of legal 
and regulatory requisites well as costs of entrance into the market. 
 
In analysing how competitive a market is, it is necessary that an analysis of the market 
structure be given.  A market structure is comprised of the number firms that exist, the 
relative size of the firms, technological costs and conditions as well as the ease with which 
firms can enter as well as exit the market.
327
  Economic theory suggests that the less 
competitive a market is, the higher the price of products and services in the market will be.
328
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3 4 2 3    The competitive environment of the South African remittance industry 
 
In terms of the Exchange Control Regulations, only authorised dealers are allowed to deal in 
foreign currency.
329
  Previously, the only institutions that were permitted to provide 
remittance services were those that were in possession of a license granting full authority to 
deal in foreign currency.  ADLAs were not permitted to be directly or indirectly involved in 
the provision of such businesses.
330
  This, in addition to the SARB‟s previous policy of 
awarding full authorisation licenses to banks alone, made it very difficult for non banking 
institutions to enter the remittance market as service providers.   
 
MTOs such as Western Union and MoneyGram had to form partnerships with banks so as to 
provide services in South Africa.  Such partnerships do not favour competition as remittance 
businesses that form partnerships with banks are constrained by the latter‟s transaction costs, 
hence compromising their ability to innovate and compete on price.
331
  Studies indicate that 
remittance prices are higher in markets were MTOs are required to partner with banks in 
order to provide remittance services.
332
 
 
The SARB, in a move that is aimed at increasing the competitive level in the South African 
remittance industry, has expanded the transactions that ADLAs are permitted to carry out to 
include remittance services, both within, and out of South Africa.
333
  Hence bureaux de 
change with limited authority to deal in foreign currency such as American Express and 
Travelex are now able to provide remittance services and are currently doing so in 
partnership with Western Union. 
 
Most ADLAs, instead of providing their own remittance products, act as agents of either 
Western Union or MoneyGram. The latter MTOs often require their agents to enter into 
exclusive agreements which prohibit them from acting as agents of other RSPs.
334
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If such agreements are in force in South Africa they could pose a potential threat to the 
development of competition with the remittance industry, taking into account that the SARB 
appears to favour that MTO‟s services be provided as part of a bank or foreign exchange 
bureau‟s services as opposed to the MTO‟s being stand alone entities.335  Exclusive 
agreements effectively prohibit the agents of MTO‟s from acting as agents of other MTO‟s.  
These agreements potentially compromises the capacity of other MTO‟s to enter the 
remittance industry as they could find themselves in a situation where they are unable to find 
any reputable authorised institutions with which they can form partnerships with.  The nature 
of these agreements shall be discussed further below 
 
 
3 4 2 4   Exclusive agreements 
 
In the field of Competition law, exclusive agreements can be classified as vertical 
agreements.  Vertical agreements are agreements that exist between parties in a vertical 
relationship.
336
  In South Africa a vertical relationship is defined as being the relationship that 
exists between a firm and it suppliers, customers or both.
337
   
 
An example of a vertical agreement would be an agreement between a firm in the upstream 
market which, in the South African international remittance context, would be an MTOs such 
as Western Union, and suppliers in the downstream market, the latter being agents such as 
banks  bureaux de change and post offices.
338
  According to section 1(1) of the Competition 
Act
339
 it is not necessary for a contract to have been concluded for a vertical agreement to 
exist.  Any arrangement or understanding between parties in a vertical relationship regardless 
of whether or not it is legally enforceable can qualify as a vertical agreement. 
 
Exclusive agreements, unlike minimum resale price maintenance agreements,
340
 are not 
prohibited per se and are classified under the non-price vertical restraints.
341
  They are only 
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prohibited if they substantially prevent or lessen competition in a market and a party to the 
agreement cannot prove that it presents pro-competitive gains that outweigh its anti-
competitive.
342
  The latter entails carrying out what is known as „a rule of reason analysis‟.343  
Such an analysis is carried out for agreements that are likely to have pro-competitive as well 
as anti-competitive effects and requires the following to be taken into consideration:
344
 
 
 Whether or not the agreement leads to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition 
within the market? 
 Whether the benefits of the agreement outweigh the possible anti-competitive effects? 
 Whether it is necessary for the agreement to be in place in order for the claimed benefits to 
be attained? 
 
In determining whether or not an agreement is anti-competitive it is necessary for the 
structure of the relevant market as well as the position of the upstream and downstream 
supplier in the market to be examined.  The more prominent the position of the relevant 
suppliers in the market is, the more likely it is that the agreement will be anti-competitive.
345
 
 
It is submitted that the market structure of the remittance industry in South Africa is one 
within which a limited number of RSPs exist.  This is attributable to the fact that potential 
RSPs face considerable regulatory barriers when they attempt to enter the remittance market.  
Amongst the barriers that RSPs face, are factors such as the need to be in possession of an 
authorised dealer license in order to deal in foreign currency.  Remittances transactions 
inevitably require the RSP to deal in foreign currency prompting individuals or institutions 
wishing to provide such services to obtain authorised dealer licenses.  
 
At the present moment the SARB is only willing to award authorised dealer licenses to banks 
and bureaux de change,
346
 which limits the number of RSPs in the market and makes banks 
and Bureaux de change prominent downstream suppliers.  In South Africa can be considered 
to be Western Union and MoneyGram are prominent upstream suppliers of remittance 
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services therefore, taking into account the nature of the market structure, vertical agreements 
between them and authorised dealers are more likely to be anti-competitive. 
 
The Competition Tribunal has stated that evidence of anti-competitive effects of a vertical 
agreement can be presented in the form of:
347
 
 
 Consumers being exploited. This can be in the form of exposure to higher prices and 
restricted choice in regard to products and services; 
 Competitors being denied entrance or expansion in the market; and 
 Customer foreclosure.348 
 
It is submitted that the effects mentioned above are already being felt in the South African 
remittance market.  The latter is stated taking into mind that potential RSPs face considerable 
barriers to entrance into the remittance market as well as the fact that South Africa is listed as 
having some of the highest remittance prices in the world.  It is submitted further, that 
applying exclusive agreements within the South African remittance industry would 
exacerbate these negative aspects.  
 
One could argue that exclusive agreements, despite being an impediment to inter-brand 
competition present benefits such as the promotion of more intense inter-brand 
competition.
349
  The latter could, in turn, foster better service delivery to consumers.  It is 
submitted that, in the South African international remittance market, such beneficial effects 
are outweighed by the fact they would only exacerbate the negative effects of limited 
competition such as restricted service choice and high remittance prices.   
 
Imposing exclusivity agreements within a market that already has significant legal, as well as 
financial, barriers to entrance, would only stifle competition to an even further extent and 
ultimately be detrimental to consumers.  In a market structure such as that of South Africa‟s 
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international remittance industry, which has limited variety of authorised RSPs, exclusive 
agreements would facilitate monopolistic conditions allowing for prices to be set above a 
competitive level. 
 
 
3 4 2 5    Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that the South African international remittance industry can be classified as 
having an oligolopy market structure.  An oligolopy market structure is one within which a 
limited number of firms participate in the sale of products and services.
350
  Firms that wish to 
enter such markets find themselves facing significant barriers that impede their entry.
351
 
 
Oligopoly market structures raise concern due to the fact that they can enable a single firm to 
control prices and act independently of other firms enabling it to hinder effective 
competition.
352
 Alternatively, if the existing firms are more or less of equal size there is a 
possibility, according to economic theory, that firms will act collusively and exert co-
operative market power as opposed to them competing against each other.
353
  If firms are to 
act concretively the benefits associated with free and fair competition, namely lower prices 
and variety of choice, are lost. 
 
South Africa‟s Exchange Control laws combined with the SARB‟s policies foster an anti-
competitive environment by requiring that an institution or person be in possession of an 
authorised dealer license in order provide remittance services, with the Post Office being the 
only exception to this law.  Currently only banks and bureaux de change posses such 
licenses
354
 hence MTOs such as Western Union has formed partnerships with these 
institutions so as to provide its remittance services in South Africa.  MTOs such as Western 
Union often require agents to enter into exclusivity agreements which prohibit them from 
being the agents of other money transfer providers.
355
  Such agreements effectively affect the 
ability of other MTO‟s to enter the remittance market and foster conditions which allow 
prices to be set beyond competitive levels. 
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The low level of competition is also exacerbated by the fact that all foreign exchange 
transactions must be reported to the SARB by using the Cross Border Foreign Exchange 
Transaction Reporting System.  The time within which transactions must be reported is very 
limited and more or less forces RSPs to invest in an in house reporting system.  The costs of 
installing SARB‟s reporting system are, reportedly, quite extensive.  It is submitted that such 
costs can pose a significant barrier to potential RSPs that may wish to enter the remittance 
industry, but lack the finance to invest in the system.   
 
 
4   EXCHANGE CONTROL IN ZAMBIA 
 
4 1   Introduction  
 
Zambia, in contrast to South Africa, does not have any foreign exchange control laws.  
Exchange control laws were effectively abolished on the 28
th
 of January 1994.
356
  Such was 
done for purposes of eradicating barriers that were posed to private businesses and 
individuals, in order to facilitate mobility of resources and consequently allow for investment 
in the economy.
357
  It was envisioned that the latter would in turn, promote growth as well as 
economic development.  
 
Zambia does, however, have policies and laws that impact upon the remittance industry.  
These shall be looked at below, as a means of making a comparison with the status quo in 
South Africa.  The most relevant pieces of legislation for the purposes of this chapter are the 
Banking and Financial Services Act
358
 and the National Payment System Act.
359
 
 
 
4 2   The Financial Sector Development Plan 
 
The Zambian Government has committed itself to the task of establishing a well-developed 
financial sector which it realises is essential in order for it attain sustainable economic growth 
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and eradicate poverty.
360
  The Financial Sector Development Plan,
361
 which was launched in 
2004, embodies this commitment.
362
   
 
At the time that the FSDP was initiated, the Zambian financial sector was characterised by 
several weaknesses such as, for instance, low financial intermediation, and low income 
consumers had a very limited access to financial services.
363
  The financial services sector 
was dominated by commercial banks, due to the fact that a large number of the public 
institutions that would ordinarily provide financial services to the average consumer were 
either, ineffective, or, had closed down.
364
  In response to these, as well as other, weaknesses 
faced by the financial sector the Government launched the FSDP.
365
 
 
The FSDP is, amongst other things, a strategy that aims to foster greater financial inclusion 
within the Zambian financial sector and to improve low income consumers‟ ability to access 
the financial system.
366
  It is also aimed at developing the non-banking financial sector, so as 
to create a more balanced financial structure and promote competition.
367
  The objectives of 
creating greater diversity, in terms of financial service providers, and promoting competition 
in the financial sector are reflected within the Zambian legislation that impacts upon the 
remittance industry.  Such legislation shall be examined and discussed below.  
 
 
4 3   The Banking and Financial Services Act 
 
The Banking and Financial Services Act regulates the Zambian financial sector and provides 
for, amongst other things, the licensing of banks as well as other financial institutions, their 
organisation, administration, financial accountability, supervision and prudential 
regulation.
368
  The Act permits banks to, amongst a variety of other services, engage in the 
provision of money transfer services and facilities.
369
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The Act does not, however, exclusively reserve the business of providing remittance services 
to banks alone.  On the contrary, it provides room for financial institutions other than banks 
to engage in the business of providing money transfer services and facilities.  The open 
approach in regard to the provision of remittance services can be gathered from reading the 
definition given, by the Act, to financial institutions together with that given to the term 
„financial services‟. 
 
A financial institution is defined as being any person, other than a bank, that conducts a 
financial service business.
370
  In terms of the Act no person other than a licensed bank or 
financial institution may conduct or offer to conduct a financial service business,
371
 to do so 
would constitute an offence that is punishable by means of a fine or imprisonment term not 
exceeding five years, or both.
372
   
 
An application for a financial institution license must be submitted to the Registrar of Banks 
and Financial Institutions,
373
 who in turn, upon granting a license, registers the financial 
institution in the Register of Banks and Financial Institutions.
374
  Upon registration a financial 
institution may engage in the provision of some, or all, financial service business, depending 
on the nature of the license awarded.  The term „financial services‟ is broadly defined by the 
Act and encompasses, amongst other financial activities, the purchase and sale of foreign 
currency
375
 as well as the provision of money transfer services.
376
   
 
The effect, therefore, of the Act is to open up the remittance service industry to banks as well 
as other financial institutions.
377
  In practice however, the Act was interpreted as allowing for 
banks alone, to engage in the provision of money transfer services.  Only after the NPS Act 
was passed could any organisation, regardless of its institutional form, register as one that 
engages in the business of providing money transfer services.  The only exceptions to the 
latter principle are post office as well as other postal services.
378
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4 4   The National Payment Systems Act 
 
The National Payment Systems Act
379
 is a piece of legislation that specifically deals with 
payment mechanisms and provides for the registration of money transfer businesses which 
the Act refers to as payment system businesses.
380
  A PSB is defined as a business that 
provides, amongst other services, money transfer or transmission services, or any other 
business that may be prescribed by the BoZ as being a payment systems business.
381
   
 
The definition given to PSBs is fairly broad and does not exclusively limit the capacity to 
engage in the business of providing money transfer services to any specific institution.  When 
post offices or banks act as agents of MTOs such as Western Union or Money Gram, they are 
the regulated entities and not the MTOs.
382
 
 
The responsibility and supervision of payment system operations is a responsibility that has 
been bestowed upon the BoZ.
383
  In terms of the Act the BoZ must act to ensure the 
effectiveness, integrity, efficiency, competitiveness and security of the payment systems.
384
  
The BoZ is  therefore entitled to specify the criteria for entry it a payment system as a 
participant, issue and vary guidelines to be followed by participants in respect of payment 
orders, prescribe rules and arrangements in respect of the operations of payment systems and 
give directives to participants as may be necessary.
385
 
 
New PSBs are required to apply to the BoZ for registration,
386
 after which they are subject to 
the supervision of the BoZ‟s payments system department.387  Upon the Act coming into 
effect, old PSBs were also required to apply for registration within 180 days.
 388 
 Registration 
of old PSBs was merely a formalisation process as they were already deemed to legally 
designated PSBs.   
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In regard to an application to be designated as a PSB the following have been set as minimum 
requisites by the BoZ.
389
 
 
 
The PSB must: 
 
 be effective, efficient, competitive and safe; 
 have clear and adequate risk-sharing, management and control mechanisms in place; 
 ensure formality and irrevocability of payments and settlements; 
 have adequate mechanisms in place to address operational financial soundness and other 
matters pertaining to systemic risk; and 
 have clear rules and procedures for its operation in place. 
 
Upon receipt of the relevant documentation, the BoZ has 180 days within which to either 
accept or reject an application.  Failure to respond within the set time frame implies an 
automatic approval.
390
 
 
The BoZ, being the overseer of the NPS is authorised by the NPS Act to prescribe rules, 
regulations, directives or guidelines that it may feel are necessary in order for it to effectively 
carry out its administration of the Act.
391
  By virtue of such powers the BoZ has subsequently 
issued guidelines for money transfer service providers.  These guidelines shall be discussed 
below. 
 
 
4 5   The National Payment System Act (Money transmission services guidelines)  
 
These guidelines
392
 were issued by the BoZ for purposes of regulating the conduct of money 
transfer service providers and their agents and, inter alia, set out how money transfer services 
are to be operated.  According to the guidelines it is a criminal offence for a person to provide 
remittance services unless they are designated, under the guidelines, as a local money 
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transmission provider
393
 or as an agent of either, a local, or, an international money 
transmission service provider.
394
  This technically renders informal remittance channels 
illegal.  
 
The guidelines also specify the reporting requisites that money transmission service providers 
must comply with.  Money transfer service providers are required to submit, in a format 
prescribed by the BoZ, monthly reports on receipts and payments made in connection with 
the transmission of money.
395
  The BoZ requires all banks as well as financial institutions to 
submit reports to it via either e-mail or diskette, and for such purposes are required to have 
Microsoft Access Database software on their computers, which, nowadays, is a standard 
feature on all Microsoft‟s Operating systems.396   
 
Although not outlined within the guidelines, money transmission service providers cannot 
process outward remittances that exceed a value of USD5000.  Such payments have to be 
channelled through a commercial bank.
397
  The limit placed on outward payments is but one 
of a variety of measures introduced by the Zambian government in 2001 in order to stabilise 
the foreign exchange market.
398
  Such measures were necessitated by unscrupulous conduct 
within the private sector, in regard to foreign exchange transactions, which raised the concern 
of Government.
399
 
 
 
4 6   Analysis 
 
Zambian legislation follows „an open policy‟ in regard to the institutions it permits to provide 
remittances services.  The legislative environment does not exclusively restrict the business 
of providing remittances services to any specific financial institution.  On the contrary, the 
relevant legislation allows for a variety of financial institutions to participate as RSPs, on 
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condition that they are duly licensed and registered.  It is submitted that this provides room 
for a healthy level of competition to exist within the remittance industry.   
 
It is submitted further, that the open policy can be attributed to the Government of Zambia‟s 
FSDP which, amongst other things, seeks to promote diversity and competition within the 
financial sector.
400
  The BoZ is committed to fulfilling the objectives of the FSDP and, by 
virtue of such, has created an enabling regulatory environment that allows for private sector 
payment system players to provide payment services to the unbanked.
401
  The BOZ views 
remittances as an entry point into the formal financial sector which can play a facilitative role 
in expanding financial inclusion.  As a consequence the BOZ is willing to work with industry 
participants in creating a regulatory framework that accommodates new ventures and 
channels.
402
 
 
Despite the fact that, technically speaking, informal remittance channels are illegal, the BoZ 
in administering the Act and supervising PSBs has adopted a „pull‟, as opposed to „clamp 
down‟, approach.403  The BoZ seeks to draw clients towards formal financial services by 
strengthening the formal financial sector, promoting transparency as well as reducing 
transaction costs.  The BoZ has favoured such an approach partially due to the practical 
difficulties it would face in identifying, let alone, regulating informal remittance systems.
404
 
 
The BoZ‟s failure to shut down informal channels has not aroused much concern as consumer 
complaints in regard to abuse within informal channels have not been prevalent.
405
  The BoZ 
has taken cognisance of the fact that informal channels persist due to their convenience and 
value to users and therefore seeks to eliminate them by making the formal financial sector 
more efficient.
406
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5   EXCHANGE CONTROL IN ZIMBABWE 
 
5 1   Introduction 
 
Zimbabwe, like South Africa, is a country that still maintains Exchange Control laws.  In 
order for one to have a more comprehensive understanding of Zimbabwe‟s Exchange Control 
environment it is necessary to take cognisance of the country‟s economic situation.   
 
Zimbabwe has, for the greater part of the last decade, been facing severe economic strain.  
Such is reflected by the country‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is projected to have 
cumulatively fallen by 40% in-between the year 2000 to 2007, plunging down by a further 
14% in 2008.
407
  The country also has the highest rate of inflation in the world which in 2006, 
was reportedly, at an annual rate of around 1000%.
408
 
 
Zimbabwe‟s economic troubles can partially be attributed to the fact that many Western 
nations and organisations have halted economic aid and investment in Zimbabwe.
409
  This has 
been done in response to controversial Government policies such as the land reform evictions 
of 2001. Nations such as the United States have passed legislation that advocates for 
international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank to withhold loans to, and 
abstain from cancelling any debts owed by Zimbabwe.
410
 
 
In the midst of its economical quagmire Zimbabwe has faced a severe foreign currency 
shortage.  The latter has inclined the Government to enforce strict controls on foreign 
currency which in turn, as shall be highlighted in this chapter, have an impact upon the 
remittance market. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
407
 The Brenthurst Foundation “Zimbabwe‟s economy: A report card, mid-2009” (2009) 4. 
408
 IRIN Africa“Zimbabwe: Propping up the official exchange rate at any cost” (2006-10-10) 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/.aspx?Reportld=61297 (accessed 08-12-2010). 
409
 CIGI “Zimbabwe in crisis: Mugabe‟s policies and failures” (2008) 5. 
410
 See s 4(b)(2)(A) of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001.  Available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s107-494 (accessed 08-12-2010). 
80 
 
5 2   The legal and regulatory framework 
 
Exchange control in Zimbabwe is primarily governed by the Exchange Control Act
411
 and the 
Exchange Control Regulations.
412
  Aside from these pieces of legislation, the RBZ monetary 
policies and Orders also play a significant role in shaping the countries Exchange Control 
environment. 
 
 
5 2 1   The Exchange Control Act and the Exchange Control Regulations 
 
In terms of Section 2 of the Exchange Control Act, Regulations may be passed that, inter 
alia, either prohibit or restrict dealings in foreign currency.  In consequence to this, the 
Exchange Control Regulations were enacted.  The latter provide for a more comprehensive 
regulation of foreign currency transactions whereas the Exchange Control Act provides the 
framework for such regulation to be adopted.   
 
The Exchange Control Regulations state that, as a general rule, only authorised dealers and 
bureaux de change may deal in foreign currency.
413
  According to the RBZ, the term „dealing 
in foreign currency‟ relates to the buying and selling of foreign currency.414  The term 
„authorised dealer‟, according to the definition, relates to the RBZ and commercial banks 
declared by the RBZ to be an authorised dealer for purposes of the regulations.
415
  The 
Regulations do, however, provide room for other entities to handle foreign currency provided 
that the attain permission from an exchange control authority.
416
  Hence room is made for 
remittance service businesses to exist within the financial system.  In Zimbabwe these are 
referred to as Money Transfer Agencies.   
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5 3   Money Transfer Agencies 
 
In Zimbabwe Money transfer agencies
417
 are granted existence by virtue of the Exchange 
Control (Money Transfer Agencies) Order
418
 made by the RBZ, as empowered by the 
Exchange Control Act,
419
 in 2004.  The MTAs Order provides, amongst other things, for the 
licensing of MTAs and specifies how they are to operate. 
 
In terms of the MTAs Order no person may engage in the business of providing money 
transfer services unless they are they are registered as an MTA in accordance with its 
provisions.
420
  The latter, read together with the Exchange Control Act,
421
 makes it a criminal 
offence to provide informal remittance services.  Applications for registration as an MTA are 
to be submitted to the Exchange Control Department of the RBZ together with an application 
fee of ZWD500 000 as well as other specified documentation.
422
  MTAs are required to 
renew their licenses on an annual basis subject to payment of a ZWD500 000 renewal fee.
423
 
 
MTAs are required to make reports to the RBZ on a weekly basis, regarding all moneys 
received from abroad and dispersed to recipients as well as commissions and charges that 
have received.  Such returns are to be submitted to the Exchange Control Department of the 
RBZ before the end of work hours every Friday.
424
   The fact that only receipts and pay-outs 
are reported may be related to some of the restrictions that have been placed on MTA 
services. 
 
At the present moment MTAs are not permitted to directly provide outward remittance 
services.  All outward payments have to be channelled through an authorised dealer.
425
  In 
order to provide outward remittance services an MTA would have to operate via an 
authorised dealer.
426
  Such restrictions should be viewed in light of the fact that MTAs were 
introduced into the Zimbabwean financial system as a means of ensuring that funds could be 
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safely channelled to Zimbabwe and more importantly, for the government, a means of 
attracting increased inward flows of, much needed, foreign currency into the country through 
official channels.
427
  The focus in introducing MTAs was to facilitate more inward, as 
opposed to outward, flows of foreign currency. 
 
 
5 3 1   MTA Operations 
   
In recent years the functional operation of MTAs has not been particularly smooth, for 
reasons that are attributable to the RBZ‟s policies.  On the 9th of October 2006 the operations 
of all MTAs were suspended and their licenses were withdrawn.
428
  The RBZ Governor cited 
non-performance and deviant behaviour on the part of the suspended MTAs as being the 
reasons for withdrawal of their licenses.
429
 
 
Despite the fact that the MTAs Order permits remittance recipients, at their option, to either 
be paid in foreign currency or in local currency equivalent to the amount sent,
430
 the RBZ 
required MTAs to pay out remittances in local currency.  MTAs were, allegedly, instead of 
paying out remittances in local currency at the official exchange rate, doing so at rates that 
were almost equal to those offered on the parallel market.
431
  The parallel market exchange 
rates were five times higher than the official exchange rates applied by the RBZ which were 
viewed, by many, as being unrealistic taking into account the country‟s level of inflation.432  
 
The move allowed the RBZ to attain a monopoly on the remittance market via its own money 
transfer agency, Homelink, which was the only remaining MTA.
433
  In the period following 
the closure of the agencies, the interbank foreign exchange market posted a 17.7% decline in 
hard currency sales from September to October, when they totalled US$13.5 million, and a 
10.5% fall in foreign exchange purchases to US$15.3 million.
434
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The RBZ eventually reinstated 7 of the MTAs that had been suspended and, at later stage, 
lifted restrictions on inward remittances, allowing MTAs to pay out remittances in foreign 
currency.
435
  A certain level of uncertainty, however, existed in regard to whether or not all 
MTAs could make pay-outs in foreign currency.  In 2009, in a move favoured by many, the 
Governor of the RBZ, in his annual monetary policy statement
436
 stated that Zimbabwe was 
now subject to a multi-currency system.  Aside from the local Zimbabwean Dollar, the US 
Dollar and Rand, amongst other currencies, can suffice as legal tender.  Hence MTAs can 
now, undoubtedly, make pay-outs in foreign currency. 
 
 
5 4   Analysis 
 
In discussing Zimbabwe‟s remittance market one has to draw a distinction between the 
business of providing inward remittance services and that of providing outward remittances 
services.  In respect of inward remittances, Zimbabwean legislation, in a manner similar to 
that of Zambia, does not constrain the business of providing such services to any specific 
financial institution or entity.  Both authorised dealers as well as MTAs that are designated 
under the MTAs Order may engage in the business of providing such services.  The MTAs 
Order makes room for a variety of potential service providers to exist within the market, 
provided they have, amongst other requisites, the necessary financial guarantees.
437
  The 
position differs in regard to the provision of outward remittance services.  
 
The current policy adopted by the RBZ limits the business of providing outward remittance 
services to institutions that are authorised dealers.  The latter are primarily banking 
institutions.
438
  It is submitted that the different approach adopted toward outward and inward 
remittance services can be attributed to the country‟s foreign currency shortage.   
Zimbabwe has been facing a severe foreign currency shortage in the past years and hence the 
RBZ has focused on trying to attract more inward flows of foreign currency via official 
channels.  The Governor of the RBZ has, however, taking into mind recent economic 
improvements, given indications that consideration is being given to the issue of authorising 
MTAs to engage in providing outward remittance services.
439
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In the past years, informal mechanisms have been the preferred means of sending funds to 
Zimbabwe.  The preference for informal channels is however not a result of the Exchange 
Control laws per se, but a consequence of restrictions placed on MTAs by the RBZ which 
required MTAs to pay-out remittances in local currency at the official exchange rate.  The 
parallel market rates were far more lucrative than those offered on the official market and the 
large discrepancies between the two rates were an incentive for emigrants to send funds via 
informal channels so as to allow recipients to change foreign currency on the parallel 
market.
440
 
 
With developments such as the RBZ eventually allowing MTAs to pay-out remittances in 
foreign currency as well as the introduction of a multi-currency system in 2009,
441
 inward 
remittance transactions via official channels have been steadily increasing.  According to 
statistics released by the RBZ the amount of remittances sent through formal channels have 
increased by 40% in the first half of 2010.
442
   
 
 
6   CONCLUSION  
  
Foreign currency controls are generally perceived as being deterrents to the formalisation of 
remittances in both the sending and recipient countries.
443
  South Africa is no exception to the 
latter notion.  The application of Exchange Control Laws in South Africa effectively stifles 
the formalisation of remittances from the country.  The problem, more particularly, centres on 
the issues of licensing and the SARB‟s stance in regard to whom it is willing to awards 
authorised dealer licenses, the need to report transactions via the SARB Cross Border Foreign 
Exchange Transaction Reporting System and the residential status of the remitter.  These 
factors can pose significant barriers to low income migrants who wish to use formal 
remittance channels.  They can also prohibit potential RSPs from entering the remittance 
industry thereby stifling competition, which can lead to high remittance prices. 
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Countries that do not have exchange control laws, in comparison to those that do, have 
experienced an increased usage of formal channels to remit funds.  In the Philippines, for 
instance, exchange control was abolished in 1995 and in the same year private remittances 
through formal channels quadrupled in volume.
444
  India‟s liberalisation of exchange rates in 
1991 has been associated with a substantial decrease in the utilisation of formal channels to 
remit money to the state of Kerala, a principal remittance destination in India.
445
  Pakistan, in 
contrast to the Philippines and India, decided to impose exchange control in 1998 due to 
political instability in the country.  The imposition of exchange control was followed by a 
decrease in the use of banking services to remit funds, with flows decreasing from 
approximately US$150 million per month to US$50 million per month. 
 
Whilst the act of abolishing exchange control laws can be a positive step towards formalising 
remittances, it does not necessarily eradicate the use of informal mechanisms.  This is clearly 
illustrated by the remittance landscape in Zambia.  Even though Zambia does not have any 
exchange control laws, individuals continue to use informal mechanisms to remit funds.  The 
use of informal remittance mechanisms is primarily a consequence of factors that are not 
related to the regulatory environment, such as, for instance, consumer perceptions of formal 
channels.  Consumers in Zambia tend to view formal channels as being unreliable, 
inconvenient and slow despite the fact that, at times, they may in actual fact be quicker that 
informal mechanisms.  The „last mile challenge‟ is another factor that fosters the continued 
use of informal channels.
446
   
 
In Zimbabwe, as indicated earlier,
447
 the preference for informal remittance over the past 
years can be significantly attributed to the RBZ‟s policies. The RBZ required MTAs to pay-
out remittances in local currency at rates that were less favourable in comparison to those 
offered on the parallel market.  This requisite is no longer applicable and with recent 
monetary developments that have been implemented remittances through official channels 
have been increasing. 
 
The Zambian and Zimbabwean pieces of legislation that apply to remittance services adopt 
an open policy in regard of the institutions that are able to obtain a license.  It is submitted 
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that by doing so these laws give room for a positive level of competition to exist within the 
remittance industry.   
 
In Zambia and Zimbabwe unlike the status quo in South Africa, the residential status of a 
remitter does not act as a barrier when individuals wish to remit funds through formal 
channels. The laws do not draw a distinction between residents and non residents when it 
comes to foreign currency transactions.
448
 
 
In South Africa the persistent use of informal remittance mechanisms is to a large extent a 
consequence of Exchange Control law.  These laws, combined with the SARB‟s policy in 
regard to whom it awards licenses granting authority to deal in foreign currency, place 
significant barriers to potential RSPs that may wish to enter the remittance market in South 
Africa.  In addition, remitters also face significant barriers in accessing formal remittance 
channels depending on the legality of their presence in South Africa.  This is due to the fact 
that exchange control law intertwines the provision of financial services with the policing of 
immigration laws. 
 
Taking into account the negative implications that the exchange control environment poses 
for the formalisation of remittances from South Africa the following recommendations are 
proposed.  Firstly, it is suggested that the SARB consider the option suggested by Genesis 
analytics which recommends introducing an ADLA license that caters for remittance 
businesses.
449
  Doing so would allow RSPs such as MTOs to operate independently, as is the 
case in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and can increase the competitive level of the remittance 
market and subsequently lead to lower remittance prices.
450
   
 
In awarding such licenses it is recommended that the SARB follow an approach similar to 
that applied in Zambia and Zimbabwe, whereby any financial institution, regardless of its 
form, is capable of being awarded authority to provide remittance services provided that they 
it as able to provide appropriate financial and risk guarantees.   
 
Taking into account that remittances are low value payments, RSPs, in the event of incurring 
credit, liquidity, or operational failure, are unlikely to pose systemic risk to the financial 
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system.
451
  In South Africa the risk of systemic risk being presented by RSPs is curbed 
further by the fact that they are not able to handle business remittances, which are by nature 
large value payments. 
 
Secondly, in the event that an ADLA license is introduced for the remittance market, it would 
be preferable for the SARB to adopt a more lenient approach in regard to the manner in 
which foreign exchange transactions are to be reported to it by remittance businesses.  It is 
recommended that it consider the option suggested by Truen et al, who recommend 
permitting institutions to report directly to the SARB as opposed to requiring them to report 
strictly via the Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System.
452
  Allowing 
such would allow RSPs that lack the funds to invest in the reporting system to partake in the 
provision of remittance services thereby facilitating competition within the market.   
 
Furthermore the SARB could consider allowing such remittance businesses to report through 
institutions that have installed the SARB reporting system.
453
  This would make it 
unnecessary for remittance businesses to have an in house reporting system.  In order to 
facilitate the latter, the requirement that foreign exchange transactions must be reported 
within 24 hours would have to be addressed.  Increasing the latter period could, however, 
compromise the efficient monitoring of the country‟s foreign currency reserves. 
 
Thirdly, agency agreements concluded by MTOs and their agents ought to be closely 
scrutinised and those consisting of exclusivity clauses ought to be prohibited.  Such 
agreements are detrimental to competition particularly in a remittance environment such as 
that in South Africa were only authorised dealers may engage in the provision of remittance 
services and MTOs do not operate as standalone entities.  It would be more favourable for 
agents to be able to act as the agents of more than one MTO.
454
 
 
Fourthly, instead of the SARB requiring that all foreign exchange transactions be reported it 
could, as suggested by Truen et al, introduce a threshold amount and system whereby only 
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transactions that go beyond the specified threshold amount are reported.
455
  Truen et al 
recommended a threshold amount of R5000.
456
  By setting a threshold amount, the cost of 
carrying out transactions on amounts that fall below the threshold would be reduced and 
formal remittance channels can become more accessible for low income remitters who are 
price sensitive.   
 
Introducing a threshold amount would however compromise one of the purposes that 
Exchange Control law is imposed for, which is to provide for the country‟s foreign currency 
flows to be monitored.  The SARB, as custodian of the country‟s foreign currency reserves is 
responsible for monitoring and supervising such flows.  Allowing certain transactions to be 
exempted from being reported would compromise the SARB‟s ability to carry out its 
responsibilities sufficiently. 
  
In conclusion it is recommended that the provision of formal financial services be separated 
from the policing of immigration laws.  This matter shall be elaborated upon much further in 
the following chapter which deals with immigration laws. 
 
Exchange Control laws, despite having a significant impact upon the remittance industry are 
not the only piece of legislation that do so.  Within this chapter it has been indicated that the 
legality of a non-resident‟s presence in South Africa plays a significant part in determining 
their ability to access formal remittance channels.  In the subsequent chapter an examination 
as well as discussion of the immigration laws of South Africa and their implications for the 
formalisation of remittances shall be carried out. 
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CHAPTER 4: IMMIGRATION LAWS 
 
1      INTRODUCTION 
 
As part of the process of examining the impact of the South African regulatory environment 
upon the formalisation of migrant remittances it is necessary for a discussion of the country‟s 
immigration laws to be carried out.  Such a discussion is necessary because in South Africa 
the legality of a remitter‟s presence in the country plays a crucial role in determining whether 
they are able to access the services of formal financial institutions.   
 
For purposes of regulating and formalising remittances, three categories of immigrants can be 
distinguished, these being:
457
 
 Legal migrants – These are individuals who enter South Africa with a valid passport 
from their country of origin and remain present in South Africa by virtue of a valid 
visa, work permit or some other authority from the South African government. 
 
 Documented migrants – This category refers to migrants who enter South Africa 
with a valid travel document from their country of origin but who are no longer in 
possession of valid authorisation to remain in South Africa. 
 
 Undocumented migrants – These are migrants that enter South Africa without any 
valid travel document and who have never had any authority to legally reside in 
South Africa. 
 
Aside from citizens of South Africa, only legal migrants may remit funds from South Africa 
through formal channels, provided that they can verify the source of the funds.
458
  
Encompassed within the legal migrants category, amongst others, are permanent as well as 
temporary residents.  Permanent residents are individuals who are not originally from South 
Africa but have applied for, and been consequently granted, permanent residence in South 
Africa.  Temporary residence, on the other hand, is awarded to foreigners who apply and 
qualify for an appropriate permit.  Such permits allow the holder to remain within South 
Africa for a specified period of time.   
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Once a valid permit is granted the applicant qualifies as a legal migrant with valid authority 
to remain in South Africa.  Due to the fact that this dissertation is particularly concerned with 
the context of migrant workers, this chapter shall look at the manner in which the 
immigration laws of South Africa cater for migrants who seek to work in the country legally. 
In addition, so as to make a comparison, an examination of the position in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe shall also be made. 
 
 
2      SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION ENVIRONMENT 
 
2 1   Background 
 
South Africa, in comparison to other African countries, is a relatively politically and 
economically stable nation.  As a consequence of such it has become a prominent destination 
for migrants who originate from its neighbouring states as well as other countries on the 
African continent and the globe as a whole.
459
  South Africa has had a long- standing 
migration relationship with its neighbouring countries, which goes as far back as the 19
th
 
century when the diamond and gold industry were formalised.
460
 
 
Post apartheid policy shifts resulted in a greater proportion of migrant labour, particularly in 
the mining sector, flowing into South Africa.
461
  The influx of foreign-based mine workers 
has been curbed by the 2002 Immigration Act
462
 which has made it more difficult for mining 
companies to hire foreign labour.
463
 
 
Formal immigration flows into South Africa have been compounded by informal and 
irregular flows, fuelled by internal strife in neighbouring countries such as the civil war in 
Mozambique in the 1980s and, more recently, Zimbabwe‟s economic and political 
meltdown.
464
  As a result of such, a large number of migrants in South Africa are residing in 
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the country illegally.  The precise number of undocumented migrants is, for understandable 
reasons, unknown but estimations put the numbers as being significantly high.
465
 
 
Most migrants are drawn by the prospect of finding employment opportunities that appear 
favourable in comparison to those within their countries of origin.  South Africa can only 
accommodate a certain number of immigrants, otherwise its citizens will not be adequately 
catered for, and hence immigration laws have been put in place as a way of, amongst other 
purposes, controlling the number of immigrants who enter the country. 
 
 
2 2   The Immigration Act 
 
In South Africa the status of labour migrants is currently governed by the Immigration Act 13 
of 2002
466
 and is administered by the Department of Home Affairs.  Migrants seeking to 
work legally can apply for either a quota,
467
 general,
468
 exceptional skills
469
 or an intra-
company transfer
470
 work permit, which are provided for in the Act.  The nature of each of 
these permits shall be outlined within the paragraphs that follow.  
 
 
2 2 1   Quota work permit 
 
A quota work permit is issued by the Department of Home Affairs to foreigners who posses 
certain academic qualifications and, or, a certain level of professional experience.  A 
foreigner that applies for a quota work permit must provide an “Evaluation Certificate for 
Foreign Qualifications” in regard to the highest level of education certificate that they posses.  
Such certificates are issued by The South African Qualifications Authority,
471
 and are used 
for comparing foreign qualifications with South African qualifications.
472
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One of the advantages of this type of permit to a migrant is that it can be issued regardless of 
whether or not the applicant has a job offer or employment contract.  The applicant is, 
however, required to attain employment within 90 days of the permit being issued.
473
  Should 
the foreigner fail to attain employment within the 90 day period, the permit is deemed to have 
expired and they must apply for a new one in their country of origin.
474
  In this way what was 
previously known as the “work seekers permit” has been re-introduced.475  A further 
advantage is presented by the fact that the employer is not required to justify their reason for 
employing a foreigner nor do they need to prove that the position could not be filled by a 
South African citizen or permanent resident.
476
 
 
Quota permits are only issued in respect of work categories that have been specified by the 
Minister of Home Affairs after consulting with the Ministers of Labour and Trade and 
Industry.
477
  The determination of such categories is to be carried out, at least, on an annual 
basis.  The fact that these permits are only issued for specified categories of work, and not 
every category, effectively limits their availability.   
 
The limited availability of quota permits is accelerated further by the fact that such permits 
are only issued to a limited number of applicants on an annual basis.  Once the permits 
allocated to a specified category of work have been fully issued, no further permits can be 
granted.
478
  According to Isaacson only 15-20% quota permits are filled as the Department of 
Home Affairs does not take an active role in marketing to, and recruiting, labour from abroad 
and it is, allegedly, difficult for foreigners to process applications on their own from outside 
the country.
479
 
 
 
2 2 2   General work permit  
 
If a migrant‟s area of skill does not fall within a category that is covered by quota work 
permit they can apply to the Department of Home Affairs for a general work permit.  One of 
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the pre-requisites for a person to be awarded a general work permit is that the applicant must 
already have a job offer prior to applying for the permit.   
 
In addition to the migrant being required to have a job offer, the prospective employer is 
required to satisfy the Director-General that despite having carried out a diligent search they 
have failed to employ a South African citizen or resident with qualifications or expertise 
similar to those of the foreign applicant.
480
  Proof of such a search is facilitated by, amongst 
other methods, advertising the vacancy in a newspaper.
481
  Previously certain categories of 
workers such as medical practitioners and doctors were exempted from the need to advertise 
vacancies.  Since the amendment of the Act in 2004 the exemption no longer applies and 
every employer must advertise job vacancies.
482
  Employers are required to provide a detailed 
list of all prospective applicants who applied for the advertised vacancy, giving an 
explanation in regard to why neither of them is as suitable, for the position, as the 
foreigner.
483
   
 
The employer must also satisfy the Director-General that the terms and conditions upon 
which they intend to employ the foreigner are not inferior to those offered to citizens and 
residents in the relevant market.  As a result of the latter requisite a benchmarking procedure 
has been instituted in terms of which each applicant must submit a certificate confirming that 
their remuneration and conditions of employment are not inferior in comparison to those 
offered to other employees within the same market segment.
484
  Such a certificate may be 
acquired from either the Department of Labour or an organization that offers benchmarking 
services. 
 
A general work permit lapses if the employee fails to submit, to the Director-General, 
satisfactory proof that they are still employed on the same terms and conditions specified in 
their work permit application and job description.
485
  Such proof is to be submitted within six 
months of the permit being issued and for every year thereafter.
486
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2 2 3   Exceptional skills permit   
 
Skilled labour migrants also have the option of applying for an exceptional skills work 
permit.  This permit, as the name suggests, is granted to individuals who have exceptional 
skills.  Individuals who have exceptional skills or qualifications can obtain this work permit 
purely on the basis of the skill or expertise.  The applicant is not required to have obtained a 
job offer or employment, prior to applying for the permit.  The Director-General determines 
which skills qualify as exceptional skills.
487
 
 
 
2 2 4   Corporate permit 
 
Another type of work permit is the corporate work permit which accommodates unskilled 
migrant labour.  The corporate work permit is a remnant of the apartheid system and in such 
times gave preferential treatment to farms and mines in regard to the employment of foreign 
labour.
488
  In contrast to the other work permits a migrant does not personally apply for a 
corporate work permit.  It is the employer who applies for the permit and upon being                           
approved the employer is awarded a corporate permit so as to enable them to employ 
foreigners.  Employees, upon their application being approved, are subsequently issued with 
corporate work permits. 
 
An employer that seeks to attain a corporate permit must motivate why, as well as prove that, 
such an employer has an on-going need for foreign labour.
489
  The corporate work permit 
principally benefits large employers, more often those that are in the mining sector.  
Therefore migrants that seek employment as, for instance, restaurant staff, house-help and so 
forth are not covered by the corporate work permit. 
 
 
2 2 5   Intra-company transfer permit 
 
The intra-company transfer work permit is another permit that caters for skilled migrant 
labour.  The latter permits are valid for a period of two years and are granted to foreigners 
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who work abroad for a business that has operations in South Africa and who by reason of 
their affiliation with the business are required to come and work in South Africa.  Such, often 
occurs within multinational companies. 
 
 
2 2 6   Business permit 
 
The business permit is a permit that, despite not being a work permit per se, entitles the 
holder to conduct work in South Africa.
490
  To apply for such a permit the foreigner is 
required to, amongst other requisites, establish or invest in a business, in the country, a 
prescribed financial or capital contribution.   
 
Aside from impacting on the remittance industry by determining the legality of a remitter‟s 
status in South Africa, the Immigration Act also affects the remittance industry by requiring 
financial institutions to police immigration laws.  The latter aspect shall be discussed within 
the subsequent paragraphs.  
 
 
2 3   The Duty to ascertain the legality of a client’s presence in South Africa 
 
Section 45 of the Immigration Act states that prescribed institutions may, in a specified 
manner, be required to ascertain the residence status, or citizenship of persons with whom 
they enter into commercial transactions.  In terms of the Regulations passed in terms of 
section 7 of the Immigration Act,
491
 banks as well as other financial institutions, amongst 
other institutions and organizations, are „accountable institutions‟ as contemplated in section 
45 of the Immigration Act.
492
 
 
Accountable institutions, in line with the obligation placed upon them by the Immigration 
Act, are required to scrutinize their client‟s passport or identity document.  They must satisfy 
themselves that, ex facie, the passport or identity document belongs to the person presenting 
it and, in the case of foreigners, that they are legally present in South Africa.
493
  These 
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institutions are required to report any illegal foreigner, or person whose citizenship or 
residence status they cannot ascertain, to the Department of Home Affairs.
494
 
 
 
2 4   Analysis 
 
The South African Immigration Act provides a variety of permits for skilled migrants who 
seek to work in South Africa legally.  Such migrants have the option of applying for, amongst 
other permits, either a quota, general or exceptional skills work permit.  Unskilled migrants 
on the other hand, aside from the corporate work permit have no other work permit for which 
they may apply.  Corporate work permits cater for large employers such as mine operators 
and, therefore, do not accommodate migrants that seek casual forms of employment such as 
being a domestic helper or a waiter at a restaurant.   
 
It is submitted that the lack of a variety of work permits that cater for unskilled migrants is a 
factor that influences many foreigners to enter South Africa illegally.  In 2006, according to a 
study commissioned by the United Association of South Africa (UASA), South Africa was 
home to as many as 10 million illegal immigrants and these figures were expected to rise due 
to the fact that South Africa was to play host nation for the 2010 Soccer World Cup.
495
  The 
prospective informal and formal employment opportunities presented by virtue of South 
Africa being the host nation were viewed as an incentive for foreigners to come and seek 
work in South Africa.  
  
Unskilled migrants who are not accommodated by corporate work permit find themselves in 
a situation where they have no other option but to work illegally in South Africa. As a 
consequence of being illegality present in South Africa, such migrants are unable to access 
the services of formal financial institutions.  This is due to the fact that Exchange Control 
laws, as stated in the previous chapter, require that financial institutions be provided with an 
identity or residence permit number when carrying out transactions.
496
   
 
Without proper documentation, migrants find themselves facing an insurmountable barrier 
when they wish to remit funds through formal channels and are thereby, it is submitted, 
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inclined to utilise informal means to remit funds.  The inclination to utilise informal channels 
is further exacerbated by section 45 of the Immigration Act.   The section, read together with 
regulations in terms of the Act, places a duty on financial institutions, these being 
„accountable institutions‟ in terms of the Act, to police immigration laws by requiring them to 
determine the citizenship or residence status of clients and report to the Department of Home 
Affairs when they fail to do so.   
 
It is submitted that section 45, by interlinking the provision of financial services with the 
policing of immigration laws, acts as a hindrance to the formalisation of remittances from 
South Africa.  This is due to the fact that migrants without proper documentation will be 
hesitant to use the services of formal financial institutions as they risk being deported from 
South Africa if they do so.  Such migrants choose to rely on informal remittance mechanisms 
to channels funds out of South Africa.   
 
In countries such as the United States of America certain methods have been implemented in 
order to bring undocumented immigrants within the scope of the formal financial system 
without necessarily legalising their presence in the country.  The latter shall be elaborated 
upon below. 
 
 
2 5   The United States of America: Matricular card 
 
In the United States, the matricular card has been adopted by financial institutions as a means 
of identifying undocumented Mexican immigrants.  The card is an identity document that is 
issued by Mexican embassies to Mexicans who reside in other countries, regardless of the 
legality of their presence within the particular country.
497
  The initial purpose of the 
document was to grant Mexicans, living outside Mexico, access to consular services.  Over 
the past years, however, the matricular card has been accepted by financial service providers 
as proof of identification thereby allowing undocumented Mexican migrants to access formal 
financial services.  At least 175 banks in the US accept the matricular card as proof of 
identity.
498
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The acceptance of the matricular card as a form of identification has been fostered by the fact 
that in the United States financial services are not intertwined with the policing of 
immigration laws.  Hence the bearer of a matricular card is able to register as a tax payer, as 
the United States Internal Revenue Service does not bear a responsibility to police 
immigration laws, and subsequently open a bank account. 
 
In order to obtain a matricular card, an undocumented migrant must provide the following:
499
 
 
 Proof of nationality – This can be presented by means of a birth certificate, passport, or 
certificate of Mexican naturalisation; 
 Proof of identity – Such may be provided by means of any official document issued by the 
Mexican Government or a foreign authority.  Documents such as, for instance, a passport 
or driver‟s license would suffice; 
 Proof of address in the foreign country - This can be provided by way of a utility bill; and 
 A fee of USD$29. 
 
A number of visible as well as hidden security features exist, such as ultraviolet logos and 
micro lines, so as to avoid falsification of the card.  In addition, a special database was 
established in Mexico so as to allow banks to confirm the authenticity of cards presented to it 
by clients.   
 
South Africa has, to a certain extent, taken steps to try and bring undocumented migrants into 
the formal regulatory system.  A prominent example of such a step is the approach that the 
Government has taken towards Zimbabwe, which is one of the major sources of migrants 
who come to South Africa.  This shall be discussed below. 
 
 
2 6   Regularising Zimbabwean migration to South Africa 
 
In April 2009 the South African Department of Home Affairs announced that it had plans to 
grant Zimbabweans, in South Africa, a 12 month “Special dispensation permit” based on 
section 31 (2) (b) of the Immigration Act.  The permit would allow Zimbabweans to live and 
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work in South Africa legally.  As a complementary measure, a moratorium on deportation of 
Zimbabweans who were in the country illegally was introduced.
500
 
 
Another complementary measure was introduced when the then Minister of Home Affairs, 
Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, announced that Zimbabweans intending to travel to South Africa 
were no longer required to apply for a Visa prior to arriving in South Africa.  Instead, 
Zimbabweans could now apply for a free ninety-day visitor‟s permit at the border which also 
allows them to engage in casual work whilst in South Africa.
501
   
 
The introduction of the special dispensation permit and a free 90-day visitor‟s Visa for 
Zimbabweans has been viewed as a positive development that would complement bilateral 
economic support between South Africa and Zimbabwe.
502
  Increasing the legal employment 
options for Zimbabweans would allow them to contribute towards Zimbabwe‟s 
reconstruction by way of remittances.
503
  It has also been suggested that the new policies 
contributively reduce Government expenditure in relation to monitoring the border for illegal 
crossings and aid in curtailing the utilisation of informal remittance channels.
504
 
 
The special dispensation permit and moratorium on deportations shall cease to operate on the 
31
st
 of December 2010 as per the agreement between the South African and Zimbabwean 
governments.
505
  From the 1
st
 of January 2011 all Zimbabweans are to be treated in the same 
way as other foreigners, hence all those who will have not formalised their presence in South 
Africa by then shall be deported.
506
  The decision to bring the dispensation permit to an end 
emanates from the fact that some form of stability, economically and politically, has returned 
to Zimbabwe.
507
  The permit was introduced as a means of allowing free movement between 
the two countries and to assist Zimbabweans who were in dire strait as a consequence of the 
previous economic and political instability. 
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3   ZAMBIAN IMMIGRATION ENVIRONMENT 
 
3 1   Background 
 
Zambia, despite having a poor economy, draws a number of migrants from all over the 
SADC region due to the fact that it is a relatively peaceful as well as stable nation.  In 
addition, the country‟s geographical position makes it susceptible to migration, especially 
when either one of its neighbours undergo political or economical instability.
508
 
 
Prior to its economical difficulties Zambia was a prominent destination for labour migrants, 
particularly in the mining sector.  However, since the decline in copper prices in the 1970s 
the country has not been a haven for economic migrants.  Most migrants in Zambia enter the 
country as refugees as opposed to doing so for economical reasons. 
Due to the deterioration in socio-economic standards Zambia has experienced a significant 
loss of skilled and experienced professionals.  The latter have moved to countries that have 
more progressive economies such as Botswana and South Africa.  Emigrants from Zambia 
tend to be from particular industries such as, for instance, the health sector.  The outflow of 
skilled individuals has resulted in a shortfall of workers in the health sector.
 509
  The Zambian 
government has not yet developed a programme designed to retain and attract professionals 
in specific industries, despite the fact that such was included within its 2002 Poverty 
Reduction plan.
510
  
 
 
3 2   The Immigration and Deportation Act 
 
In Zambia the principle piece of legislation, in terms of regulating immigration, is the 
Immigration and Deportation Act.
511
  In regard to migrant labour, Zambia‟s Immigration Act 
bears significant differences in comparison to that of South Africa.  For instance, in contrast 
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to South Africa, which provides for a variety of work permits, Zambian legislation only 
provides for a single work permit that caters for all migrant labour.
512
 
 
Section 28 of the Act outlines the different types of persons to whom the Director-General 
may issue a work permit.  More relevant for the purposes of this dissertation are those that are 
outlined in Schedule 1 of the Act as belonging in Class A of the persons that may be issued 
with residence permits.
513
  Persons falling into Class A are those that would be beneficial to 
Zambia due to the fact that, amongst other possibilities, they posses skills or qualifications in 
a field within which there is an insufficient number of employees. 
 
In contrast to South African legislation, there are less stringent measures placed on employers 
who wish to employ foreigners.  The Immigration and Deportation Act does not place any 
obligation on employers to prove that they have failed to find a Zambian resident or citizen 
with qualifications or expertise equal to those possessed by the foreigner they wish to 
employ.   
 
Another significant difference between Zambia‟s immigration laws and those of South Africa 
is the fact that Zambian legislation does not force financial institutions to partake in the 
policing of immigration laws.  Zambia‟s Immigration and Deportation Act does not consist of 
a provision similar to Section 45 of South Africa‟s Immigration Act.  The latter, as indicated 
previously,
514
 calls upon financial institutions to investigate the legality of their client‟s 
presence in South Africa and to report illegal immigrants, or those persons whose status 
could not be ascertained, to the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
4   ZIMBABWEAN IMMIGRATION ENVIRONMENT 
 
4 1   Background 
 
From a labour migration perspective Zimbabwe has historically been both a sending and 
receiving country.  Most Zimbabweans go to work in countries such as South Africa and 
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Botswana whilst most incoming migrants came from countries such as Zambia, Malawi and 
Mozambique.
515
 
 
Migration patterns have taken a significant shift since the country gained its independence in 
1980.  Zimbabwe, unlike in the past, is no longer a major recipient of migrant workers and 
has, instead, experienced a high level of outward migration.
516
  The outward migration has 
occurred in two significant waves.  The first wave was encountered immediately after 
independence when a significant number of whites relocated to South Africa.  The second 
wave was experienced in the 1990s when a growing number of Zimbabweans moved to 
neighbouring countries.
517
 
 
Over the past decade the level of outward migration has been on a significant rise.  The latter 
is attributable to the country‟s economical and political meltdown which has resulted in the 
country experiencing a severe foreign currency shortage and record levels of inflation.  These 
factors combined with political intimidation of Zimbabweans have resulted in a large number 
of skilled and educated Zimbabweans leaving the country. 
 
A large number of Zimbabweans are currently residing in South Africa illegally.  Irregular 
migration from Zimbabwe occurs in two ways.  Firstly, there are those that enter South 
Africa legally through official means and eventually stay beyond the period that their Visa 
permits them to do so.  Secondly, there are those who leave Zimbabwe without valid travel 
documents and who enter the country via illegal entry points,
518
 these migrants have caused a 
strain in South Africa as well as other countries in the SADC region.  Over the past years 
illegal Zimbabwean migrants, as well as those from other countries, have been the victim of 
xenophobic attacks by South Africans.
519
 
  
Regardless of the significant levels of outward migration from Zimbabwe, there is a popular 
belief that most people only left the country temporarily and shall eventually return.
520
  With 
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the recent introduction of a Government of National Unity there have been significant 
improvements to the country‟s economic and political situation.  It remains to be seen 
whether or not this shall have a significant impact in drawing Zimbabweans back to their 
country.  
 
 
4 2   The Immigration Act 
 
In Zimbabwe the principle piece of legislation that regulates the status of migrants is the 
Immigration Act.
521
  The Act empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to make regulations 
that provide for, amongst other permits, temporary work permits.
522
  Such regulations have 
been duly passed and are embodied in the Immigration Regulations of 1998.
523
 
 
In contrast to the status quo in South Africa, Zimbabwe does not have a variety of work 
permits that cater for migrants in differing work categories.  Only one work permit exists and 
cater for all migrant workers.  This permit is provided for in Regulation 22 of the 
immigration regulations and is known as a „temporary employment permit‟. 
 
An employer who intends to employ a foreigner is required to apply for a temporary 
employment permit, for the foreigner, from the Chief Immigration Officer.  A temporary 
permit lasts for a period of five years,
524
 after which it may be renewed for a further period by 
the Chief Immigration Officer.
525
  
 
As in Zambia, Zimbabwe‟s immigration laws do not require an employer to prove that he has 
failed to locate a Zimbabwean citizen or resident with expertise or qualifications similar to 
those of the foreigner they intend to employ.  Furthermore the immigration laws of 
Zimbabwe, unlike those of South Africa, do not place an obligation upon financial 
institutions to enquire into the citizenship or residence status of their clients. 
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5   CONCLUSION 
 
In South Africa, as mentioned previously, the legality of a remitters‟ presence in the country 
plays a crucial role in determining whether or not they can access formal financial services.  
The latter is exacerbated by Section 45 of the Immigration Act which expressly places an 
obligation upon financial institutions to police immigration laws by requiring them to 
ascertain their client‟s residence or citizenship status.  If a financial institution fails to 
ascertain the latter, or discovers that its client is an illegal immigrant, it is required to report 
such to the Department of Home Affairs.  It is submitted that this duty, placed upon financial 
institutions, acts as a factor that inclines undocumented migrants to use informal remittance 
mechanisms. 
 
In order for an individual to access formal financial services they must either be a South 
African citizen or be in possession of a valid residence permit.  South Africa‟s Immigration 
Act provides for a variety of work permits, but the requisites for attaining such permits are 
fairly burdensome.  For instance, in order for a migrant to attain a general work permit the 
prospective employer must prove that they have publicised the vacancy and failed to find a 
citizen or resident with qualifications or expertise equivalent to those of the foreigner they 
intend to employ.   
 
It is submitted that such stringent requisites are justifiable if one takes into account the level 
of unemployment in South Africa.
526
  The latter makes it necessary to cater for South African 
citizens and residents as far as possible.  One has to also take into mind that in line the 
provisions of Section 9 (2) of the Constitution,
527
 which calls for legislative as well as other 
measures be taken in order to protect and advance South African individuals that have been 
disadvantaged by the discriminatory policies of the apartheid regime.   
 
Acts such as the Employment Equity Act
528
 and Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act
529
 have been enacted to cater for such purposes.  It is submitted that the stringent 
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provisions imposed by the Immigration Act in regard to the employment of foreigners 
facilitate the achievement of the objectives pursued by the aforementioned Acts.  The latter 
Acts aim to inter alia attain equitable representation of previously disadvantaged groups in 
the workplace through, for instance, encouraging employers to give preferential treatment to 
such individuals when recruiting employees. 
 
Although the Immigration Act
530
 provides for a variety of work permits, these primarily 
accommodate skilled and educated immigrants.  It is submitted that the latter factor is 
logically understandable taking into account that a skilled workforce would play a more 
meaningful role in advancing the country‟s development. 
 
The only work permit that can accommodate semi skilled and unskilled migrants is the 
corporate work permit.
531
  The latter however is mainly tailored for mine and farm labour and 
therefore does not accommodate casual employees such as domestic workers and restaurant 
staff.  The only option for migrants that seek jobs in the latter categories of employment is to 
enter and work in South Africa illegally.  As a consequence of Exchange Control law as well 
as Section 45 of the Immigration Act,
532
 such migrants are unable to access formal financial 
services, this subsequently inclines them to utilise informal remittance channels when they 
wish to send funds to their country of origin. 
 
It is submitted that factors such as the fact that the stringent requisites must be fulfilled in 
order for foreigners to attain work permits as well as the fact that South Africa‟s immigration 
laws do not cater for unskilled migrants, fuel illegal immigration into South Africa.  
Immigrants who are in South Africa illegally are unable to access the services of formal 
financial institutions by virtue of the fact that the provision of such services is intertwined 
with the policing of immigration laws. 
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even though they may not be the best candidate for the job. 
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The linking of financial services and the policing of immigration laws can be viewed as a 
way of dissuading and curbing illegal immigration by crippling an illegal immigrant‟s ability 
to access financial services.  Viewed within the context of remittances, the merits of the latter 
are questionable.   It is submitted that migrants who are unable to access formal remittance 
channels simply rely on those provided within the informal sector. 
 
Informal remittances can subsequently have detrimental consequences for the South African 
economy by compromising its money supply.
533
  Aside from the latter, as well as other 
concerns, informal remittance channels can act as an alternative mechanism for money 
launderers as well as terrorist organisations to launder and mobilise illicit funds.
534
 
 
Taking into account the current levels of unemployment in South Africa, any debate on 
amending the Immigration Act
535
 in order to make it easier to employ foreigners is unlikely 
to be welcomed.  Aside from the latter, the need to cater for South African individuals that 
are from previously disadvantaged groups also has to be taken into consideration. 
 
For purposes of increasing formal remittance flows, Truen et al recommended that South 
Africa consider adopting a policy similar to that which applies in the U.S where 
undocumented Mexican migrants can access formal financial services by using a Matricular 
card issued by the Mexican Consulate.  They however state that instead of an identity card 
being used, foreigners should be granted access to formal financial products on presentation 
of a valid passport alone without the clients‟ residential status being taken into account.536  
Taking the latter into mind, it is suggested that South Africa follow the approach followed by 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, where the provision of financial services is not interlinked with a 
responsibility to police immigration laws. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANTI - MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATTING THE 
FINANCING OF TERRORISM LAW 
 
1      INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since the terrorist attacks upon the United States of America on September 11 2001, 
governments and financial service providers across the globe have realigned as well as 
increased their efforts to curb the financing of terrorism and money laundering activities.
537
  
Remittance services, as a result of these heightened efforts, have been subjected to an 
increased level of scrutiny.  This is due to the fact they are perceived as being vulnerable to 
misuse for purposes related to terrorist financing and money laundering. 
 
Remittances are, by nature, unrequited transfers of money that do not require the remitter to 
present any documentation to substantiate the purpose for which funds are remitted.  The 
latter aspect of remittances affords criminals the opportunity to disguise their illicit funds as 
legitimate remittances and, by doing so, avoid the ordinary frustrations associated with 
obtaining legitimate documents that hide the true nature of the funds.
538
 
 
As part of the process of suppressing money laundering and combating terrorism inter-
governmental organisations have set out recommendations on how States should structure 
their anti-money laundering
539
 as well combating the financing of terrorism legislation.
540
  In 
turn, governments have passed legislation that criminalises money laundering, and sets out the 
measures to be implemented in suppressing such activity.   
 
AML and CFT legislation unavoidably have an impact upon remittances, regardless of 
whether or not they are for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.  This is due to the fact that 
remittances, as mentioned before, are unrequited transfers which makes it difficult to 
distinguish between legitimate and illicit funds.  The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the 
implications that AML and CFT laws and measures bear for the formalisation of remittances.  
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Prior to doing so however it is necessary to give a background on money laundering and 
terrorism to be given. 
 
 
2      MONEY LAUNDERING  
 
Money laundering, in general terms, refers to any activity that is aimed at concealing the 
illegal proceeds of criminal activity so as to give the impression that they are from a 
legitimate source.
541
  Such is usually achieved by converting money from illegal activities 
into legitimate assets, thereby concealing the predicate illegal activity.
542
  Criminals, by 
converting their illicit funds into legitimate assets, are able to manipulate the proceeds of their 
criminal activity without drawing the attention of authorities to the illegal source of the funds.  
 
The term „money laundering‟ is often attributed to the notorious gangster Al Capone who 
established a number of Laundromats in order to „legitimise‟ the proceeds of his boot-legging, 
as well as other, criminal activities.  Authors such as Cowling, however, are of the view that 
the patron saint of money laundering was Mayor Lansky,
543
 often referred to as the mob‟s 
accountant who, after Capone‟s indictment on tax evasion charges, realised that new schemes 
had to be established in order to evade internal revenue authorities.  In order to achieve the 
latter he utilised numbered Swiss accounts
544
 as well as offshore investment havens.
545
 
 
 
2 1   The money laundering process 
 
Three phases are commonly associated with the money laundering process.  These are the 
placement, layering and integration phases.  The procedure can be completed by using either 
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formal or informal financial mechanisms.  In regard to remittances, informal channels, in 
comparison to formal channels, are more susceptible to misuse as they do not necessarily 
require any documentation in order for a transaction to be carried out and leave no paper trail.  
This aspect of informal remittance channels rouses the concern of regulators.   
 
 
2 1 1   Placement 
 
This involves the introduction of illegitimate funds into the formal financial system.
546
  The 
placement stage, according to authors such as Cowling and Thony,
547
 entails the highest risk 
of detection due to the fact that financial institutions, by virtue of AML and CFT legislation, 
are required to report on suspicious transactions as well as those that exceed a certain amount.  
In an attempt to avoid being caught, criminals falsify documents and break what would 
otherwise be large deposits of money into smaller ones via multiple transactions.
548
  The 
smaller deposits are of values below the threshold beyond which the relevant financial 
institution must identify or report.  It is submitted that the process of making smaller, multiple 
transaction deposits can arouse suspicion. 
 
Hawala remittance channels can be very useful at this stage of the money laundering cycle, 
particularly where the hawalaadar operates a legitimate business.  The hawalaadar is able to 
deposit funds obtained from their remittance business into a bank account under the guise of 
them being obtained from the legitimate business of the hawalaadar and by virtue of such 
illicit and legitimate funds can be mixed.
549
 
 
 
2 1 2   Layering 
 
In the layering phase, the launderer attempts to manipulate the illicit funds in such a way that 
they appear to have been obtained through legitimate activities, disassociating them, as far as 
possible, from their illegitimate source.
550
  At times, money launderers „layer‟ funds through 
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formal banking institutions by using various account-to-account transactions.  The latter can 
be problematic for the launderer in two ways.  Firstly, transactions via formal financial 
institutions inevitably leave an audit trail that could result in the laundering process being 
unravelled in the event that any phase of the money laundering process is investigated by 
regulatory authorities.  Secondly, the numerous transactions could rouse the suspicion of the 
financial institutions involved and they may report such transactions to the relevant 
authorities.
551
 
 
Informal remittance mechanisms can be utilised in the layering phase and can be more 
efficient in doing so in comparison to using formal financial mechanisms.  Informal 
remittance channels do not necessarily involve any documentation and leave, if at all, a sparse 
and confusing paper trail.  Basic hawala transfers are hard to trace and link to the original 
source of the funds.  Hawala transfers, through use of a network of hawalaadars across the 
globe, can be layered in ways that make it difficult to locate the source of funds.
552
  
 
 
2 1 3   Integration  
  
At this stage of the money laundering process the „washed‟ gains of criminal activity are 
brought back into circulation in the form of legitimate funds.  Such can be done through the 
purchase of assets or investing in various business schemes.  The same traits that make 
informal remittance channels, such as hawala, potentially useful in the layering process also 
make it an attractive mechanism for the integration process. 
 
 
2 2   The three dimensions of money laundering 
 
Goredema has outlined three types of money laundering.  These are:
553
 
 
 Internal money laundering; 
 Incoming money laundering; and 
 Outgoing money laundering. 
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Internal money laundering entails laundering proceeds or assets, derived from crime, within 
the country in which the crime was committed.
554
  Such may be achieved by, amongst other 
possibilities, purchasing motor vehicles, real estate or setting up shell companies. 
 
Inward money laundering consists of laundering proceeds or assets derived from crimes that 
are committed in another country.  Such may be done in order to complicate an investigation 
trail or because the destination country has better investment opportunities or inefficient law 
enforcement.
555
  
 
Outgoing money laundering, on the other hand, entails laundering proceeds or assets that are 
derived from criminal activity by moving them to another country or countries.
556
  Such is 
more likely to occur were the perpetrators of the predicate criminal activity are foreigners. 
 
 
2 3   The importance of suppressing money laundering 
 
There a number of reasons that can be put forth in regard to why it is essential for money 
laundering to be suppressed.  One of these is based on the link between money laundering and 
criminal activity.  Money laundering aside from allowing criminals to enjoy the proceeds of 
their illegal activities assists in the furtherance of further crimes.  Money laundering has been 
linked to crimes such as fraud, bribery, corruption and even international terrorism.
557
  Failure 
to keep money laundering under control can compromise public confidence in the legal 
system. 
 
Money laundering can also have adverse economic consequences.  If left unchecked it may 
have adverse effects such as increasing the demand for cash, rendering interest rates and 
exchange rates more volatile as well as increasing the rate of inflation.
558
  In addition, money 
laundering compromises the integrity of a country‟s financial institutions and markets.  The 
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latter affects the credibility of a country‟s financial market in the eyes of investors and 
consumers.
559
   
 
As shall be indicated later on, a country‟s commitment to suppressing money laundering can 
have significant consequences on the financial relationship that its banking as well other 
financial institutions may wish to establish with foreign counterparts.  If a nation has not 
taken steps to adopt adequate AML measures, its financial institutions may find themselves in 
a situation where they are unable to form correspondent financial relationships with foreign 
counterparts. 
 
 
3      TERRORISM AND ITS FINANCING 
 
3 1   Terrorism 
 
Terrorism, despite not being a recent phenomenon, does not have a concrete universal 
definition.  Varying definitions have been given to the term by different state departments and 
organisations.  Some of these shall be outlined below.   
 
The United Stated Department of State has defined terrorism as 
 
“[T]he calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence, to inculcate 
fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of 
goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.”560 
 
The Unite States  Code of federal regulations on the other hand defines terrorism as 
 
“[T]he unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.”561 
 
                                                          
559
 RBZ Guideline No. 1 – 2006 BUP/SML: Anti-Money laundering guidelines 14; CGAP & The World Bank 
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The United States Department of State has defined terrorism as being 
 
“[P]remeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.”562 
 
South Africa‟s Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act
563
 describes terrorist activity as any violent and harmful action which threatens 
the life, freedom, physical integrity or causes the death of any person.  The aim of such action 
must, inter alia, be to induce fear into the public or a segment of the public so as to influence 
them to act in a certain manner in order.  In addition, it must have the objective of advancing a 
political, religious, philosophical or ideological motive, objective, cause or undertaking.
564
 
 
From what has been mentioned above it is possible to outline the common aspects of an act of 
terrorism namely:  
 
i. The commission of a violent act or threat of such against non-combatants,  
ii. so as to incite fear,  
iii. in order to further political, religious or ideological views. 
 
Terrorism is a criminal activity that is meant to have an impact that goes beyond the 
immediate victims of the act.  It is often committed as a strategy aimed at drawing the 
attention of the local populace, government and world at large towards a religious, ideological 
or political view.
565
 
 
Terrorists plan their attacks in such a way that they attract the greatest publicity and often 
choose targets that symbolise what they oppose.
566
  The success of the terror attack is not 
based on the successful execution of the act but rather depends on the effect that the attack has 
upon the targeted audience.
567
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3 2   The financing of terrorism 
 
Although no concise definition for terrorist financing activity exists per se, one can derive a 
notion of what the activity entails if the provisions of Article 2 of the United Nations 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism are taken into 
account.  Taking into mind the provisions of the Convention, terrorist financing can be 
defined as the act of collecting or providing funds that are intended to be used to cause death 
or serious bodily injury to a person, who is not actively participant in an armed conflict.   
Where the purpose of such is to intimidate a population, or compel a government or 
international organisation, to do or abstain from doing any act. 
 
Whilst money laundering is aimed at legitimising the proceeds of criminal activity, financing 
of terrorism is focused on using either legitimate or illicit funds to finance terrorist activities.  
Despite having differing objectives the two activities are often executed using the same 
techniques.  In regard to terrorist financing, however, the funds need not necessarily be from 
an illegal activity.
568
 
The events of September 11 2001 spurned international organisations to increase their efforts 
to combat terrorism and it‟s financing.  Organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force 
have developed policies and standards that are aimed at dealing with the issue of terrorist 
financing more effectively and these are known as the FATF „Nine Special 
Recommendations‟.569   
 
 
4   THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE 
 
4 1   Background 
 
In 1989, at the G-7 summit in Paris, the Financial Action Task Force
570
 was established by the 
G-7 heads of state as a response to the internationally mounting concern in regard to money 
laundering.
571
  The FATF is an inter-governmental body which, amongst other activities, 
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establishes international standards as well as promotes and develops policies that are aimed at 
suppressing money laundering and terrorist financing.   
 
The FATF seeks to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative as 
well as regulatory reforms in the areas of money laundering and terrorist financing.  At the 
present moment it has 34 members, inclusive of South Africa which became a member in 
June 2003.
572
 
 
The organisation has developed a set of standards which countries are recommended to adopt 
as minimum standards in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.  These 
standards are embodied in what have become known as the FATF “Forty plus Nine 
Recommendations” and have had a considerable influence in shaping AML and CFT 
legislation and counter measures across the globe. 
 
 
4 2   The FATF 40+9 recommendations 
 
The original recommendations, which were issued in April 1990, were forty and primarily 
focused on stifling the misuse of financial systems by individuals wishing to launder 
money.
573
  Following the events of September 11 2001, these recommendations were 
supplemented by “Eight Special recommendations” in October 2001. The latter 
recommendations focus on combating the funding of terrorist activities and organisations.  In 
October 2004 the FATF published a ninth Special recommendation which strengthened the 
agreed international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing to 
further extent. 
 
The FATF recommendations despite being, what is submitted to be, a significant step in the 
fight against terrorism and suppression of money laundering, do not have a binding effect 
upon member states.  In order for them to be effective, member states need to adopt domestic 
legislation which reflects the standards embodied within the recommendations. 
   
Regardless of the fact that they are not legally binding, non implementation of the 
recommendations can have negative implications for the financial institutions of a non-
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compliant country.
574
  The FATF recommendations call upon the financial institutions of 
compliant countries to treat transactions of non compliant countries with extra 
circumspection.
575
  This can significantly slow down, or in some cases, hamper such 
transactions.
576
  
 
 
4 2 1   Implications that the recommendations bear for the remittance industry 
 
The FATF recommendations are not binding, but they can have significant implications for 
the remittance industry when implemented by a country.  A key example of such is 
recommendation 5 which calls upon financial institutions to establish and verify the identities 
of their clients, using reliable and independent documents, when carrying out transactions.  
Such can deter people from using formal remittance services particularly when they do not 
have valid identification documents.   
 
The Nine Special recommendations on terrorist financing also bear significant consequences 
for the remittance industry, recommendations 6 and 7 being of particular significance in this 
regard.  The former requires governments to take measures to bring all RSPs, inclusive of 
those that operate in the informal sector, and their agents into the formal regulatory system, by 
way of licensing and registering them.  Countries are required to make sure that all RSPs that 
operate illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions.  
 
Licensing and registration may drive informal RSPs further underground where a fee is 
charged for such or the process is rigorous and it may also, amongst other negative 
implications, stifle competition within the formal sector of the remittance industry.
577
  Smaller 
RSPs may find licensing and registration too costly and burdensome in relation to the size of 
their business and therefore be unable to enter the market as formal service providers.
578
  In 
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such circumstances criminalising the provision of unlicensed or unregistered remittance 
services would only serve to drive informal RSPs further below the radar of authorities.
579
 
 
Recommendation 7 calls upon nations to ensure that money remitters, as well as other 
financial institutions involved with the money transfer business, obtain information on the 
sender of the funds.  Such information is to remain within the message sent with funds 
throughout the payment chain.  The latter recommendation has, to a certain extent, been 
adopted into South African via the customer due diligence requisites imposed on financial 
institutions by AML legislation.
580
 
 
 
5   SOUTH AFRICA: AML AND CFT LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
5 1   Money laundering in South Africa 
 
In South Africa money laundering activity is largely related to drug activity.  South Africa is 
believed to have the largest drug market in the SADC, with more than 100 active drug 
syndicates.
581
  Such syndicates launder their illicit funds through the purchase of motor 
vehicles, properties and legitimate businesses. 
 
Money laundering activity is also associated with economic crimes such as corruption.  At 
times the perpetrators of such are foreigners who would have embezzled funds in their 
countries of origin and launder their gains by investing in South Africa 
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5 2   Anti-Money laundering legislation 
 
Before the enactment of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act
582
 there was no South African 
legislation that specifically dealt with the issue of money laundering.
583
  Prior to the Act, 
launderers were prosecuted in terms of the South African common law.
584
  The Act, amongst 
other things, made it a criminal offence to launder the proceeds of specific drug related 
offences and required suspicious transactions related to the proceeds of drug activities to be 
reported.
585
  Money laundering in relation to non-drug related activities was not covered by 
the criminal legislation of South Africa at the time.   
 
In 1996, pursuant to the recommendations of the South African Law Commission, the 
Proceeds of Crime Act
586
 was enacted.  The Act enhanced the money laundering legislation 
that existed at the time and broadened the offence of “money laundering” to go beyond drug 
related proceeds, such that it encompassed the proceeds of any criminal activity.
587
   
 
The Act also created three money laundering offences, namely: 
                       
1. Disguising the proceeds of any crime;588 
2. assisting another to benefit from the proceeds of crime;589 and 
3. acquiring, using, or possessing property knowing it to be the proceeds of crime.590 
 
If a person was found guilty of either of these offences they could either incur civil liability in 
the form of a fine or criminal sanctions in the form of imprisonment for a maximum period of 
30 years.
591
 
 
In 1999 the PCA and the money laundering provisions of the DTA were repealed by 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act
592
 which, at the present moment, is the principle piece of 
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legislation in terms of criminalising money laundering.
593
  The Act expressly criminalises 
money laundering and outlines other offences that are related to the proceeds of unlawful 
activities.
594
  It provides severe penalties for money laundering as well as dealing in the 
proceeds of unlawful activities which can be as severe as a fine of R1 million or a maximum 
of 30 years imprisonment.
595
  
 
Whilst the POCA is the primary piece of legislation in terms of outlining activities that 
constitute money laundering offences, it does not outline the measures to be implemented to 
suppress and detect money laundering.  Such is provided for in the Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act
596
 which is the principle piece of legislation in terms of outlining AML measures.  
 
 
5 2 1   AML measures: FICA 
 
The FICA is based on the FATF Recommendations as well those of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision.
597
  The FICA provides for the establishment of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre
598
 which serves as South Africa‟s Financial Intelligence Unit.  The 
primary objective of the FIC is to assist in identifying the proceeds of unlawful activities and 
suppressing money laundering and terrorist financing and related activities.
599
  
  
Supervisory powers have been awarded to, amongst other bodies, the SARB and the Financial 
Services Board.
600
  The latter play a role in ensuring compliance with the Act and are, for the 
purposes of FICA, the primary supervisory bodies in regard to banking and non-banking 
financial institutions respectively. 
 
The FICA places a variety of obligations upon financial institutions in order to suppress 
money laundering.  Financial institutions are, for instance, required to identify their clients 
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and verify such identity in a specific manner.
601
  Such obligations, particularly those that have 
an impact upon the remittance industry, shall be elaborated upon further at a later stage within 
this chapter.
602
  
 
 
5 3   CFT legislation 
 
In order to implement the FATF “Nine Special Recommendations” as well as international 
Conventions dealing with terrorism and its related activities the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act
603
 was enacted.  The POCDATARA 
expressly states that it is an offence for anyone to engage in terrorist activity.
604
   
 
From reading the definition that the POCDATARA gives to the term „terrorist activity‟, it can 
be described as being any violent and harmful action which threatens the life, freedom, 
physical integrity or causes the death of any person.  The aim of such action must, inter alia, 
be to induce fear into the public or a segment of the public so as to influence them to act in a 
certain manner.  In addition, it must have the objective of advancing a political, religious, 
philosophical or ideological motive, objective, cause or undertaking.
605
 
 
The POCDATARA also makes provision for a variety of other offences related to terrorism 
such as, for instance, knowingly assisting or associating with a terrorist organisation and its 
activities.
606
  More relevant for the purposes of this dissertation is the offence created by 
Section 4 of the Act.  Section 4 criminalises any actions that are connected to, or associated 
with, the financing of any offences specified within the Act‟s provisions.  Terrorism, as 
mentioned previously, is outlined as an offence in section 2 of the Act.  The POCDATARA 
therefore criminalises terrorist financing as well as actions that facilitate such.
607
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A person who is found guilty of engaging in terrorism or its financing, amongst other 
specified offences, faces severe penalties.
608
  In addition to imposing a punishment, in the 
form of a fine or imprisonment, the relevant court must declare any property that is 
reasonably believed to have been used in the commission of terrorist activity or it‟s financing 
as being forfeited to the state.
609
  „Property‟ is defined broadly and includes money, moveable 
and immoveable corporeal or incorporeal things.  It also encompasses rights, privileges, 
claims, securities and interests therein and all proceeds of such.
610
   
 
Upon coming into effect the POCDATARA amended various pieces of legislation which 
were in force at the time.  The FICA was amongst the pieces of legislation that were amended 
in order to accommodate the POCDATARA.  Amongst other amendments, there was an 
amendment to title of chapter 3 of the FICA.  The title now reads as follows: 
 
“CONTROL MEASURES FOR MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING 
OF TERRORISM AND RELATED ACTIVITIES”. 
 
This effectively means that the AML control measures that are applied in terms of FICA‟s 
provisions are the same ones to be applied in combating the financing of terrorism for 
purposes of the POCDATARA. 
 
 
6   ANALYSIS 
 
South African AML and CFT laws primarily affect the formalisation of remittances via the 
customer due diligence
611
 requirements that they place upon financial institutions.  The CDD 
measures of the FICA and the POCDATARA are contained within the FICA.  The nature of 
these CDD requisites and their impact upon remittance transactions shall be examined below 
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6 1   CDD obligation imposed by FICA 
 
6 1 1   Customer identification and verification 
 
Section 21 of the FICA, which is based on recommendation 5 of the FATF Nine Special 
Recommendations, places an obligation upon “accountable institutions” to establish as well as 
verify the identity of their clients.  The First Schedule of the Act outlines which institutions 
are accountable institutions in terms of the Act and amongst those that are listed are banks as 
well as money remitters.  The FICA prohibits these institutions from establishing a business 
relationship or concluding a single transaction with a person unless they have taken steps to: 
 
a)  establish as well as verify the identity of the client; and 
 
b) if the client is acting on behalf of another person, or alternatively, if the person 
acts on behalf of the client, the institution must establish and verify the identity of 
the other person and their authority to act on behalf of the client, or as the case 
may be, the clients authority to act on behalf of another person. 
 
Should an accountable institution conclude a single transaction or conclude a once-off 
transaction without duly identifying the client it commits an offence in terms of FICA.
612
  The 
penalty for such an offence is imprisonment for a maximum period of 15 years or a fine of R1 
million.
613
 
 
The FICA Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations,
614
 which have to 
be read in conjunction with the Act, give more intrinsic details in regard to how customer 
identification and verification of such is to be carried out.  The Regulations state that when 
establishing and verifying the identity of a client the following information must be obtained: 
 
 In the case of citizens; their full name, date of birth, identification number, 
residential address and tax registration number.
615
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 In the case of foreigners; in addition to the ordinary information that a citizen 
must provide they a required to give details in regard to their nationality as well as 
passport number.
616
 
 
FICA, in contrast to the Exchange Control Act and its Regulations, does not put a duty on 
financial institutions to determine whether or not their clients are legally present in South 
Africa.  Hence non-citizens are not required to provide details in regard to their residence or 
work permit in order for financial institutions to comply with the FICA provisions.
617
  
 
A person‟s identity has to be verified by means of an identification document.618  In the case 
of South African citizens and residents an official national identity document would need to 
be presented whereas foreigners have to present a passport.
619
  Residential addresses are to be 
verified using documents such as a utility bill.
620
  Records in regard to, amongst other 
information, a client‟s identity, as well as transaction amounts, must be kept for a period of 
five years from the date that the business relationship is established or transaction is 
concluded.
621
 
 
It appears that the relevant authorities took into mind the fact that the need to present an 
identity document could prevent individuals without such from accessing formal financial 
services and hence created room for exception.  The Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Control Regulations allow financial institutions, in circumstances were it is deemed 
to be reasonably acceptable for a person to be unable to provide an identity document, to rely 
on another document issued to that person that bears the following:
622
 
 
a) a photograph of the person; 
b) the persons full name, initials and surname; 
c) the persons date of birth; and 
d) the person‟s identity number. 
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Examples of documents that can be accepted as alternative form of verification in exceptional 
circumstances are a valid South African driver‟s license or passport as well as a valid 
temporary identity document issued by the Department of Home Affairs.
623
  The latter 
documents should be valid in the sense that they must be current and unexpired. 
 
The exception does not, however, seem applicable to individuals who are not South African 
citizens or residents, as no mention of such is made within the Regulations.  If the Regulations 
are strictly implemented, migrants who do have neither a passport nor valid travel document 
in their possession would be unable to access formal remittance services.  It is submitted 
however, that even if the exception were applicable to foreigners it would likely be of little 
effect taking into mind that, according to Genesis Analytics, financial institutions such as 
banks have been hesitant to exercise the discretion bestowed upon them by Regulation 6.  The 
conservative approach has been attributed to the significant fines that are associated with 
money laundering offences.
624
 
 
Ideally the information gathered in identifying a client should enable a financial institution to 
form a client profile.  With such, a financial institution is able to make comparisons between 
similar client profiles and thereby detect unusual behaviour by a client.  Furthermore it allows 
an institution to detect transaction patterns that do not suit a client‟s profile. 
 
According to De Koker, in South Africa it is not always possible to form a full client profile 
for each financial service customer.  This is due to the fact that under ordinary circumstances 
financial institutions are only obliged to obtain information that pertains to the personal 
identity of the client.  Such particulars only play a small role in building a client profile and, 
according to De Koker, are insufficient to enable a financial institution to detect suspicious 
financial activity.
625
 
 
For a client profile to effectively established information such as the source of the client‟s 
income would be needed.
626
  Financial institutions are only obliged to obtain such information 
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in the case of business relationships or transactions that present a high risk of facilitating 
money laundering activities.
627
 
 
In circumstances were a business relationship or once-off transaction presents a high risk of 
facilitating money laundering or were it is necessary to for a financial institution to identify 
the proceeds of unlawful activity or money laundering, inter alia, the following must be 
ascertained: 
 
i. The source of the clients income; and 
ii. the source of the funds which the client intends to use to conclude the transaction 
or series of transactions in the course of a business relationship. 
 
De Koker states that the procedure prescribed by regulation 21 is essentially a “know your 
customer” (KYC) procedure, in contrast to the ordinary procedure of identifying clients which 
is a CDD procedure.
628
 
 
 
6 1 2   The provision and verification of a residential address  
 
As a means of making it more difficult for terrorists and launders to commit identity fraud, 
law enforcement agencies so it fit for the FICA Regulations to make it necessary for clients of 
financial institutions to present more than just an identity document when verifying their 
identity.
629
  The obligation to provide an address and the need for such to be verified appears 
to have been the chosen safeguard against identity fraud.
630
 
 
The value of providing a residential address for purposes of identifying a customer has been 
questioned by authors such as De Koker who argues that such would be more significant in 
developed countries without a system of national identity numbers.
631
  In such countries 
people will often have similar names and surnames making it necessary for addresses to be 
provided so as to distinguish one person from the other.  He states that in countries such as 
South Africa were a system of national identity numbers and documents applies, the provision 
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of an address for purposes of identifying clients is of no real value.  Once an accountable 
institution obtains a clients name, date of birth and identity number there is no need for it to 
obtain a residential address.   
 
De Koker argues further that the value of residential addresses in identifying clients is 
compromised by the high level of internal migration in South Africa.
632
  Such arguments 
become relevant when one considers the practical difficulties that have been experienced in 
South Africa in verifying the residential addresses of individuals. 
 
In South Africa, the verification of a clients address has presented certain difficulties, 
particularly with low-income individuals.
633
  These difficulties are related to the fact that a 
fair number of low-income individuals stay in informal settlements which, by nature, do not 
have formal addresses.  In addition, low-income consumers are increasingly pre-paying for 
their utilities such as water and electricity and hence they do not have utility bills.  The 
drafters of the FICA and its Regulations were aware of the fact that individuals who lived in 
informal settlements and rural areas could face problems in verifying their residential address 
in accordance with the regulatory requisites.
634
  As a consequence, room for exception from 
the need to provide a residential address was created by means of exemption known as 
“Exemption 17”.  The latter is contained within the Schedule to the money laundering and 
terrorism regulations.
635
 
 
 
6 1 2 1   Enhancing financial inclusion: Exemption 17 
 
Exemption 17 relieves certain financial institutions from the general obligation placed upon 
them by section 21 of the FICA which requires them to attain as well as verify their 
customer‟s residential addresses.  The exemption is only applicable if certain requisites are 
fulfilled.   
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The exemption was included within the Regulations as a means of enhancing low-income 
individual‟s ability to access formal financial services.  However, when practically applied it 
proved to be of little assistance in enhancing such access.
636
  For instance, one of the 
requisites for the exemption to be applicable was that the client‟s could not remain unused for 
a period of 180 days.  The latter did not accommodate individuals who are contract workers, 
with no fixed income.
637
  Aside from this, the exemption did not apply to accounts that 
enabled the holder to transfer funds outside South Africa.  Most “mass market” financial 
products utilize debit cards that allow that provide cross border functionality and as a 
consequence would not qualify for exception in terms of Exemption 17‟s provisions.638 
 
The need to amend the provisions of Exemption 17 became more apparent when the four 
major banks,
639
 in collaboration with Postbank, sought to launch the Mzansi account.
640
  The 
latter is a savings account with basic transaction capability aimed at the low-income market.   
 
The AML regime posed a significant barrier to the launching of the Mzansi account as a 
significant portion of the low-income market did not have a formal address and the criteria for 
Exemption 17 application were not broad enough to accommodate the practical needs of low-
value accounts and transactions.  Although the FICA regulations allow financial institutions to 
accept documents that present a reasonable form of address verification, compliance officers 
in institutions such as banks interpreted the regulations conservatively thereby restricting the 
leeway that had been provided.
641
 
  
As a consequence of the aforementioned issues banks, approached the regulatory authorities 
for some form of relief.  In response, Exemption 17 was repealed and replaced with an 
amended Exemption 17
642
 which is based on actual market research and takes the needs of the 
financially excluded into account.  The exemption now applies to remittance transactions that 
go beyond South Africa and the 180 day dormancy period is no longer applicable.
643
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The amended Exemption 17 facilitated the launch of the Mzansi account and has reportedly 
brought over 3 million people into the formal financial sector.  The FIC has, in addition, 
issued guidance notes
644
 as contemplated in section 4(c) of the FICA, which provide guidance 
to banks in regard to which documents qualify as acceptable verification documentation.  In 
establishing and verifying customer identity, banks are encouraged to undertake a risk based 
approach as opposed to them following a “one size fits all approach”.645 
 
It is submitted that the relief granted by Exemption 17, even its amended form, is only 
partially effective in achieving the desired effect of increasing financial inclusion.  This is 
stated taking into account that the exemption only provides room for exception in regard to 
the ascertainment of a clients address and tax registration number,
646
 it does not absolve 
individuals from presenting an identity document.  In addition to the latter, the exemption 
does not apply to cross-border transactions that go beyond the CMA.
647
  Remittance 
transactions that go beyond the CMA are still subject to the stringent CDD requisites imposed 
by FICA.  Furthermore, the exemption only applies to certain accountable institutions and not 
all of them.  Remittance businesses, unlike banking institutions, have not been included 
within the scope of the exemption.
648
   
 
 
6 2   Impact of AML and CFT measures upon the remittance industry 
 
6 2 1   Access to formal remittance services 
 
The CDD framework prevents individuals who do not have valid documents that verify their 
identity or residential address from accessing formal remittance channels.  In the case of 
South African citizens and residents, room for exception has been granted in the Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations
649
 as well as Exemption 17.  The 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations allow South African citizens 
and residents, when verifying their identity, to use acceptable documents other than an 
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identity document when the circumstances are acceptable.  Exemption 17 absolves them from 
presenting particulars that verify their address in respect of certain accounts and transactions.   
 
Foreigners, on the other hand, have not been granted any exception from the CDD requisites 
by the FICA Regulations or exemption 17.  In order for migrant labourers to access formal 
remittance channels, they must be able to present a passport
 650
  bearing their name and must 
also verify their residential address.  
 
This fact that a passport must be presented effectively bars undocumented migrants that do 
not have valid travel documents from accessing formal remittance services.  Migrants who 
live in informal settlements
651
 are also barred from accessing formal remittance channels as 
they are unable to fulfil the address verification requisite imposed by FICA. 
 
The relief granted by Exemption 17, as mentioned previously, is only partially effective in 
facilitating greater access to formal remittance services.  The latter is stated taking into 
account that exemption 17 is not applicable to remittance transactions that go beyond the 
CMA,
652
 nor does it apply to financial institutions that provide remittance services as their 
only business.
653
  Hence, migrant labourers who live in informal settlements face a significant 
barrier in accessing formal remittance services as they are likely to face significant difficulty 
in verifying their residential address. 
 
 
6 2 2   Compliance costs 
 
It is submitted that the FICA imposes compliance costs which affect both the financial 
institution, which incurs direct costs, as well as its customers.  Such costs are attributed to the 
necessary expenses that financial institutions have to incur in order to comply with the CDD 
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requisites imposed upon them as well as their duty to monitor transactions and report those 
that are suspicious to the FIC.
654
  The latter duty implies that financial institutions must invest 
in monitoring systems and must furthermore have specialist enforcement and monitoring 
personnel available.
655
  Subsequently AML compliance affects the cost of running accounts 
and establishing customer relations. 
 
According to an unnamed bank that was interviewed by Genesis Analytics initial costs of 
complying with AML measures were estimated to be the equivalent of USD$ 18,5 million 
with a recurring cost of at least USD$ 1 million per annum.
656
  Whilst financial institutions 
absorb the bulk of such costs to a certain extent part of these costs are passed onto consumers 
as part of the services costs which, it is submitted, would be less if it were not for the 
necessary costs that financial institutions incur in complying with AML laws.  It is submitted 
that these additional costs contribute to the high remittance costs that prevail along South 
Africa‟s remittance corridors. 
 
 
6 2 3   Cross border networking 
 
If one is to take a look at the effects of AML measures upon the remittance industry from a 
wider perspective recommendation 7 and 21 of the FATF Forty Recommendations become 
relevant.  Recommendation 7 calls upon financial institutions that are involved in cross-border 
banking and similar relationships to investigate whether or not their correspondent 
counterparts have any AML and CFT measures.  If they do have such measures in place, the 
extent to which they are applied must be ascertained.   
 
Recommendation 21 calls upon financial institutions to treat business relationships and 
transactions with financial institutions located in countries that do not, or inadequately, 
implement the FATF recommendations with special attention.  RSPs often have to form 
partnerships with foreign financial institutions in order to establish adequate distribution 
networks.
657
  Taking the latter into account the implementation of recommendation 7 and 21 
could bear significant consequences for the formation of such networks.  At the present 
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moment South Africa has no yet adopted these recommendations within its AML 
legislation,
658
 hence the full implications of their effect is yet to be seen. 
 
 
7   ZAMBIA 
 
7 1   Background 
 
Zambia, in contrast to South Africa, is not a major financial centre within the SADC region, 
or internationally for that matter.   Despite such, however, money laundering is a problem that 
the country faces within its borders.  Drug trafficking and its related activities, corruption as 
well as human trafficking are some of the predicate activities associated with money 
laundering in Zambia.
659
 
 
Criminals have adopted the use of certain tactics so as to launder their illicit funds.  These 
tactics include undervaluing assets they purchase and use of front businesses.  Other methods 
include the purchase of luxury goods such as vehicles as well as real estate.
660
 
 
In an effort to suppress money laundering activities as well as combat the financing of 
terrorism, Zambia has passed legislation that criminalises such activity.  Zambia has also 
displayed its commitment to curbing money laundering and terrorist financing by becoming a 
member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti - Money Laundering Group.
661
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7 2   AML legislation 
 
In the period before the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act coming into 
effect, section 22 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
662
 was the only 
legislative provision that criminalised money laundering.  It eventually became clear to the 
government of Zambia that the NDPSA, on its own, was not efficient in combating money 
laundering as it focused on criminalising money laundering in relation to drug activities, 
whilst in reality it was linked to other crimes such as fraud.
663
 
 
In 2001 the Prohibition and Prevention of Money laundering Act
664
  was enacted and it 
repealed section 22 of the NDPSA upon coming into effect.
665
   The PPMLA is the primary 
piece of legislation in terms of criminalising money laundering and also outlines which 
activities constitute money laundering offences.
666
  A person found guilty of committing a 
money laundering offence can be liable for a fine or imprisonment up to a maximum period of 
10 years.
667
  It is also possible for an individual to simultaneously incur civil as well as 
criminal liability.  
 
Aside from criminalising money laundering the PPMLA also outlines the AML measures that 
are to be implemented so as to suppress money laundering activity.  The PPMLA provides for 
the establishment of the Anti–Money Laundering Investigations Unit, which is empowered to 
inter alia collect information on, and prosecute money laundering matters.
668
  Supervision of 
the AML is carried out on a sector basis with the BoZ being in charge of supervising financial 
institutions such as banks, bureaux de change and PSBs.  The Securities and Exchanges 
Commission oversees the capital market and supervises role players such as financial 
intermediaries, issuers of debt and equity instruments. 
 
The PPMLA provides a framework within which AML measures can be adopted and 
implemented within the financial sector.  It places various AML obligations upon financial 
institutions such as a duty to identify clients as well as keeping records of such.  
Comprehensive details in regard to how the process of customer identification and 
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verification is to be carried out are contained within the AML Directives issued by 
supervisory authorities.  
  
The BoZ issued its AML Directives in 2004 whilst the Securities and Exchanges commission 
issued its AML Directives in 2009.  The aforementioned Directives virtually contain similar 
provisions, in regard to the CDD procedures that are to be applied, and differ in that they 
apply within different sectors in the Zambian financial sector.  The BoZ Directives are more 
relevant for the purposes of this dissertation and hence these shall be the focus of the 
discussion within the following section. 
 
 
7 2 1   BoZ AML Directives, 2004  
 
The PPMLA places an obligation on all Supervisory Authorities established in terms of its 
provisions to issue money laundering Directives.
669
  In compliance with the latter statutory 
obligation the BoZ, as a Supervisory Authority, has issued the Bank of Zambia Anti Money 
Laundering Directives, 2004.   
 
These Directives apply to all banks and financial institutions that are regulated and licensed 
by the BoZ.  Remittance businesses, which are referred to as Payment Service Businesses in 
the Zambian NPS, fall under the regulation of the BoZ
670
 and are hence subject to these 
Directives.  Within the following paragraphs some of the duties placed upon regulated 
institutions by the Directives which are felt to be relevant for purposes of this dissertation 
shall be outlined and examined. 
 
 
7 2 1 1   CDD requisites  
 
The CDD procedure prescribed by the BoZ AML Directives is almost almost identical to that 
which the South African FICA prescribes for financial institutions.  The BoZ AML Directives 
require financial institutions, when establishing business relations or conducting transactions 
with clients, to identify their clients and verify such by either one of the following:
671
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 A national registration card; 
 a valid passport; and 
 a driver‟s license. 
 
In the case of foreigners a national registration card and a passport with, were applicable, a 
valid visa must be provided.
672
 
 
As is the case in South Africa, the BoZ Directives require clients to provide a residential 
address and for such to be verified.
673
  In verifying a client‟s address the following can be 
used:
674
 
 
 A reference from a professional, an employer of the customer, a known customer 
of the financial institution or a customary authority who knows the customer.  The 
referee must have known the customer for at least a year. 
 In the case of non-residents, were possible reference must be obtained from their 
banks in their country of origin. 
 A credit reference agency search. 
 An original or certified true copy of recent council or applicable rates or utility 
bill receipt. 
 Any address validation or verification service that may be on offer; 
 In addition to either one or all of the above, the financial institution may do all 
that it  deems necessary in order to verify the documents submitted by the client. 
 
Regulated institutions are required to maintain transaction as well as customer identity records 
for a period of ten years after the termination of the business transaction.
675
  Such records 
must be kept by way of original documents in the form of hard copies or by way of electronic 
storage.
676
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7 2 1 2   Reporting of suspicious transactions and activities 
 
Institutions that fall under the supervision of the BoZ are also required to monitor client 
conduct and report suspicious transactions or activities to the Anti Money Laundering 
Investigations Unit.
677
  Should the Anti Money Laundering Unit require further information in 
regard to the suspicious behaviour, the reporting institution must be provide it with copies of 
the relevant documentation and retain the originals for itself. 
 
The Directives do not define what constitutes a suspicious activity but merely give examples 
of what actions amount to such.
678
  Suspicious transactions, on the other hand, are defined by 
the Directives as follows:
679
 
 
“[A] transaction which is inconsistent with a customer‟s known legitimate business or 
personal activities or with the normal business for the type of account which the customer 
holds, and includes, but is not limited to, the activities listed in the first schedule hereto.”  
 
The definition of suspicious transactions is broad in scopes and encompasses actions that 
constitute suspicious activity in terms of schedule 1 of the Directives. 
 
 
7 2 2   Practical application of AML measures 
 
In applying AML measures, a separate approach has been adopted in regard to transactions 
concluded via banking channels (account based transactions) and those carried outside the 
banking sphere (non- account based transactions).  AML measures have not been applied to 
the latter transactions with as much intensity as that which has been applied to transactions via 
banking channels.  As a consequence of such some PSBs do not carry out any CDD 
procedures when carrying out remittance transactions.
680
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Research carried out by the World Bank indicates that some PSBs have not applied any 
identification of senders were the amount sent does not exceed USD$ 1000.
681
  The 
persistence of such practices is fostered by the fact that the BoZ does not view the latter 
category of transactions, which are relatively low in value, as being a money laundering 
risk.
682
 
 
According to Finmark Trust, the BoZ has attributed the differing application of AML 
measures to the fact that the AML directives predated the NPS Act and did not take into 
account the needs of remittance clients, their transactions being anonymous and often small in 
terms of value.  The BoZ payment system department is aware that remittance clients can 
become hesitant to use the formal financial system if they are required to undergo extensive 
identity and address verification.  Such procedures would raise the costs of transactions and 
act as a barrier to penetration of the mass market.
683
 
 
 
7 3   Anti-terrorism legislation 
 
The principle piece of legislation in terms of criminalising terrorism and its financing is the 
Anti-Terrorism Act.
684
  According to the Act it is an offence for a person to commit any act of 
terrorism
685
 and a person found guilty of such may be imprisoned for a minimum period of 20 
years and a maximum of life imprisonment.
686
  Upon successful conviction of a person 
accused of engaging in terrorist financing the court may make a forfeiture order in regard to 
any funds in the persons possession that are related to terrorist activity.
687
 
 
The Anti-Terrorism Act
688
 outlines various activities related to terrorism which constitute 
offences, such as for instance inciting another to commit any act of terrorism.  More relevant 
for the purposes of this dissertation are section 20 and 21 which make it an offence to funds 
terrorist activities.  The penalty imposed for engaging in any form of terrorist funding is life 
                                                          
681
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imprisonment.
689
  The Act empowers an authorised officer
690
 who, on reasonable grounds, 
suspects that money imported or exported into or out of Zambia is terrorist property, to seize 
such money.   
The Act also states that in carrying out terrorism investigations, a police officer at or above 
the rank of inspector, may request a financial institution to provide customer information for 
the purposes of the investigation.
691
  The information that may be requested includes 
information in regard to; inter alia, the client‟s name and address. 
 
The Anti–Terrorism Act does not expressly place any CDD requisites on any financial 
institution.  However, from the provisions of the Second Schedule, which outlines what 
information may be requested from financial institutions during a terrorism investigation,
692
 
one can gather the impression that the CDD requisites imposed upon financial institutions by 
the PPMLA and its Directives are the same ones to be applied for purposes of combating the 
financing of terrorism.  The following constitute customer information for purposes of the 
Second Schedule:
693
 
 
a) Information in regard to whether a business relationship exists or existed between 
a bank, financial institution or financial service provider and a particular 
customer; 
b) a customer‟s account number; 
c) the customer‟s date of birth; 
d) the customer‟s full name; 
e) the customer‟s full date of birth; 
f) a customer‟s current or former address; 
g) the date upon which the business relationship between the bank, financial 
institution or financial service provider and customer begins or ends; 
h) any evidence of the customer‟s identity obtained in pursuance or for purposes of 
the PPMLA; and 
i) if applicable, the identity of the person sharing an account with the customer. 
 
                                                          
689
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The information required when identifying is almost to that which must be attained in terms 
of the PPMLA and its directives.  In verifying such identity the investigating officer may rely 
on any evidence gathered in pursuance or for purposes of the PPMLA.  
 
 
7 4   Analysis 
 
It is submitted that Zambia‟s AML and CFT regulatory framework, in comparison to that 
which is applicable in South Africa, facilitates greater access to formal financial services 
more than it inhibits it.  Such is illustrated by the manner in which a client‟s address can be 
verified.  The BoZ directives allow for a variety of documents as well as methods to be used 
in verifying a customer‟s address and it is submitted that by doing so reduce the possibility of 
address verification being a barrier to access to formal financial services.  In regard to address 
verification no distinction is specifically drawn between residents and non–residents, but 
rather it seems that non-residents have the option of relying on a reference from their banks in 
their country of origin were such is possible.  
 
According to empirical research conducted by Finmark Trust, the AML regime has generally 
not compromised the capacity of individuals to access formal financial services.  It has also 
not affected the ability of financial institutions to service low-value accounts.  Despite the fact 
that the CDD and transaction monitoring requisites imposed by the Directives inevitably raise 
transaction costs, these have been viewed as a necessary overhead that has not affected the 
approach of regulated institutions towards any customer segment.
694
 
 
The AML and CFT regulatory regime could, to a certain extent, inhibit migrants from 
accessing formal remittance services particularly those that do not have a passport and 
national registration card.  This is due to the fact that the Directives require that they present 
both a passport as well as national registration in order to identify themselves when carrying 
out financial transactions with formal financial institutions.  It is submitted, however, that the 
potential exclusionary effects of the Directives are neutralised by the manner in which AML 
Directives have been applied in Zambia, more specifically the fact that at times AML 
measures are not applied to non account based transactions.
695
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8   ZIMBABWE 
 
8 1   Background 
 
Zimbabwe, like many other countries on the African content and around the globe faces 
money laundering problems.  Activities such as illegal trade in precious minerals and 
corruption some of the predicate activities that initiate money laundering.
696
  Zimbabwe has 
subsequently taken steps to criminalise money laundering and suppress its occurrence.  As 
part of its commitment to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Zimbabwe 
has become a member of the EEAMLG and is also a signatory to international AML and CFT 
conventions.
697
   It has also enacted legislation that deals with the issues of money laundering 
and terrorism. 
 
 
8 2   AML legislation 
 
8 2 1   The Serious Offences (Confiscation of Profits) Act 
 
In Zimbabwe money laundering has been outlined as a statutory offence since 1990 when the 
Serious Offences (Confiscation of Profits) Act
698
 was enacted.  The Act criminalises money 
laundering and provides that a person shall be guilty of such if they;
699
 
 
a) engage, directly or indirectly, in a transaction, whether in or outside Zimbabwe, of money 
or other property which is the proceeds of crime;
700
 or 
b) receive, possesses, conceal, dispose of, bring into or remove from Zimbabwe, any money 
or other property which is the proceeds of crime, and they know or ought to have 
reasonably known that the money or other property was derived or realised, directly or 
indirectly, from the commission of an offence.
701
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The section has been criticised as being inadequate in criminalising money laundering 
activity.  Goredema criticises section 63(1)(a) for not being in line with the conventional 
understanding of money laundering as it targets conduct that may or may not constitute 
conversion of illegitimately gained assets into legitimate ones.
702
 
   
Goredema argues further that section 63(1)(b) is too broad, to the extent that a person who 
merely receives stolen property is guilty of money laundering.
703
  The section is criticised as 
describing money laundering in such a manner that the distinction between money laundering 
and its predicate activities is blurred.  As a consequence the essence of the term „money 
laundering‟ is lost.  Any actions related to illegally obtained property would, in terms of 
section 63, constitute money laundering.   
 
The SOFA is also criticised by Fundira for failing to outline which entities qualify as 
accountable institutions and outlining any reporting requisites.
704
  As a result of such, as well 
as Goredema‟s arguments, Fundira is of the view that the SOFA does not adequately 
criminalise and suppress money laundering. 
 
Aside from the SOFA, other pieces of legislation also touch upon money laundering as an 
offence.  Some of the more significant of these are; 
 
a) Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act; 
b) Criminal Matters ( Mutual assistance) Act;705 and 
c) Public Order and Security Act.706 
 
Prior to 2004, anti-money laundering provisions were scattered within different pieces of 
legislation, making it difficult for those wishing to comprehend the money laundering regime 
to do so.  There was a danger that different policies, issued by differing authorities, designated 
by separate Acts, would contradict each other.
707
  There was also the possibility that different 
Acts would impose opposing penalties for similar transgressions.
708
   Zimbabwe was in need 
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of legislation which dealt with money laundering in a more comprehensive manner and, as a 
consequence of such, the Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money Laundering Act 
was enacted. 
 
 
8 2 2   The Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money Laundering Act 
 
In 2004 the Bank Use Promotion and Suppression of Money Laundering Act
709
 was passed 
and, amongst other purposes, seeks to promote greater use of formal financial systems so as to 
make the detection of money laundering easier via audit trails.
710
  The Act was also passed in 
order to consolidate Zimbabwe‟s money laundering legislation.  Authors such as Fundira 
credit it as being the most comprehensive piece of Zimbabwean legislation in terms of dealing 
with the issue of money laundering.
711
   
 
Another positive element of the Act lies within the definition it accords to money laundering 
which, it is submitted, is more suitable in comparison to that provided for in the SOFA.  The 
BUPSMLA provides the following definition:
712
 
 
“Money laundering or laundering the proceeds of a serious offence means any act, 
scheme, arrangement, device, or artifice whatsoever by which the origin of the proceeds 
of any serious offence is sought to be hidden or disguised.” 
 
The Act provides for the establishment of a financial intelligence centre unit known as the 
Financial Intelligence Inspectorate and Evaluation Unit.
713
  The FIIEU is responsible for, inter 
alia, receiving reports on money laundering and forwarding such to the relevant authorities as 
well as monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Act.
714
 
 
The Act applies to all entities or individuals listed as „designated institutions‟ in terms of its 
provisions, of which financial institutions, other than The RBZ, and persons involved in the 
provision of either formal or informal money transfer services are included.  The Act outlines 
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the measures that designated institutions are required to implement in the suppression of 
money laundering.  These shall be outlined and examined within the following paragraphs. 
 
 
8 2 2 1   Customer identification 
 
The BUPSMLA expressly prohibits designated institutions from opening an account or 
concluding a single once-off transaction with an individual without taking reasonable steps to 
establish and verify the identity of the person.
715
  Comprehensive details in regard to what 
information is to be obtained are contained in the RBZ BUMPSLA guidelines.
716
 
 
In terms of the BUPSMLA guidelines a person‟s identity is comprised of; their date of birth, 
current permanent residential address, the nature of their business, normal financial 
transactions and any agency or beneficiary relationship they may have.
717
   Taking into 
account De Koker‟s description of what information is required in terms of a „Know Your 
Customer‟718 procedure, the customer identification process in Zimbabwe can be described as 
a KYC procedure as opposed to the CDD process applied in South Africa and Zambia. 
 
A client who is resident in Zimbabwe has to have their name verified by means of an original, 
official and valid document that bears a recent photograph of the individual.  Any of the 
following documents may be used in verifying a resident‟s name:719 
 
a) a national identity card; or 
b) a current and valid driver‟s license; and 
c) a current and valid passport. 
 
As an integral part of a person‟s identity it is important for the residential address of a client 
to be verified as well.  Such may be done by providing any of the following documents:
720
 
 
a) a recent utility bill; or 
b) a recent bank or credit statement; or 
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c) a recent bank reference. 
 
A copy of the document used to verify a customer‟s identity must be retained after the 
original has been viewed by the designated institution.
721
  Residents are offered some leeway 
in regard to the verification of their identity as the guidelines allow for a respected customer 
who is personally known by the manager or trusted member of staff of the financial institution 
to verify the client‟s identity.  Verification of a clients identity by means of third party 
reference is to be applied as an exception and not a as the norm.  Details in regard to who 
initiated and allowed for the introduction to be made must be recorded in the customers file. 
A third party reference cannot, however, be used in verifying a client‟s residential address.722   
 
In regard to non residents, aside from the normal information that must be obtained in regard 
to residents the following details must also be obtained; a mailing address, telephone and fax 
number, details in regard to their nationality, their occupation and name of their employer (if 
self employed the nature of the self employment must be outlined) and authorisation for an 
independent bank‟s reference to be obtained.723 
 
For purposes of verifying the identity of non residents either of the following particulars may 
be provided: 
 
a) a national identity card; or 
b) current, valid passport; or 
c) current, valid driver‟s license; and 
d) an armed forces identity card. 
 
The financial institution must record the reference numbers of whichever of the verification 
documents, mentioned above, is used by the client.  A bank or cash dealer
724
 must also make a 
comparison between the signature used in the business application form and the one on the 
relevant verification document.   
 
Banks and cash dealers are also required to verify a client‟s identity and address by contacting 
a reputable credit or financial institution in the clients ordinary home country or country of 
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residence.
725
  Records in respect of customer identity are to be kept for a period of at least five 
years.
726
 
 
 
8 2 2 2   Reporting of suspicious transactions and activities 
 
Designated institutions are required to report transactions which, on reasonable grounds, they 
believe to be related to money laundering or a serious offence to the Bank use Promotion and 
Suppression of Money Laundering Unit.
727
  The report must consist of information pertaining 
to relevant client and transaction as outlined in section 25(1) of the BUPSMLA.  So as to 
facilitate the obligations placed by section 26, designated institutions are required to establish 
and maintain internal reporting procedures.
728
 
 
 
8 2 2 3   Correspondent relationships 
 
The RBZ BUPSMLA guidelines call upon banks and cash dealers to gather information on 
foreign institutions that they, or wish to, form correspondent relationships with.
729
  Amongst 
other things, they are required to enquire into the correspondent institution‟s money 
laundering detection and prevention efforts. 
Banks and cash dealers are encouraged to only establish correspondent relationships with 
foreign banks and money transfer service providers that are regulated and have adequate KYC 
policies in place.
730
  The guidelines call for extra scrutiny to be given to financial institutions 
located in countries with poor KYC policies or that have been indicated as being non 
compliant in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing.
731
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8 3   Anti-Terrorism legislation 
 
Zimbabwe‟s anti terrorism laws are not contained within a single piece of legislation but are 
instead contained within various pieces of legislation such as The Public Order and Security 
Act.
732
  The POSA states that it is an offence for any person to engage in any terrorist activity 
within Zimbabwe.
733
  The penalty for engaging in such activity differs depending on whether 
or not the act of terror causes death.  In the event that it causes death the perpetrator can face 
either the death penalty or life imprisonment.  In cases where there is no loss of life the 
sanction imposed is life imprisonment.
734
  Aside from the POSA there are a variety of pieces 
of legislation which deal directly with terrorist activity or its actions that are related to it.
735
   
 
A significant deficiency of Zimbabwean anti-terrorism laws lies in the fact these deal with 
Acts of terrorism on a domestic level.  They do not cater for terrorist actions that are not 
directed towards Zimbabwe.
736
  In realisation that terrorism has to be fought on an 
international level and that Zimbabwean legislation does not actively cater for such, the 
legislature began work on a legislation to suppress foreign and international terrorism.
737
  This 
law is currently in the form of a bill known as the Suppression of Foreign and International 
Terrorism Bill.
738
   
 
Upon coming into effect the SFIT bill shall make it an offence for anyone to actively 
participate in international or foreign terrorist activity and impose a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment for such.
739
  It shall also criminalise the financing of foreign or international 
terrorist activities and provides for an offender to either be fined or imprisoned for a 
maximum period of five years, or face both penalties.
740
  It shall provide for money used for 
the financing of terrorist to be seized in terms of the BUPSMLA.
741
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Zimbabwean anti terrorism legislation does not expressly provide outline any CFT measures 
for financial institutions to implement.  It is submitted that the AML measures imposed upon 
financial institutions by the provisions of the BUPSMLA can equally apply as CFT measures. 
The latter is stated taking into mind that the mobilisation of terrorist funds through use of the 
formal financial system constitutes abuse of the system and that one of the purposes of the 
BUPSMLA is to curb the abuse of the banking system.  
 
 
8 4   Analysis 
 
Zimbabwean AML and CFT legislative framework, in terms of its impact on the formalisation 
of remittances, in not as prohibitive as that which applies in South Africa.  A key example of 
the facilitative role that the AML and CFT legislation play in formalising remittances is 
illustrated by the manner in which personal identity is to be verified.  The KYC procedure 
prescribed by the BUPSMLA and the RBZ accommodate the use of various documents in 
regard to the verification of a client‟s identity, regardless of their nationality.  It is submitted 
that the AML and CFT regime avoids excluding individuals from the formal financial sector 
as far as possible. 
 
A possible barrier to an increased use of formal remittance services, however, lies in the 
manner in which residential addresses must be verified.
742
  Such must be done, in the case of 
Zimbabwean residents and citizens, by means of official documentation such as utility bills 
and in the case of foreigners by way of reference from a reputable financial institution in the 
client‟s ordinary home country or country of residence.   
 
It is submitted that the address verification requisites potentially exclude those who live in 
informal settlements as well as migrants who do not use the formal financial system in their 
countries of origin.  When it comes to verification of residential addresses, Zimbabwe does 
not afford the flexibility that laws such as those in Zambia‟s give nor is there an exemption 
similar to South Africa‟s Exemption 17. 
 
Aside from potentially compromising access to formal remittance services via the address 
verification requisites, another possible barrier to the formalisation of remittances is lies 
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within the RBZ guideline‟s recommendations on correspondent financial relations.743  These 
recommendations call upon banks and cash dealers to only form correspondent relationships 
with financial institutions that are regulated and have adequate KYC policies in places.
744
  It 
is furthermore recommended that these institutions treat financial institutions located in 
jurisdictions without, or that have inadequate, AML and CFT measures with extra 
circumspection.  Money transfer businesses are encompassed within the definition of cash 
dealers
745
 and hence this recommendation may have an impact upon the remittance market. 
 
It is submitted that a potential effect is that financial institutions, should they heed the RBZ 
guidelines strictly, may not form correspondent relationships along certain corridors.  Hence 
migrant labourers affected by the lack of formal remittance services to their home countries 
may have to rely on informal mechanisms.  Another possible effect is a reduction in 
competition along certain corridors, making remittance services along them more expensive 
than they would be under competitive conditions.  
 
 
9   CONCLUSION 
 
AML and CFT measures have been cited as being potentially inhibitive in regard to 
enhancing low-income individual‟s ability to access formal financial services, particularly in 
developing countries.
746
  The additional costs incurred in complying with legislation in 
addition to stringent AML and CFT measures imposed by legislation may have the 
unintended consequence of driving individuals away from the formal financial sector as 
opposed to drawing them within it. 
 
In South Africa, the CDD requisites imposed by FICA prohibit undocumented migrants from 
accessing formal remittance services.  The FICA Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Control Regulations require foreigners to verify their identity by means of a 
passport in order for them to conclude financial transactions.  Migrants who enter the country 
illegally without valid travel documents are thereby unable to access formal remittance 
services due to FICA CDD requisites.  The reprieve granted to South African citizens and 
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residences by FICA regulations,
747
 in regard to the manner in which they may verify their 
identity, does not apply to foreigners. 
 
As a means of guarding against identity fraud, all individuals are required to provide a 
residential address and provide some form of verification for the address they provide.  The 
drafters of the FICA Regulations took into mind that the Act‟s address verification provisions 
could be significantly inhibitive in extending financial access to low-income individuals who 
stayed in informal settlements.  As a consequence Exemption 17 was included within the 
FICA Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations and has absolved 
South African citizens and residents from verifying their residential address, in regard to 
certain transactions and accounts.   
 
Exemption 17 does not, however, apply to foreigners as well as remittance transactions that 
go beyond the CMA.  Furthermore, the Exemption does not relieve remittance businesses 
from complying with the general CDD obligations placed by FICA and its Regulations.  
Migrants who stay in informal settlements subsequently face a possibly insurmountable 
barrier, in the form of the address requisite imposed by FICA, when they seek to use the 
services of formal RSPs such as Western Union, or even those of a bank. 
 
Whilst the need to impose AML and CFT measures is unquestionable and the susceptibility of 
remittance systems to abuse by terrorists and criminals is quite considerable,
748
 it is submitted 
that the objectives sought by AML and CFT legislation could still be accomplished under a 
less stringent regulatory environment.  A less inhibitive regulatory environment would 
actually foster these objectives by drawing more financial transactions into the formal sphere 
making it easier to trace illicit transactions. 
 
As a means of enhancing the formalisation of remittances it is recommended that South 
Africa consider adopting some of the policies implemented in Zambia and Zimbabwe.  For 
instance, in regard to the manner in which a foreigner‟s identity may be verified it is 
suggested that the practice followed in Zimbabwe be implemented in South Africa.  In 
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Zimbabwe a foreigner may use a variety of particulars, such as their driver‟s license to verify 
their identity.
749
 
 
It is further recommended that South Africa consider following Zambia‟s approach to 
verifying residential addresses.  In Zambia a variety of methods can be used in confirming 
residential addresses aside from official documentation such as a utility bill.
750
  A client can, 
amongst other possibilities, rely on a reference from their employee.  Alternatively, taking 
into account De Koker‟s criticism of the address requisite imposed by FICA,751 it is suggested 
that the duty placed upon financial institutions to obtain and verify client‟s residential address 
be extinguished. 
 
Truen et al have proposed extending the application of Exemption 17 to encompass cross-
border transfers that fall within the SADC or Africa as a way of enhancing the formalisation 
of remittances.
752
  At the present moment only remittance transactions that fall within the 
CMA are eligible for the exceptions provided by Exemption 17.  It is submitted, however, that 
for purposes of enhancing the ability of migrants to access formal remittance services it will 
not be enough for Exemption 17 to simply be made applicable to remittances that go beyond 
the CMA.  It would be necessary for Exemption 17 to be amended so as to render it applicable 
to foreigners as well. 
 
It has been stated that some policy makers are open to the idea of expanding the application of 
Exemption 17 to encompass low value cross-border transfers (assumedly those going beyond 
the CMA), possibly with monetary limits that are more stringent in comparison to those 
applied to domestic transfers.
753
  It is submitted that such a stance would be a positive step 
towards increasing the formalisation of remittances 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation was to examine the laws and regulations of South 
Africa that have an influence on the remittance industry, and ascertain whether these hinder 
or facilitate the formalisation of remittances by low income migrants.  The Exchange Control, 
immigration and AML\CFT laws were indicated as being the principle laws and regulations 
in this regard. 
 
The secondary objective was to outline, were felt necessary, possible recommendations on 
how South Africa‟s laws can be adapted so as to facilitate formal remittances by low income 
migrants.  In order to do so the laws of Zambia and Zimbabwe were also examined so as to 
make a comparison with South Africa‟s legal provisions. 
 
Zambia has been selected as it, like South Africa, is a developing country in the SADC and 
has similar laws to those of South Africa which affect remittances but differs in the manner in 
which it applies these in some aspects.  Zimbabwe has also been selected for similar reasons 
as well as the fact that it one South Africa‟s main sources of migrant labour. 
 
 
2 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
2 1   Exchange Control 
 
It was established that South Africa‟s Exchange Control laws have the effect of inhibiting 
formal remittances by low income migrants, more than they facilitate them.  They do so by 
restricting the ability of remitters to access formal financial channels and stifling competition 
within the remittance market.  These prohibitive aspects are presented in three ways which 
shall be outlined within the subsequent paragraphs. 
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2 1 1   Authorised dealer licenses 
 
The Exchange Control Regulations of South Africa state that only persons in possession of 
authorised dealer licenses may deal in foreign currency.
754
  At the present moment the only 
institutions awarded such licenses are banks and bureaux de change.  International remittance 
transactions require providers of such services to deal in foreign currency.  Therefore they 
must be in possession of an authorised dealer license in order to provide remittance services.  
The Post office is the only exception to the latter. 
 
As a consequence of the SARB‟s approach in regard to the institutions it is willing to grant 
authorised dealer licenses to, RSPs that are not banks or foreign exchange bureaus must 
partner with these institutions or the post office if they wish to provide remittance services in 
South Africa.  Such partnerships can affect the ability of RSPs to compete on price as they 
may be constrained by the service costs of the institution that they form a partnership with.  
Aside from the latter another potentially detrimental aspect of such partnerships is the 
possibility of exclusive agreements being implemented.   
 
MTOs such as Western Union often require their agents to enter into exclusive agreements 
which prohibit them from being agents of any other RSP.
755
  In a remittance market such as 
South Africa were entrance by RSPs is not easy and a limited variety of RSPs exist, it is 
submitted that these agreements would exacerbate the barriers to such entry, stifling 
competition even further and subsequently culminating in high remittance costs.  Economic 
theory suggests that were the competitive level in a market is low the price of products and 
services is likely to be higher.
756
  High remittance costs are amongst some of the factors that 
inhibit low income migrants from using formal remittance channels.   
 
 
2 1 2   The reporting of foreign exchange transactions 
 
Regardless of the value involved, all cross-border foreign exchange transactions must be 
reported to the SARB.  Such reporting must be done by means of the SARB Cross Border 
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Foreign Exchange Transaction reporting system within 24 hours of being executed.  An 
authorised dealer cannot commence business prior to installing the system.
757
   
 
The costs of installing the SARB reporting system have been reported to be substantially 
expensive.
758
  It is submitted that the expenses that have to be incurred in installing the 
system may compromise the ability of smaller entities, without a vast amount of resources at 
their disposal, from entering the remittance market.  The need to be in possession of the 
SARB reporting system may thus act as a barrier to entrance into the remittance market, 
subsequently affecting the market‟s competitive level. 
 
The fact that each remittance transaction must be reported upon regardless of the value 
involved increase the costs of providing remittance services.  It is submitted that such costs 
are passed on to the consumer as part of the overall transaction costs and contribute to the 
high fees associated with South African remittance transactions.  
 
 
2 1 3   The residential status of the remitter 
 
The ability of migrants to access formal remittance services is affected by the fact that 
exchange control laws call upon financial institutions to be provided with a valid work permit 
by foreigners, who must also substantiate the source of their funds.  This calls upon financial 
institutions to police immigration laws and prohibits migrants who are working in the country 
illegally from accessing formal remittance services.  
 
 
2 1 4   Recommendations 
 
Firstly, it is suggested that the SARB consider the option suggested by Genesis analytics 
which recommends introducing an ADLA license that caters for remittance businesses.
759
  
Doing so would allow RSPs such as MTOs to operate independently, as is the case in Zambia 
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and Zimbabwe, and can increase the competitive level of the remittance market and 
subsequently lead to lower remittance prices.
760
   
 
Taking into account that remittances are low value payments, RSPs, in the event of incurring 
credit, liquidity, or operational failure, are unlikely to pose systemic risk to the financial 
system.  In South Africa the risk of systemic risk being presented by RSPs is curbed further 
by the fact that they are not able to handle business remittances, which are by nature large 
value payments. 
 
Secondly, in the event that an ADLA license is introduced for the remittance market, it would 
be preferable for the SARB to adopt a more lenient approach in regard to the manner in 
which foreign exchange transactions are to be reported to it by remittance businesses.  It is 
recommended that it consider the options suggested by Truen et al, who recommend 
permitting institutions to report directly to the SARB as opposed to requiring them to report 
strictly via the Cross Border Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System.
761
  Allowing 
such would allow RSPs that lack the funds to invest in the reporting system to partake in the 
provision of remittance services thereby facilitating competition within the market.   
 
Furthermore the SARB could consider allowing such remittance businesses to report through 
institutions that have installed the SARB reporting system.
762
  The latter would make it 
unnecessary for remittance businesses to have an in house reporting system.  In order to 
facilitate the latter, the requirement that foreign exchange transactions must be reported 
within 24 hours would have to be addressed.  Increasing the latter period could, however, 
compromise the efficient monitoring of the country‟s foreign currency reserves.   
 
Thirdly, agency agreements concluded by MTOs and their agents ought to be closely 
scrutinised and those consisting of exclusivity clauses ought to be prohibited.  Such 
agreements are detrimental to competition particularly in a remittance environment such as 
that in South Africa were only authorised dealers may engage in the provision of remittance 
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services and MTO‟s do not operate as standalone entities.  It would be more favourable for 
agents to be able to act as the agents of more than one MTO.
763
 
 
Fourthly, instead of requiring that all foreign exchange transactions be reported to the SARB, 
it is recommended that a threshold amount be introduced.  Only transactions that go beyond 
the specified threshold amount should be reported to the SARB.  Genesis Analytics has 
recommended a threshold amount of R5000.
764
  By setting a threshold amount the cost of 
carrying out transactions on low value amounts would be reduced and formal remittance 
channels will become more accessible for low income remitters.  The downside to the latter 
recommendation is that it would comprise one of the objectives of putting Exchange Controls 
in place, which is to monitor outward and inward movement out of South Africa.  It would 
comprise the accuracy of data on the country‟s foreign currency reserves. 
 
Fifthly, for purposes of formalising remittances it would be necessary for the manner in 
which immigration laws are policed to be addressed.  It is suggested that financial institutions 
be absolved from the need to obtain a work permit from foreigners who are not permanent 
residents of South Africa.   
 
 
2 2    Immigration laws 
 
It was established that the despite the fact that the Immigration Act provides for a variety of 
work permits, these are mainly tailored for skilled migrant labour.  The only work permit that 
can accommodate unskilled migrant labour is the corporate permit.  The corporate permit 
mainly caters for large scale employers such as mining companies, who can prove that they 
have a recurring need for foreign labour.  The permit does not cater for migrant that seeks 
casual employment as, for instance, domestic workers or restaurant staff. 
 
It is submitted that the lack of permits that accommodate migrants without a certain level of 
skill or expertise contributes fuels illegal immigration into South Africa.  Migrants that fail to 
acquire a work permit are forced to enter, and work, in the country illegally.  Such migrants 
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are subsequently unable to access formal remittance channels due to Exchange Control law 
requisites.
765
 
 
Aside from affecting migrant‟s capacity to work in South Africa legally, the Immigration 
laws of South Africa also place an obligation upon financial institutions to police 
immigration laws.
766
  The Immigration Act of South Africa calls upon financial institutions to 
take steps to ascertain the residential or citizenship status of their clients and to examine their 
identity cards or passports, in the case of foreigners. Financial institutions are required to 
satisfy themselves that ex facie that the passport or identity document belongs to the person 
presenting it and that they are legally in the country.   
 
In the event that the financial institution fails to ascertain the person‟s citizenship or 
residential status, or if they establish that the person is illegally in the country, they must 
inform the Home affairs Department.  It is submitted that the obligation placed on financial 
institutions hinders migrants who are not legally in the country from using formal financial 
services as they could face deportation by doing so.  This inclines such migrants to use 
informal mechanisms to remit funds to their home countries. 
 
 
2 2 1   Recommendations 
 
For purposes of formalising migrant remittances it is suggested that the policing of 
immigration laws be separated from the provision of formal remittance services.  Truen et al 
have recommended that South Africa consider adopting a policy similar to that which applies 
in the U.S where undocumented Mexican migrants can access formal financial services by 
using a Matricular card issued by the Mexican Consulate.
767
  They however state that instead 
of an identity card being used, foreigners should be granted access to formal financial 
products on presentation of a valid passport alone without the client residential status being 
taken into account. 
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The above mentioned recommendation could be facilitated further if the approach adopted in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe is considered.  In these countries the immigration laws do not place 
an obligation upon financial institutions to establish the residential status of their clients.  
 
 
2 3    AML and CFT legislation 
 
It was established that the CDD diligence measures contained within the FICA bear 
significant implications for the formalisation of remittances.  These measures call upon 
financial institutions to establish and verify the identity of their clients before establishing a 
business relationship or concluding a once-off transaction.
768
   
 
Verification of one‟s identity is to be done by means of either an identity document, in the 
case of South African residents and Citizens, or a passport, in the case of foreigners.  The 
latter prevents migrants who do not have a passport from accessing formal remittance 
channels.   Room for exception has been granted for South African Citizens and residents and 
they may use alternative verification documentation to verify their identity, in circumstances 
were it is deemed reasonable for them to be unable to provide an identity document.  Such 
exception does not apply to foreigners. 
 
A financial institutions client must also provide a residential address and verify such by 
means of official documentation such as a utility bill.  In South Africa the need to verify 
residential addresses posses a barrier to the formalisation of remittances as a number of low-
income consumers live in informal settlements.  Taking the latter into account the regulators 
created room for exception by means of Exemption 17.  The latter Exemption absolves 
financial institutions from the duty placed upon them to establish and verify a client‟s 
residential address in respect of certain transactions and accounts.   
 
Exemption 17 does not, however, apply to foreigners as well as remittance transactions that 
go beyond the CMA.  Furthermore, the Exemption does not relieve remittance businesses 
from complying with the general CDD obligations placed by FICA and its Regulations.  
Migrants who stay in informal settlements subsequently face a possibly insurmountable 
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barrier, in the form of the address requisite imposed by FICA, when they seek to use the 
services of formal RSP‟s such as Western Union, or even those of a bank. 
 
 
2 3 1     Recommendations 
 
As a means of enhancing the formalisation of remittances it is recommended that South 
Africa adopt some of the policies implemented in Zambia and Zimbabwe.  For instance, in 
regard to the manner in which a foreigner‟s identity may be verified it is suggested that the 
practice followed in Zimbabwe be implemented in South Africa.  In Zimbabwe a foreigner 
aside from using a passport, may use a variety of particulars to verify their identity.  They 
may for instance use their driver‟s license or national identity card. 
 
It is further recommended that South Africa consider following Zambia‟s approach to 
verifying residential addresses.  In Zambia a variety of methods can be used in confirming 
residential addresses aside from official documentation such as a utility bill.  A client can, 
amongst other possibilities, rely on a reference from their employee.  Alternatively, taking 
into account De Koker‟s criticism of the address requisite imposed by FICA,769 it is suggested 
that the duty placed upon financial institutions to obtain and verify client‟s residential address 
be extinguished. 
 
Genesis Analytics has recommended that Exemption 17 be made applicable to cross border 
transfers that fall within the SADC and Africa as a way of enhancing the formalisation of 
remittances.
770
  At the present moment only remittance transactions that fall within the CMA 
are eligible for the exceptions provided by Exemption 17.  It is submitted, however, that for 
purposes of enhancing the ability of migrants to access formal remittance services it will not 
be enough for exemption 17 to simply be made applicable to remittances that go beyond 
CMA.  It would be necessary for Exemption 17 to be amended, so as to render it applicable to 
foreigners as well. 
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It has been stated that some policy makers are open to the idea of expanding the application 
of Exemption to encompass low value cross-border transfers (assumedly those going beyond 
the CMA), possibly with monetary limits that are more stringent in comparison to those 
applied to domestic transfers.
771
   It is submitted that such a stance would be a positive step in 
enhancing the formalisation of remittances 
 
 
3           CONCLUSION 
 
The negative impact that the legal and regulatory provisions of South Africa have upon the 
formalisation of remittances by low income migrants cannot be viewed as an intended 
consequence.  It is instead a by-product of the pursuit of legitimate goals.  It is submitted, 
however, that some of these goals would be attained more efficiently if the relevant legal and 
regulatory provisions were less prohibitive.  It is therefore necessary for the legislature to 
pursue ways in which the objectives of laws and regulations can be attained whilst at the 
same time facilitating the use of formal financial services. 
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